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I.1. INTRODUCTION
Developments in the Spanish economy during 
2002 and in early 2003 unfolded against an adverse 
international background marked by the persistence 
of significant factors of uncertainty that have de-
tracted from the expected pick-up in the world 
economy. The euro area has also been markedly 
weak, showing great vulnerability to external distur-
bances and a scant ability to generate economic 
momentum of its own accord. The weakness in Eu-
rope has evidenced a relative delay in incorporating 
technical progress, the limited headway made in the 
structural reforms needed and the scant headroom 
available to apply counter-cyclical policies owing to 
the presence of certain inflationary biases and the 
tardiness in consolidating public finances. The Eu-
rosystem’s monetary policy managed, however, to 
maintain a growth-sustaining stance, the scope of 
which widened when the risks for price stability 
progressively cleared.
The behaviour of the main macroeconomic vari-
ables shows that the Spanish economy has proven 
notably resilient to the adverse external environ-
ment. And although it has slowed somewhat, it has 
been able to negotiate the cyclical downturn with a 
positive growth rate of around 2%, and has contin-
ued to generate employment at a rate of over 1%. 
Progress in real convergence has thus continued to 
be made in the downward phase of the cycle, which 
is when slippage in this process used to occur.
These results clearly show the benefits reaped 
from the change in macroeconomic regime that ac-
companied entry into the euro area, from the adop-
tion of policies geared to a balanced budget, from 
the anchoring of expectations around low inflation 
rates, from the moderation of wage growth and 
from the structural reforms applied. As a result of 
these changes, the strong monetary impulses gener-
ated by the convergence of interest rates and EMU 
membership – which have made for a strong expan-
sion of credit financing – have been conducive to the 
growth of household expenditure and companies’ 
ordinary profits being achieved in a manner compat-
ible with the general requirements of macroeco-
nomic stability.
Yet these results, in contrast to the difficulties 
besetting a large number of euro area economies, 
are not free from certain factors of risk for the con-
tinuity of real convergence, once the transitory im-
pulses of the initial phase of monetary integration 
gradually peter out. Such continuity will require a 
substantial increase in productivity to complement 
the buoyancy of employment that has sustained real 
convergence in recent years. Also, the prolonged 
expansion of domestic demand, in conjunction with 
the persistence of certain structural rigidities, has 
allowed significant inflation differentials to remain in 
place. Despite the improvement in recent inflation-
ary figures, such differentials may pose a risk for 
competitiveness and growth in the future. Likewise, 
the forceful increase in financing, which reflects the 
natural adaptation to a sustainable scenario of low 
interest rates, is fuelling an overvaluation of house 
prices. High debt levels may, if prolonged, ultimately 
limit the future spending capacity of households and 
firms.
Overall, the economy is potentially poised to 
resume more buoyant growth, once the interna-
tional context improves. Ongoing real convergence 
will increasingly depend, however, on domestic de-
velopments. Consequently, sustaining appropriate 
macroeconomic policies and furthering structural 
reform is of paramount importance. This is vital for 
promoting the generation and assimilation of new 
technologies and securing the productivity gains re-
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quired to ensure competitiveness against the back-
ground of heightened competition resulting from 
globalisation and, above all, from the imminent en-
largement of the European Union. To face these 
challenges, the economy will need to adapt its pro-
ductive specialisation via a reallocation of resources 
that will only be possible if agents, markets and insti-
tutions show sufficient flexibility.
The key recent economic developments analysed 
in this Annual Report thus turn on the deterioration in 
the international climate and European weakness, on 
the resilience displayed by the Spanish economy in 
the recent period and on the challenges that must be 
addressed to ensure continuing real convergence.
I.2.  THE WORLD ECONOMY AMID HIGH 
UNCERTAINTY
During 2002 the world economy picked up to 
some extent following the sluggish pace of activity 
seen the previous year. Nonetheless, growth was 
weak and hesitant, thwarting the forecasts made, 
and was very uneven across the different areas.
In 2001, the international economy had lost a 
striking amount of steam as a result of the crisis in 
the information and communications technology 
(ICT) industry, the marked decline in international 
stock market prices and high oil prices. The terrorist 
attacks on 11 September that year considerably dis-
rupted economic conditions, although their effects 
became only clearly apparent in early 2002. Then the 
deterioration in certain key industries such as air 
transport and insurance and, above all, the fall in con-
sumer and investor confidence, became patently 
manifest. Indeed, the events that day marked the start 
of a phase, still in train, of international political ten-
sion which has seen military conflict in Afghanistan 
and, more recently, war in Iraq. This geopolitical un-
certainty affected financial-market and crude oil pric-
es, which were considerably volatile throughout last 
year. Further, it impacted the foreign exchange mar-
kets, where the dollar depreciated against other cur-
rencies. In particular, the euro appreciated by 14.1% 
against the dollar in 2002. The upward course of the 
euro has continued in the opening months of the cur-
rent year, enabling it to make up the ground lost in its 
cumulative depreciation between 1999 and 2001.
The stock markets were also rocked in 2002 by 
various financial scandals, especially in the United 
States. The irregularities identified in major corpora-
tions’ financial statements highlighted the shortcom-
ings of their management control procedures and 
cast doubt on the veracity of the favourable earn-
ings reported by companies in recent years, which 
contributed to the marked rise in equity prices in 
the second half of the nineties.
The backdrop of international political conflict 
coupled with the unfavourable developments on fi-
nancial and oil markets detracted from the process 
of recovery in the main areas. While, generally, 
economies maintained a degree of cyclical synchro-
ny, assisted by the salient leading role of the US 
economy in the world cycle and the globalisation of 
financial activity, significant differences could be seen 
in terms of the different exposure of each region to 
the aforementioned political and financial distur-
bances, their capacity to adjust and the policies ap-
plied in each case (see Box I.1).
The US economy, despite being directly ex-
posed to the political and financial turbulence, 
managed to increase its growth rate markedly to 
2.4% in 2002 (see Chart I.1). Contributing to this 
was the capacity it showed during 2001 rapidly to 
make part of the adjustment required by the de-
terioration in economic conditions. Private con-
sumption proved notably resilient, underpinned by 
the wealth effects derived from rising house pric-
es (which offset the decline in the value of finan-
cial assets), while employment continued to trend 
adversely. Further, domestic demand was assisted 
by the highly accommodative stance of monetary 
policy, which kept nominal and real interest rates 
at their lowest levels of recent decades. Fiscal 
policy adopted a strongly expansionary stance, on 
both the expenditure and the revenue sides, 
meaning the budget deficit rose to 3.6% of GDP 
last year.
The buoyancy of current expenditure thus al-
lowed the US economy to increase its growth 
rate appreciably in 2002, despite the strong con-
traction (of almost 6%) in non-residential invest-
ment. However, although the private saving ratio 
picked up slightly, the intense resort to mortgage 
lending prevented any reduction in the high rate 
of household debt. The above-mentioned trend in 
public finances led to the re-emergence of a 
budget shortfall on a scale unseen since 1994, and 
prompted an increase in the current-account defi-
cit to close to 5% of GDP.
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BOX I.1
Determinants of the differences in US and euro-area cyclical patterns
In the second half of the nineties the euro-area and US 
cycles moved, as the first panel shows, relatively similarly. In-
deed, the maximum correlation between the cyclical move-
ments in the two areas was about 90% during the 1995-2002 
period, with the US cycle two quarters ahead of that of the 
euro area. This figure is far higher than that obtained if the 
entire period depicted in the accompanying chart is consid-
ered.
The greater cyclical synchrony experienced by these 
economies in recent years has largely been related to the 
influence of global shocks, such as the new technologies cri-
sis, the rise in oil prices and, more recently, the geopolitical 
tension following the 11 September terrorist attacks. The ef-
fect of these global disturbances was amplified by the chan-
nels permitting the international propagation of economic 
fluctuations. Thus, the greater geographical diversification of 
corporate interests and of households’ and financial inter-
mediaries’ portfolios has prompted a greater correlation in 
economic agents’ spending decisions. The progressive trade, 
financial and business integration of the United States and 
the euro area in the world market in recent decades has 
therefore increased the possibility that disturbances that 
arise may have a symmetrical impact on both areas.
Nonetheless, against the background of this greater 
economic integration, the euro area showed a lesser capacity 
for recovery in 2002 than the United States. This evidences 
the euro area’s greater sensitivity to global shocks, testifying 
to which may be the poorer performance of stock market 
prices compared with that in the United States. In the euro 
area, moreover, the greater inertia of wages and of inflation 
(brought about largely by the presence of significant struc-
tural rigidities) means the absorption of shocks is slower. In 
fact, as the second panel shows, both the labour and goods 
markets are more strictly regulated in most euro area coun-
tries than in the United States. That hinders the rapid adap-
tation of the productive system to changes in demand condi-
tions and results in a lesser adjustment of the economy’s 
nominal variables in the presence of shocks. Hence whereas 
in the United States unit labour costs have, as a result of 
wage moderation and higher productivity, reacted more 
swiftly to the economic downturn, allowing margins to pick 
up and business profitability to improve, in the euro area 
they have shown notable downward stickiness (see the third 
panel), due fundamentally to the scant sensitivity of wages to 
general economic conditions.
The presence of structural rigidities also limits the re-
sponsiveness of demand-side policies. The reduction in inter-
est rates in the euro area has thus been more modest than in 
the United States partly because the starting point for the 
former was a lower level at the onset of the downturn, but 
mainly because of the downward stickiness of inflation, despite 
the sluggishness of economic activity (see the bottom panel). 
Budgetary policy in the euro area has also seen its room for 
manoeuvre curtailed by its inability during the upturn to im-
prove the public finances position. Conversely, the comfortable 
budgetary position attained in the United States in the closing 
years of the high-growth phase provided leeway to resort to a 
demand-boosting policy. However, the strongly expansionary 
stance in place recently may, in the medium term, have uncer-
tain effects on the macroeconomic equilibria.
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The Japanese economy remained very weak, in a 
deflationary environment, despite the relative im-
provement in its exports. Behind this was the slug-
gishness of domestic demand, which traditional 
macroeconomic policies had proven incapable of 
checking. Conversely, the south-east Asian econo-
mies showed an appreciable acceleration in GDP, 
closely linked in most cases to expanding exports, 
although in the particular case of China, domestic 
demand was a significant contributory factor to the 
economic buoyancy displayed.
Elsewhere, the Latin American economies posted 
practically zero growth in 2002, due largely to the 
heavy contraction of GDP in Argentina. The other 
main countries in the region maintained positive 
growth rates of between 1% and 2%, although the 
political uncertainty in Brazil contributed to wors-
ening financing and, in particular, public-sector con-
ditions considerably. In any event, increased vigour 
began to be discernible across the area in the sec-
ond half of the year, on the basis of the possibility of 
access to international markets and of the attendant 
cost of financing moving onto a more normal foot-
ing. That said, some of the economies in the region 
remain substantially vulnerable.
Among the main economies in the world, that of 
the euro area was the only one to record substan-
tially lower growth in 2002 than a year earlier. The 
increase in GDP was 0.8%, far below that of the 
other industrialised economies, except Japan. This 
scant growth was moreover mostly based on the 
expansionary contribution of the foreign sector, de-
spite the appreciation of the euro. Internal demand 
– and investment in particular – remained very 
weak, highlighting once again the pronounced sensi-
tivity of the euro area economy to developments in 
its international environment.
Indeed, the euro area economy and its financial 
markets in particular have displayed considerable 
vulnerability to global disturbances. Stock market 
prices and the value of private fixed-income instru-
ments were greatly affected by the general crisis in 
the ICT industry, which was made worse in Europe 
by the deterioration in the outlook for any return 
on major corporate projects undertaken in this sec-
tor. Further, the balance sheets of insurance corpo-
rations, a particularly weighty sector in the European 
economy, were impacted by specific circumstances 
(such as the terrorist attacks in 2001 and floods in 
2002) and, above all, by the diminished value of the 
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equities making up part of their net worth. This, 
combined with the faltering economic activity in 
the area, explains why the declines in the main Eu-
ropean indices were notably higher in 2002 than in 
the United States, and why spreads on corporate 
bond yields should have held at relatively high lev-
els. The higher cost of capital entailed by these de-
velopments (despite the low level of interest rates), 
the increase in non-financial corporations’ debt ra-
tios and the tightening of credit terms in some 
countries contributed to intensifying the decline in 
investment which, in the case of capital goods, was 
around 5%. The scant increase in disposable in-
come, the prevalent uncertainty and the fall in fi-
nancial wealth – which was offset, albeit to a lesser 
extent than in other areas, by the rise in real estate 
values in some countries – account for the slack-
ness of consumption.
In addition to the impact of conjunctural factors, 
the recent course of the economy also reflects its 
structural shortcomings and, in particular, the insuf-
ficient incorporation of technical progress and the 
prevailing inefficiencies in the workings of its mar-
kets. Thus, the increase in labour productivity in 
2002 held at a very low rate, even bearing in mind 
the potential cyclical component, and signs of a re-
covery were only recorded at the end of the year, in 
step with the stagnation of employment. Although 
labour costs moved on a moderate course, the rela-
tive insensitivity of real wages to general economic 
conditions exerted pressure on business margins 
and contributed to slowing job-creation. Finally, 
while consumer prices were subject to the upward 
effect of various supply-side disturbances and, in 
particular, to dearer oil prices, the downward sticki-
ness of inflation, which held at over 2% despite the 
loss of momentum in private expenditure, suggests 
the presence of rigidity in price formation mecha-
nisms which hamper their adjustment to changes in 
aggregate demand. This same rigidity, along with the 
insufficient competition characterising certain indus-
tries and the differing degree of dynamism in the 
various economies, largely explain the current dis-
persion seen in national inflation rates and, above all, 
the persistence of inflation differentials. This hetero-
geneous price pattern, insofar as it is in response to 
structural deficiencies, may have a bearing on the 
relative competitiveness of each economy and cause 
an inefficient reallocation of resources between the 
industries relatively exposed to and those sheltered 
from competition. Moreover, by entailing divergenc-
es in real interest rates, it contributes to generating 
persistent discrepancies in the financial conditions 
prevailing in the euro area Member States.
Given the significance of these shortcomings, the 
limited reforming drive witnessed in most European 
economies is unsatisfactory. This lack of resolve is, as 
acknowledged in the recent EU spring summit, man-
ifest in the slow pace at which the conclusions of 
the respective Lisbon and Barcelona European 
Council meetings in 2000 and 2002 are being imple-
mented. In this respect, and except for the steps 
taken to refine the regulations on European financial 
markets and intermediaries, aimed at the deeper in-
tegration of the markets for financial services, there 
was an evident loss of momentum in the process of 
reform last year. Increased innovation and improved 
conditions for incorporating new technologies into 
productive processes are, along with the achieve-
ment of more flexible markets, matters still to be 
addressed. Successfully doing this will depend, among 
other things, on the European economy improving 
its responsiveness in the future to shocks such as 
those recently experienced.
Although macroeconomic policies have contrib-
uted to tempering the scale of the slowdown, it 
became apparent last year how their capacity to 
support economic dynamism in the euro area dur-
ing downturns is more limited than in other areas. 
The stabilising role of fiscal policy was thus under-
mined in several euro area countries by an absence 
– as a result of the lack of budgetary consolidation 
during high-growth phases – of sufficient leeway that 
would have allowed a more effective operation of 
the automatic stabilisers, without this jeopardising 
compliance with the rules laid down in the EU 
treaty and in the Stability and Growth Pact (see 
Box I.2). Moreover, the difficulties certain Member 
States have faced in keeping their public finances in 
line with the rules established has tested the effec-
tiveness of the mechanisms for the control and 
multilateral surveillance of national fiscal policies in 
the EU. As indicated in the communiqué recently 
released by the European Commission and Ecofin, 
while it is important to fine-tune how compliance 
with the rules is assessed, that should not involve 
any weakening of the commitment made by each 
Member State to maintain a sound fiscal position, 
since this is a requirement for the proper function-
ing of Monetary Union.
The monetary policy decisions adopted by the 
European Central Bank enabled the impact of the 
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slowdown to be lessened without disrupting price 
stability. Interest rates, which were already low at 
the start of the year, were further cut last Decem-
ber as a result of worsening economic conditions. 
More recently, given the deterioration in the out-
look for economic activity – owing to geopolitical 
uncertainty and the continuing slackness of invest-
ment – and the relative tightening of financial condi-
tions resulting from the trend of prices on securities 
markets and from the appreciation of the euro, the 
ECB further adjusted its monetary policy stance, 
lowering its main interest rate to 2.5%. However, 
the ECB’s conduct throughout 2002 and early this 
year was influenced by the downward stickiness of 
inflation, despite the lesser momentum of economic 
activity which, as indicated, was due to various sup-
ply-side shocks and to the insufficient flexibility of 
price- and wage-setting mechanisms.
As part of its assessment of the Eurosystem’s 
monetary policy strategy, the Governing Council of 
the ECB decided in May this year to confirm its 
definition of price stability (originally adopted in 
October 1998) as a year-on-year increase in the 
HICP for the euro area of below 2%, to be main-
tained over the medium term. At the same time, it 
made it clear that, in order to meet its primary 
objective, it will attempt to keep the inflation rate 
close to 2% in the medium term. This clarification 
indicates an undertaking by the ECB to ensure suf-
ficient margin for manoeuvre is available to act as a 
cushion against deflationary risks, and it conforms 
to the possible existence of measurement biases in 
the HICP and to the need to take into account the 
implications of inflation differentials among the 
euro area countries.
The economic conditions prevailing in the first 
half of 2003 preclude any substantial acceleration in 
GDP in the main economies, despite the rapid out-
come of the military conflict in Iraq and its favoura-
ble impact on international stock market and crude 
oil prices. In particular, high household debt levels in 
the United States and job destruction are an obsta-
cle to private consumption taking off. Likewise, the 
state of the current capital adjustment is uncertain, 
as is too – by extension – the outlook for the re-
covery in investment, the financing of which is not 
helped by the growing current-account and fiscal 
imbalances. Further, the health crisis triggered by 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) may 
temporarily impair the growth of some of the 
world’s more dynamic economies.
In the European economy, internal demand re-
mains relatively lacklustre, despite the favourable 
monetary conditions. This is due above all to the 
foreseeable continuity of slack investment, linked in 
part to the corporate balance-sheet restructuring 
process in certain countries. Any increase in private 
consumption will be highly conditional upon the 
course of employment, which has trended unfavour-
ably in recent quarters. Finally, the sharp apprecia-
tion of the euro recently is fuelling the decline in the 
contribution of the external sector to GDP growth. 
It is still to be expected, however, that the absence 
of significant macroeconomic and financial imbalanc-
es in the euro area as a whole will, in a relatively 
short time, provide for a recovery of growth to 
rates closer to the average for recent years.
Finally, mention should be made in this section 
of the enormous challenge to the European Union 
of its enlargement to 25 Member States as from 
next year. In the short run, this entails a need to 
adapt Community decision-making procedures to 
what was laid down in the Nice Treaty. As regards 
the European Central Bank, the recent Brussels 
summit has approved the reform of its Governing 
Council voting arrangements, as proposed by the 
ECB itself. This will allow it to continue functioning 
properly when new countries adopt the single cur-
rency (1). Institutional changes aside, however, the 
EU enlargement will, over the longer term, entail a 
significant qualitative change that will affect both 
the global weight of Europe in the international 
economic setting and the patterns of growth and 
productive specialisation of the various European 
Member States.
I.3.  THE SPANISH ECONOMY’S 
RESILIENCE IN THE FACE
OF AN ADVERSE ENVIRONMENT
In an international setting clouded by uncertainty, 
the Spanish economy achieved favourable results 
last year both in terms of real growth and job-crea-
tion capacity, and of maintaining its macroeconomic 
fundamentals, despite the rebound in the rate of in-
(1) For further details, see the Official Journal of the European 
Union of 1 April 2003, which includes Council Decision 2003/223/
EC, on an amendment to Article 10.2 of the Statute of the Euro-
pean System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, 
and the article in the May 2003 edition of the ECB Monthly Bulle-
tin entitled “The adjustment of voting modalities in the Governing 
Council”.
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BOX I.2
The importance of fiscal discipline for cyclical stabilisation
The experience acquired by OECD countries in re-
cent decades shows that the persistence of fiscal imbal-
ances reduces the possibility of fiscal policy acting as a 
stabilising force; indeed, it makes it necessary to apply 
tight fiscal policies during downturns so as to avoid ex-
cessive budget deficit slippage. The recent international 
economic slowdown has once again highlighted the im-
portance of maintaining sound public finances so that fis-
cal policy’s role as a macroeconomic stabilisation mecha-
nism may be recovered.
The behaviour of fiscal policy in Spain in recent 
decades illustrates the benefits that can be reaped from 
budgetary stability policies (see the accompanying top 
panel). Comparison of the economy’s cyclical position, 
measured by the output gap, and the fiscal policy stance, 
proxied by the change in the primary structural deficit, 
reveals that Spanish fiscal policy maintained a clearly 
pro-cyclical bias (1) in the 1980-1997 period. As a re-
sult, the economic expansion in the 1988-1991 period 
was accompanied by an expansionary fiscal policy that 
made it necessary to concentrate the fiscal adjustment 
during the phase of lower economic growth (1993-
1997). The behaviour of fiscal policy in Spain during the 
latest upturn (1998-2001), in which a slightly restrictive 
stance was maintained on average, is therefore in con-
trast to what occurred in previous economic expan-
sions. Accordingly, the virtually balanced budget position 
at the outset of 2002 has enabled the authorities to let 
the automatic stabilisers operate, thereby contributing 
to economic stabilisation without jeopardising budget-
ary stability.
The conclusions that may be inferred from the anal-
ysis of fiscal conduct in recent years in the four European 
Union countries (Germany, France, Italy and Portugal) 
currently with high budget deficits are along these lines. 
As can be seen in the middle and bottom panels, these 
fiscal imbalances have arisen, above all, from a certain 
abandonment of fiscal adjustment policies in these coun-
tries during the last upturn. The fiscal policy stance be-
tween 1998 and 2001 may even be characterised on the 
whole as pro-cyclical, hence the cyclically adjusted bal-
ance of over 2% of GDP in these four countries at end-
2001. As was to be expected, the current economic 
slowdown has worsened the fiscal position of these 
countries, which has drastically restricted the headroom 
for it to perform its stabilising function. In the case of Portugal, the high budget deficits recorded have even made it neces-
sary to apply restrictive fiscal policies at the height of the economic slowdown.
These events highlight the importance of compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact, which stipulates that a budg-
etary position close to equilibrium be maintained over the medium term. Observing this clause in the Pact would preclude 
the pursuit of pro-cyclical policies and allow for the symmetrical functioning of the automatic stabilisers throughout the 
cycle, in line with the recommendations of the recent Spring European Summit (2).
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(1) Fiscal policy in a specific year is characterised as pro-cyclical when the respective changes, as a percentage of GDP, in the primary struc-
tural deficit and the output gap are of the same sign.
(2) See the conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council of 20-21 March 2003.
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crease of prices and Spain’s continuing positive infla-
tion differential with the euro area countries. Real 
GDP posted a rate of 2% in 2002, 0.7 p.p. down on 
the previous year, but around half a percentage point 
above the average for the euro area. Spanish GDP 
per capita now stands at 84.5% of that of EU as a 
whole. Yet while this is an increase of about six 
points on 1994 (the last year in which there was 
slippage in convergence), it also gives some idea of 
the ground that remains to be covered.
Table I.1, which summarises the main macroeco-
nomic variables for 2002, shows how real GDP 
growth was rooted exclusively in the increase in na-
tional demand (2.3%, only half a percentage point less 
than the previous year), as the net contribution of ex-
ternal demand was negative and subtracted 0.3 p.p. 
from the increase in output (0.2 p.p. more than in 
2001). Once again, household expenditure on con-
sumption and on housing was notably robust, although 
in both cases the related rate tended to moderate as 
the year progressed. Investment in capital equipment 
by companies remained depressed (the situation may 
have begun to ease in the closing months of the year), 
and only private productive investment in construc-
tion showed signs of buoyancy. The impact of general 
government spending on economic activity was also 
positive owing to the operation of the automatic sta-
bilisers. Notwithstanding, the year closed with a negli-
gible deficit, equivalent to scarcely 0.1 p.p. of nominal 
GDP. Foreign trade flows showed no signs of picking 
up until well into 2002, following their marked slack-
ness in the first half of the year. As the rise in exports 
(lower, in any event, than that in imports) became pro-
gressively apparent, industrial activity improved; how-
ever, the unfavourable results of the tourism sector 
adversely affected certain services branches.
The moderate slowdown in real GDP fed 
through to employment, the year-on-year rate of 
change of which in terms of QNA equivalent jobs 
was 1.3% for the year as a whole (somewhat over 
one point down on the figure for 2001), as a result 
of which labour productivity picked up slightly. As to 
the behaviour of prices, the growth rate of the GDP 
deflator climbed to 4.4% during the year. Contribut-
ing to this was the trend of consumer prices, which 
ended 2002 at a rate of 4% and with a differential in 
December, therefore, of 1.7 p.p. (1.4 p.p. for the year 
on average) vis-à-vis the euro area.
The data available for the opening months of 
2003 show that the trends apparent at the end of 
last year have generally been maintained. The growth 
rate of the economy has stabilised at around 2%, 
waiting for the pick-up in the world economy to 
firm. The most dynamic factors thus continue to be 
domestic in origin and they have been boosted by 
the interest rate cut last March and by the entry 
into force of the new personal income tax reform. 
The two most favourable features of this period 
have been continuity in the process of employment 
creation (which has even stepped up) and the slow-
down in consumer prices. As a result, the 12-month 
growth rate of the HICP in April stood at 3%, re-
ducing the differential with the euro area to one 
percentage point.
These results confirm the break, anticipated in 
last year’s Annual Report, by the Spanish economy 
from what was its traditional pattern of cyclical 
behaviour, namely a build-up of substantial disequi-
libria in upturns which were then corrected by 
means of drastic adjustments in growth and in-
creases in the unemployment rate (see Chart I.2). 
The reasons for this change lie mainly in the appli-
cation of macroeconomic policies firmly geared to 
stability and of other microeconomic measures 
that have equipped the economy with greater flex-
ibility. In addition, private agents have assumed pat-
terns of behaviour more in keeping with these 
premises. In particular, the shoring up of sound 
public finances during the expansion years allowed 
for the operation of the automatic stabilisers, as 
the pace of activity progressively slowed, without 
jeopardising the balanced budget. Likewise, labour 
market reforms and the slowdown in wages have 
played a pivotal role, boosting job creation. Moreo-
ver, a more stable setting has encouraged agents to 
make use of their finance-raising capacity to soften 
the effect of the trend of their income on their 
spending decisions.
The greater resilience of the Spanish economy 
to adverse phenomena, which is the corollary of all 
the changes it has undergone, has also been manifest 
during the period under study in its capacity to ab-
sorb the impact of the crisis that struck certain Lat-
in American economies, to which sizable direct in-
vestment flows had been routed in recent years. Al-
though the main investors in Latin America had to 
withstand sizable costs, their financial position has 
remained sound. The overall effects on the pace of 
Spanish growth have also been relatively insignificant 
and, in any event, offset by the economic vigour on 
the home front.
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The growth of the Spanish economy has thus 
been based on increasingly favourable foundations, 
which have enabled the expansionary boost entailed 
by participation in EMU to be harnessed without 
jeopardising the economy’s fundamentals. Further 
real convergence with the EU countries will hinge 
decisively on these foundations firming. That might 
require certain changes in agents’ behaviour in re-
spect of the consumption/investment mix of private 
expenditure and the resort to borrowed funds. It 
will also be necessary to push through reforms con-
ducive to the greater competitiveness of the econo-
my and that help correct the imbalances that have 
begun to be discernible in the form of relatively high 
price growth in certain industries. Although these 
latter price rises are due partly to the persistence 
of the generous monetary and financial conditions 
that have boosted household spending, they also re-
flect the presence of rigidities in the workings of 
certain markets.
In 2002 the continuing real convergence by the 
Spanish economy resided, as earlier discussed, on 
the relative firmness of household spending. In real 
terms, private consumption and residential invest-
ment grew at respective rates of 1.9% and 1.5% 
which, while down on the increases posted in previ-
ous years, jointly accounted for 1.2 p.p. of the in-
crease in GDP last year. The deterioration in the 
sector’s financial wealth, which fell by approximately 
11% as a result – above all – of the contraction in 
equity prices, and the heightened uncertainty sur-
rounding the economy adversely affected household 
spending decisions. Conversely, Spanish household 
disposable income (which once again outpaced 
GDP) and continuing generous financing conditions 
contributed positively to sustaining the expansion of 
these variables.
The increase in household disposable income 
was grounded, first, in the buoyancy of employ-
ment. Despite the slowdown in activity, employ-
ment continued to post a positive rate of increase, 
in marked contrast to previous downturns. More-
over, nominal wages quickened in 2002, although 
the rebound in prices prompted a slight reduction 
in wages in real terms. Along with the role played 
by employee compensation, mention should also 
be made of the positive contribution of general 
government to the increase in household income 
in 2002. This came about via the greater provision 
of welfare benefits and a lesser personal income 
tax take.
�������� ��������� �������� �� ������������ �������� ��� ����� ��
�������
�������� ������������ �� ��� ��������
���������� ���� ��� �������� �����
����� ���
���
����
���
����
����
����
���
���
����
����
��
��
�
�
�
�
�
�
��
��
�
�
�
�
�
�
� �
��� ������
���
����
���
����
����
����
���
���
��������
��
��
�
�
�
�
��
��
�
�
�
�
� �
��� ������ ������������ ���� ���� ����
���������� ������
���
����
���
����
����
����
���
���
����
����
��
��
�
�
�
��
��
�
�
�
� �
����� ���������� ������
����
���� ����
����
����
����
����
����
����
����
��
��
��
��
��
��
��
��
�
�
��
��
��
��
��
��
��
��
�
�
� �
������ ������� �� � �� ���
20 21
The financing received by Spanish households 
as a whole grew by 14% in nominal terms, practi-
cally unchanged on the previous year. This higher 
rate reflects the expansionary nature of the financ-
ing conditions facing households and highlights the 
importance of this factor in holding up their spend-
ing decisions. The expansion of loans was essen-
tially fuelled by the attendant interest rates which, 
after the summer, resumed the declining path on 
which they had moved throughout the previous 
year, owing to expectations that the monetary pol-
icy stance would be relaxed. Such expectations 
were fulfilled in December, against the background 
of heightened bank competition. But the increase 
in credit was also sustained, on the demand side, 
by the behaviour of employment and the rise in 
house prices.
House prices increased by 13% in 2002 in real 
terms. In Spain, as in other countries, owner-occu-
pied housing is a basic component of household 
wealth, whereby higher house prices have boosted 
household spending decisions. It should be borne in 
mind that this rise in prices increases households’ 
possibility of access to financing and thus contrib-
utes to sustaining their consumer spending. Howev-
er, on the data available, mortgage lending would not 
appear to have been earmarked for greater con-
sumption, as has occurred in other countries, but 
primarily for residential investment. The effect of 
higher house prices on consumption has thus been 
channelled via a reduction in the propensity to save, 
partly countering the opposite-running impulses 
stemming from the high degree of uncertainty and 
the deterioration in financial wealth. The net out-
come has thus been a very moderate increase in the 
household saving ratio in 2002.
With the increase in financing received, Span-
ish household debt ratios – while still below 
those for countries such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom or Germany – rose in 2002 to 
the average euro-area level. The sector’s financial 
position remains sound and the course of interest 
rates has meant that the associated financial bur-
den has grown by a lesser proportion than liabili-
ties. That said, the current debt levels involve a 
greater sensitivity of spending decisions to wage 
income, to the interest rates that determine the 
cost of financing received and to the prices of 
both financial assets and, above all, of housing. To 
maintain a balanced financial position and the ca-
pacity to spend, the rate at which resources are 
raised has to move more closely in line with in-
creases in household income.
From this standpoint, the behaviour of house 
prices becomes important. Recent trends can largely 
be explained in terms of the variables underlying the 
behaviour of the supply of and demand for housing, 
and of the habitual pattern of price adjustment in 
this market. Nonetheless, current price levels show 
a certain overvaluation, comparable to that wit-
nessed in similar episodes previously. Accordingly, 
the rising trend of recent years should not be ex-
pected to continue for long; rather, a progressive 
move towards more moderate rates is more likely. 
An orderly process along these lines would be of 
decisive importance for the financial stability of 
households and their spending patterns.
Consequently, the ability of Spanish households 
to continue contributing to the growth of the Span-
ish economy in the coming years will depend essen-
tially on the continuity of the employment growth 
process, hinging less on the factors that have been 
pushing up their debt. Although job creation held at 
what is still a significantly vigorous pace, it ultimately 
proved inadequate to absorb the rise in the labour 
force in 2002. This vigour was not unrelated to the 
moderate behaviour of real wages, the consequence 
of a more-negative-than-expected price perform-
ance in 2002. It should be borne in mind that devia-
tions by the inflation rate from its forecast value 
may endanger the continuity of wage restraint.
In parallel, if the real convergence of the Span-
ish economy is to be soundly entrenched, it is vital, 
in addition to having employment growth as its 
main underpinning, that productive investment 
should emerge from its contractionary phase. That 
depends on companies’ economic and financial po-
sition as well as on the potential return on and the 
risk associated with plans to expand capacity. Ad-
mittedly, the change in the economy’s cyclical pat-
tern has also impacted the behaviour of Spanish 
corporations, which have not been as adversely af-
fected by the current slowdown in activity as in 
previous cycles. The number of bankruptcies and 
failures increased – as was to be expected – in 
2002, but this affected only 0.21% of the sector’s 
total liabilities (0.31% in terms of GDP). According 
to information from the Banco de España Central 
Balance Sheet Data Office, companies’ average or-
dinary return on equity held at around 12%, al-
though the figure was somewhat lower in manufac-
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turing industry than in services or in the energy 
sector. However, for the second year running the 
year ended with a notable decline in business prof-
its. This was due to the heavy provisions made for 
capital and other losses incurred in certain Latin 
American countries and in the telecommunications 
industry. In any event, levels of return are far above 
borrowing costs, meaning that conditions have re-
mained propitious, from this standpoint, to the 
adoption of investment decisions. Foreign direct 
investment, the expansion of which in 1999 and 
2000 may have affected domestic investment, post-
ed a moderate growth rate; consequently, this fac-
tor would not appear to help account for the 
lacklustre investment by Spanish companies last 
year either.
Total financing received by non-financial cor-
porations continued to grow at a relatively high 
rate (14%), which made for a moderate increase 
in their debt ratios. The generous conditions un-
der which fresh funds were raised explain how 
the associated burden nevertheless held stable in 
2002 compared with the levels observed in 2001. 
Thus, although greater volumes of debt mean a 
heightened sensitivity of spending decisions to 
the future cost of refinancing these loans, no 
signs of weakness in the sector’s financial posi-
tion were detected.
Given these conditions, the fall in private pro-
ductive investment in capital goods in 2002 was 
largely due to the uncertainty clouding global 
economic activity. Doubts about the true scale of 
the cyclical slowdown have meant that many com-
panies both in and outside Spain have put back 
their investment plans (even those with a clearly 
positive expected return) until risk returns to a 
more moderate level. Only construction-related 
activity and infrastructure works, which have their 
own dynamics that are more in keeping with do-
mestic considerations, have continued to expand 
notably.
National economic policy instruments have a 
limited capacity to exert influence on these exter-
nal factors shaping business expectations and in-
vestment decisions. However, they can play a much 
more influential role when it comes to promoting 
an efficient and competitive environment that en-
sures the competitiveness of Spanish products, 
both at home and abroad. As a result, as uncer-
tainty progressively clears and the vigour of mar-
kets increases, Spanish companies may be in a posi-
tion to resume the more dynamic investment path 
the economy requires.
Spanish exports in 2002 fared in keeping with 
the behaviour of foreign markets, without any sig-
nificant changes in the related shares in the differ-
ent areas, as has been habitual since Spain joined 
the euro area. In fact, there was a modest increase 
in the export share last year (similar to that in 
2001) owing to the performance in certain non-
Community markets. This was particularly the case 
in the OPEC members and the central and eastern 
European countries, where an overall real growth 
rate of around 5% was attained. The real increase 
in exports to the EU was, however, virtually zero. 
Generally, Spanish products continued to be com-
petitive on foreign markets, although the effects of 
the appreciation of the euro were felt in the sec-
ond half of the year, as some of the habitual indica-
tors show.
As international markets regain momentum, it is 
important that Spanish companies should be in a 
position to increase the presence of their products 
appreciably on foreign markets and to defend their 
share in the internal market. In this connection, the 
efficiency and competitive fundamentals of the 
economy must be improved, as the exchange rate 
can no longer be used to correct mismatches. The 
economy has to face increasingly stiffer competition 
from the EU accession countries, whose productive 
structures and export patterns are, in many cases, 
not so different from those of the Spanish economy. 
From this perspective, the risk that the build-up of 
inflation differentials with the euro area countries 
may pose for continuing competitiveness is a seri-
ous one.
Since the outset of EMU, Spain has had a persist-
ent inflation differential with the average for the 
area, more markedly so in relation to our main trad-
ing partners (France and Germany). This should be a 
cause for concern, since it is very difficult to believe 
that this tendency can continue indefinitely without 
eroding the competitive advantages on which the 
Spanish economy’s position in the European Union 
rests (see Chart I.3). And the more so when the 
relative productivity of the tradable goods sector in 
Spain is below that of the euro-area average, while 
the behaviour of the margins of the non-tradeables 
industries most sheltered from competition contin-
ues to uphold the inflation differences. At issue, then, 
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is a pattern which, if maintained, may pose a risk for 
competitiveness. Like those derived from the rapid 
growth of financing, this risk is related to the loose-
ness of the monetary conditions the Spanish econo-
my has experienced since joining the euro area. But 
it is also a response to the inadequate adaptation by 
certain markets to the new open and integrated en-
vironment.
The rebound in the consumer price index in 
2002 partly reflected the increase in labour costs. 
But the rise was to some extent a temporary 
one, as shown by the data for the opening months 
of the current year. Pressures in the oil market, 
the effect of the introduction of the euro on 
some products’ prices and the upward trend of 
certain food prices all had a bearing on the CPI in 
2002. Last year, moreover, saw the application of a 
new methodology for compiling the index, with 
significant changes in the treatment of certain rel-
evant events such as the sales season. In April this 
year, the 12-month growth rate of the CPI stood 
at 3%, approximately one percentage point down 
on the end-2002 rate. Contributing to this has 
been the performance of food and energy prices, 
along with the substantial cuts in the respective 
rates of increase of services and of non-energy 
manufactured goods prices, which were those 
most impacted at the start of last year by the 
transitory upward effect associated with the in-
troduction of the euro.
This recent improvement in inflation has 
helped reduce the scale of the differential and has 
revealed a greater responsiveness in price forma-
tion to the conditioning factors of demand, po-
tentially paving the way for a correction of the 
recent inflationary biases. In this connection, and 
so as not to jeopardise continuing job creation, 
moderation in the growth of unit labour costs 
would be necessary. In 2003 Q1 these costs in-
creased at a rate of over 4%, due partly to the 
rise in wage costs and partly to the low growth of 
productivity. What is required, therefore, is a firm 
and sustained recovery in business investment so 
as to gain access to the technological innovation 
needed to underpin productivity growth in the 
economy. Wage moderation should also be fur-
ther pursued, so that collective bargaining may be 
accommodative to the improvement in inflation-
ary expectations. Only thus may the economy’s 
competitiveness be maintained so as to ensure 
continuing real convergence.
I.4. HEADWAY IN REAL CONVERGENCE
At present, the main challenge the Spanish econ-
omy faces is to continue growing above the euro-
area average and narrow the distance in terms of 
economic well-being with the core European coun-
tries. From the standpoint of macroeconomic funda-
mentals, Spain’s starting position is a favourable one. 
In future, however, it will not be assisted by the ex-
pansionary demand impulses that have accompanied 
entry into the euro area, and it will be subject to 
the limits, as far as independent demand-side policy 
management is concerned, imposed by EMU mem-
bership. Accordingly, to continue generating employ-
ment, the processes required to entrench a stable 
economic environment, to promote competitive be-
haviour and to provide a soundly underpinned 
growth model must be undertaken.
The process of real convergence followed by the 
Spanish economy in recent years has been mainly 
based on the growth of the rate of employment, the 
productivity gap with the European countries having 
scarcely been corrected. Reflected in this process, 
therefore, have been some of the characteristics of 
the current cycle, in which the intensity of job crea-
tion has proven a key factor in the Spanish econo-
my’s resilience in the face of the decelerating im-
pulses from the rest of the world. However, to en-
sure the long-term sustainability of economic 
growth, it is of paramount importance to boost pro-
ductivity and, therefore, to increase the share of 
equipment investment in the composition of domestic 
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demand and to promote the development of human 
capital (see Box I.3).
The prolonged weakness of investment may ulti-
mately detract from the economy’s growth capacity, 
through its impact on total factor productivity and 
labour productivity. Investment in capital goods usu-
ally acts as a conduit for technical progress and in-
novation, which is why there is normally scant inno-
vation – and, by extension, limited advances in pro-
ductive efficiency – during periods of low business 
capitalisation.
The sluggishness of total factor productivity in 
Spain in recent years appears to reflect the pres-
ence of some of these effects. In turn, the capital/
labour ratio has maintained a moderate growth rate, 
against a background of brisk job creation. These 
risk factors should not however mask the fact that, 
during the current slowdown, this ratio has grown 
more in Spain than in the EU on average, owing to 
the comparatively greater significance of investment 
in infrastructure. Despite everything, therefore, the 
Spanish economy’s capitalisation drive in the recent 
past has contributed to narrowing the differences in 
terms of economic well-being with the euro area 
countries.
Taking real convergence further will, in the new 
circumstances described, impose certain require-
ments on economic policy design. Such policies 
should remain geared to maintaining macroeco-
nomic stability and withstanding the pressures that 
may arise in an environment in which, in all likeli-
hood, the single monetary policy stance will in the 
near future remain relatively loose, as will then the 
monetary and financial conditions for the Spanish 
economy. Within the monetary union, the stabilising 
function at the national level is essentially in the 
hands of fiscal policy. And in implementing fiscal pol-
icy, proper use should be made of its capacity to in-
fluence demand-side conditions. This capacity is lim-
ited, but is of great importance when monetary pol-
icy sovereignty is no longer an option.
Drawing on the budgetary stability laws and the 
latest update of the Spanish stability programme, fis-
cal policy for the coming years is aimed at maintain-
ing sound public finances, giving the automatic stabi-
lisers sufficient room to operate without jeopardis-
ing the objectives of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
At the current cyclical juncture, the attainment of a 
balanced budget in 2002 and its maintenance in 
2003 conform to the need for internal stabilisation. 
But the design of budgetary strategies should bear 
in mind the potential need to address future situa-
tions that might require expenditure-moderating 
measures.
It is also necessary to continue pushing through 
labour market reforms, so that the duality and frag-
mentation problems still evidenced by certain fea-
tures of current hiring arrangements may be allevi-
ated. The collective bargaining system should seek 
a greater and more efficient use of the labour fac-
tor and ensure employee remuneration arrange-
ments in line with the specific conditions of each 
company, along with continuing wage moderation 
in general. The latter factor is pivotal for employ-
ment generation and for setting a low-inflation en-
vironment in place.
Likewise, further liberalisation and deregulation 
are necessary to improve the competitive behaviour 
of the economy and its companies. The structural 
reforms yet to be addressed are vital for ensuring a 
permanent low-inflation scenario. That should pre-
vent the build-up of losses in competitiveness which, 
in the absence of powerful adjustment mechanisms 
(such as the role performed in the past by interest 
rate rises and currency devaluations), could lead to 
a path of low growth, limiting the possibilities of real 
convergence. Reform plans such as those on the 
agenda of the Lisbon and Barcelona European 
Council meetings that simultaneously foster techno-
logical dynamism, market flexibility, the adaptability 
of human capital and a level playing field will tend to 
promote a more efficient allocation and use of re-
sources, both between industries and within compa-
nies. And the economy’s growth potential will be 
greater as a result.
Last year’s Annual Report focused on certain 
structural reforms pending in different areas of the 
economy, namely: the labour market, the network 
industries, land-use and the pensions system. It 
would be worth reiterating here that most of what 
was then said remains fully valid. There have, howev-
er, been significant advances in the labour market, 
where the qualifying criteria for unemployment ben-
efit have been tightened, and the impact on firing 
costs of wages payable after dismissal has been less-
ened. In addition, amendments to the complex regu-
latory framework for land-use need to be consid-
ered with greater urgency, given the importance 
that distortions in this market can have on property 
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BOX I.3
Spain, Portugal and Ireland: three different instances of real convergence following EU entry
Since the second half of the eighties, Spain, Portugal and 
Ireland, three recipient countries of structural funds from 
the EU, have posted higher cumulative growth in terms of 
GDP per capita than the average for the EU. There are, how-
ever, appreciable differences regarding the intensity and com-
position of the real convergence that these economies have 
followed. They are due in part to the significant discrepancies 
in their economic structures (size, degree of external open-
ness and weight of the services sector, among others) and to 
the different starting positions from which they embarked 
on economic integration into Europe, but also to the differ-
ent determinants of economic growth in each country.
As can be seen in the top panel, in 1986 the three 
countries had a lower level of GDP per capita than that of 
the EU average. By 2002, Spain and Portugal had appreciably 
narrowed the gap in terms of economic well-being that they 
evidenced prior to EU entry (attaining levels of income of 
84.5% and 69.2%, respectively, relative to the EU) and Ireland 
far exceeded the average level of GDP per capita in Europe.
The breakdown of GDP per capita into its explanatory 
factors (see the second panel) shows that there are indeed 
appreciable differences in these economies’ growth determi-
nants. In Spain, the narrowing of the differences in terms of 
economic well-being has come about essentially owing to 
greater intensity in job creation, especially in the latter years 
of the period analysed, while apparent labour productivity 
growth has been more moderate than the average for the 
EU. In Portugal, which departed in 1986 from a very favour-
able position in terms of its rate of employment, real conver-
gence has been based on sustained increases in apparent la-
bour productivity, which has increased at a sharper rate than 
in the EU as a whole. Finally, in Ireland, economic growth has 
been driven both by sizable productivity gains and by intense 
job creation, and – particularly in the nineties – by the strong 
increase in the working-age population.
The breakdown of apparent labour productivity, into 
the degree to which primary productive resources are used 
(capital and labour) and total factor productivity (a variable 
which proxies gains in productive efficiency – see the third 
panel), indicates that the contribution of the capital/labour 
ratio to differential productivity growth in Spain and Ireland 
has been influenced by the strong growth of employment in 
both economies. As a result, despite the investment drive 
during this period, its contribution to differential growth vis-
à-vis the EU has been limited. Conversely, in Portugal, which 
started from a considerably lower level of capitalisation, the 
gap in the capital/labour ratio with the EU has been more 
forcefully narrowed. From the standpoint of the consequences for the growth potential of the three economies, the different 
growth rates of total factor productivity may be more important. With all the due caution that such an assessment requires, higher 
increases than in the EU on average are seen in Portugal and Ireland, which are in contrast to a more hesitant growth rate in Spain, 
which is lower than that of the EU as a whole.
Among the determinants that may have had a bearing on the uneven behaviour of factor productivity in these three coun-
tries, mention may first be made of the differing intensity of innovation, which can be tentatively proxied by R+D spending (see 
bottom panel) or by the different weight in output and in imports of manufactures that incorporate the latest technological ad-
vances. Also important to this end is the different rate of accumulation of human capital, which can be proxied, albeit also very 
tentatively, by per-capita public spending on education. As can be seen in the bottom panel, Ireland has outperformed the other 
two countries in each of these indicators.
In sum, the growth patterns displayed by Spain, Portugal and Ireland over recent decades show the correction (to a differing 
degree of intensity in each country) of their main shortcomings: in the cases of Spain and Ireland, the inadequate use of the supply 
of labour available, especially among women and the young, and an insufficient endowment of capital in the broad sense of the 
term; and in Portugal, a bigger lag in the endowment of productive (physical, technological and infrastructure) capital.
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price formation and on labour mobility, not forget-
ting the need to bolster the rental market. All these 
reforms are particularly important in the light of the 
challenges posed by advancing globalisation and, 
above all, the EU enlargement.
Economic policy requirements aside, it should be 
stressed that, to ensure a high growth rate in the 
medium term, certain features characterising the 
Spanish economy’s growth model in recent years 
should be modified. Also, some of the limitations on 
its productive specialisation and trading patterns 
need to be lifted. In this respect, the growth of the 
Spanish economy, which has been reliant in recent 
years on private consumption and residential invest-
ment, should move towards a productive invest-
ment- and export-led pattern. As seen, such a 
change is necessary to overcome some of the weak-
nesses discerned in recent developments that could 
curtail the intensity of economic recovery.
The robust rise in investment in construction in 
recent years has contributed to increasing the 
weight of this industry in GDP to above European 
levels. As construction is highly sensitive to interest 
rates, especially in its residential component, it has 
benefited exceptionally from the loose monetary 
conditions currently prevailing. The industry has 
managed to remain highly dynamic, and the operat-
ing margins of construction companies have in-
creased. In this way, the construction sector has ab-
sorbed resources which, under other circumstances, 
might have been channelled towards financing in-
vestment projects with a greater impact on growth 
potential. However, the expansionary course of con-
struction in recent years is partly linked to the 
process of real convergence, the requirements of 
which include the development of the infrastructure 
needed to improve economic efficiency, and the ex-
tension and modernisation of residential capital.
In respect of manufacturing industry, there are 
two angles to developments in recent years. On the 
positive side are features linked mainly to the proc-
ess of European integration and external openness, 
while the reverse side suggests risks regarding the 
industry’s ability to compete in an increasingly glo-
balised economy in which the EU enlargement from 
2004 will heighten competition. The positive features 
include, first, the significant gains in the share in out-
put and in manufactures exports since EU member-
ship; and further, the approximation of productive 
and trade structures to the European model, in 
which manufactures with a higher technological con-
tent have been gaining weight to the detriment of 
the more traditional labour-intensive industries with 
low technological requirements.
In Spain, this change in productive specialisation 
has had most significant consequences, as it has en-
tailed the transformation of the model on which its 
industrial development had been based prior to EU 
entry. In this respect, the shifts in manufacturing out-
put reveal a diversion of resources from industries 
undergoing intense restructuring (such as basic met-
als or shipbuilding), or from the activities most af-
fected by growing competition from the newly in-
dustrialised countries (mainly textiles and footwear), 
towards industries with greater growth potential 
occupying a key position in terms of the patterns of 
demand in the developed economies (the produc-
tion of motor vehicles and of machinery and me-
chanical equipment). Generally, direct investment 
from abroad has favoured this change in productive 
specialisation.
Significantly, however, the switch towards manufac-
tures with a higher technological content has not ex-
tended to high-tech activities (the production of com-
puters and electronic equipment, among others), which 
are those where the biggest productivity gains in this 
period have been seen. Moreover, this characteristic of 
the Spanish productive system has not been offset by 
more buoyant imports of this type of good, and nor 
has a significant inflow of foreign direct investment to-
wards these activities been detected.
The tertiary sector, for its part, has become in-
creasingly important in recent decades, in step with 
the increasingly service-based orientation of the 
more developed economies. Nonetheless, the in-
crease in the share of the services industry in GDP 
and in employment in the economy as a whole has 
been mainly based on the expansion of non-market 
services (i.e. those supplying the public sector); the 
growth of market services has been lower and, in 
any event, below that of the European economies. A 
particularly relevant case in point is that of services 
relating to the new information and communications 
technologies (such as IT services or business serv-
ices), which are essential for increasing productivity 
and have taken up a leading and dynamic role in the 
world economy.
Particular attention in the services sector should 
be paid to tourism, since this is one of the Spanish 
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BOX I.4
Future enlargement of the EU: some implications for the Spanish economy
The enlargement towards Eastern Europe is one of the 
major challenges facing the EU in the next few years. The 
size of the new EU partners and their heterogeneity com-
pared with the current members confers special characteris-
tics on this new enlargement, the implications of which will 
make themselves felt in numerous areas of the EU’s political, 
institutional and social workings.
Before commencing the membership process, the ac-
cession countries (Cyprus, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Hunga-
ry, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and the Czech Republic) 
generally had production structures strongly focused on in-
dustries making intensive use of natural resources and un-
skilled labour, although some of them had structures in 
which metallurgy and the production of capital goods and 
transport equipment were strongly represented. In recent 
years these economies have made notable efforts to adapt 
themselves to and integrate themselves commercially and fi-
nancially with the EU countries, while at the same time over-
hauling their organisational and business structures.
The first panel shows the structure of bilateral trade 
between Spain and the ten accession countries and the trade 
performance – based on indices of revealed comparative ad-
vantage – for 1995 and 2002. As can be seen, Spain’s trade 
pattern with these countries differs from that with other 
less developed economies to which Spain exports basically 
technology-intensive products and from which it imports la-
bour-intensive goods. The main difference is in imports, 
where Spain’s purchases from the new members consist 
predominantly of medium-high technology manufactures, 
with a growing (although moderate) weight of high-technol-
ogy manufactures. Meanwhile, the structure of Spain’s ex-
ports to the Eastern European countries displays a high and 
growing concentration in the medium-high technology in-
dustries, with motor vehicles to the fore.
Analysis of the comparative advantage indices reveals 
Spain’s favourable balance in its bilateral trade relations with 
these countries, which have over the years had to weather 
the dismantling of tariffs vis-à-vis their future EU partners. 
This performance is underpinned basically by the medium-
high technology industries, particularly chemicals and motor 
vehicles, although the latter declined appreciably during the 
period analysed. By contrast, the trade balance in the higher-
technology industries deteriorated appreciably.
The second panel shows that the pattern of productive specialisation of these countries has gradually shifted towards 
the higher-technology industries. Indeed from 1995 to 2000 – the latest year for which information is available – the most 
dynamic sectors were, in addition to motor vehicles, those producing ICT goods. Thus the Spanish production structure cur-
rently exhibits certain similarities with that of these countries, although in the latter the high-tech industries have greater 
weight.
These transformations are closely tied to the considerable inflow of foreign direct investment and to the strategy of multina-
tionals, which have tended to concentrate in certain strongly export-oriented high- and medium-high technology industries, and in 
other low-technology industries such as food, beverages and tobacco, which produce mainly for the domestic market. This devel-
opment, along with the favourable performance of other indicators relating to investment in technology and human capital forma-
tion and to the accession countries’ advantages in terms of labour costs, is evidence that the pattern of productive specialisation 
being pursued by these countries entails certain elements of risk for Spain’s position as a supplier to EU countries and for its abil-
ity to sustain competitive positions in third-country markets. Furthermore, the Spanish economy’s commercial and financial pres-
ence in the Eastern European countries, despite having increased in recent years, remains at very moderate levels, thereby limiting 
its potential for participating in the expansion of these countries.
�������� ��������� ������������ �� ������� ��� ����� �� ���
�����
��� ���������� �� ��� ������� �� ������� �� ���� �������� ����� ��
�������� �� ����� ����� �� ���� �������� ���� ��������� ��������� ������
��� �� � � �� ����
��� ������� �� ��� ���������� �� ��� ���������� ���� ����� ���
���� �� ����� ��������� ����������
��� ������ ����� �� ���� ��� �����
����� �����
���������
���������
��� ����������� ��� ��� ��� ���
������ �������� �� ��������� ��� ��� ��� ���
����� �� ����� ������� ��� ���� ���� ����
������ ����� ��� ���� ���� ���
���������� �� ������������� ������� ����� �������
��� ������ ����� ������
��
��
��
�� ��
�
�� ��
��
��
��
��
�
�� ��
��
�
��
��
��
���� �������
����
�������
���
��� ���� �������
����
�������
���
���
�
��
��
��������� �������
����
����
� �
��������� �� ������� ������� ����� ���� ���
��������� ��������� �� ����� �� ������������� ���������
��
��
��
�
��
�
��
��
��
�
��
��
�
�� ��
��
�
��
��
��
��
���� �������
����
�������
���
��� ���� �������
����
�������
���
���
�
��
��
��
������� ���������
���������
��������� �� ��� ������� �� ������������� ������
����
����
�
��
��
��
��
���
�
��
���
���
���
��
��
���� �������
����
�������
���
��� ���� �������
����
�������
���
���
���
���
���
��
��
���� ����
�����������
���������� ���
28
economy’s main sources of activity and of employ-
ment generation. The diminished buoyancy of recent 
years reflects the slowdown in the world and Euro-
pean economy; and this deceleration may have been 
amplified following the heightening of uncertainty in 
the wake of the events of 11 September 2001. Yet 
the impact of other, structural factors cannot be 
ruled out. The limited diversification of the supply of 
tourist services or insufficient advances in the quali-
ty thereof may ultimately affect Spain’s standing as a 
leading tourist destination. The biggest risk, however, 
stems from cost and price rises, which may prompt 
losses in competitiveness, especially in competition 
with countries that have retained the flexible man-
agement of their exchange rate.
In sum, the changes in the Spanish productive 
and trading structure confirm its proven capacity to 
adapt to a more competitive and increasingly glo-
balised environment. But they also indicate a certain 
lag in incorporating the latest innovative technolo-
gies, which has consequences not only for the dyna-
mism of these productive branches but also for the 
rest of the economy. That may ultimately hold down 
the productivity gains needed for sound headway in 
convergence.
Following the success of the process of Europe-
an integration and during the initial stages of partici-
pation in monetary union, the forthcoming EU en-
largement will bring additional competitive pressures 
to bear and pose new challenges for the Spanish 
economy as a whole. These stem mainly from the 
great similarity to our productive and trading struc-
tures of those of the accession countries, which 
have undergone rapid transformation, spurred by 
the substantial direct investment flows they have re-
ceived (see Box I.4). Under these circumstances, 
heightened competition will be mainly to be found 
in those medium and medium-high technology in-
dustries in which the Spanish economy has special-
ised in recent years. It is significant in this respect 
that, while these industries are the most dynamic 
core of output and those where the highest propor-
tion of foreign sales is concentrated, the associated 
foreign direct investment flows have slowed in re-
cent years. Moreover, some of these countries are 
considerably increasing their capacity to compete in 
the international market for tourist services.
Consequently, maintaining a competitive produc-
tive structure will involve reducing the risk of delo-
calisation of medium- and medium/high-technology 
manufacturing activities. But an effort must also be 
made to prevent the weight of industries in which the 
Spanish economy has traditionally maintained a com-
petitive edge from diminishing further, as a result of 
pressure from the newly industrialised countries. To 
address these challenges, the localisation and cost ad-
vantages offered by the accession countries must be 
countered through adopting differentiation strategies, 
improving the quality of goods and services and in-
creasing productive efficiency via innovation, capitali-
sation, investment in human capital and the efficient 
working of factor and product markets.
In short, progress in macroeconomic and budg-
etary stability, the structural reforms undertaken 
and the headway in real convergence have left the 
Spanish economy well positioned to resume a more 
dynamic growth path, once the uncertainty clouding 
the recent past is dispelled. It may thus continue 
drawing closer to the standards of living and well-
being of the more developed countries. To do this it 
will no longer be able to rely on some of the stimu-
li that stemmed from the effects generated by entry 
into the euro area; rather, it will depend on homeg-
rown capacity for economic expansion. Prolonging 
the path of real convergence will require more of 
an investment- and export-led growth standard. 
And to attain that will involve implementing policies 
that ensure macroeconomic and budgetary stability 
and promote the liberalisation of the economy, the 
competitiveness of firms and more flexible markets. 
Such a gearing of policies is now particularly neces-
sary, first, to avoid risks arising from inflation differ-
entials and from excessive private-sector debt; and 
further, to promote, in turn, productivity gains and 
enhance competitiveness via a productive speciali-
sation model tailored to tackle the challenges posed 
by economic globalisation and, in particular, EU en-
largement.
CHAPTER 1I
THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE EURO AREA
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II.1.  A WEAK AND WAVERING 
RECOVERY
Following the marked decline in the pace of eco-
nomic activity in 2001 prompted by the crisis in the 
ICT industry, the slump in stock market prices, 
dearer oil and, in the second half of the year, the in-
ternational political tension stemming from the 11 
September attacks, the world economy picked up 
last year, with inflation holding at a low rate. 
The brisker pace of activity in the external envi-
ronment of the euro area was, however, generally 
moderate, hesitant and not as sharp as had initially 
been foreseen, despite the more expansionary 
stance of the macroeconomic policies adopted. The 
differences in economic developments across the 
various regions were also notable, as was the 
marked dependence of the rest of the world on the 
United States.
When explaining the weakness of the recov-
ery, two factors should be borne in mind: first, the 
adverse impact of various shocks on agents’ confi-
dence; and further, the persistence of certain dis-
equilibria which were not sufficiently corrected 
during the preceding downturn. These features 
have lasted and, in the case of geopolitical uncer-
tainty, have in fact heightened during the opening 
months of the current year. As a result, entrench-
ing the recovery will hinge closely both on the 
ebbing of international political tension, now the 
Iraq war is over, and on applying solutions for the 
substantive problems underlying the international 
economy.
Undoubtedly, the tempered increase in activity 
and the fact GDP remains below potential in most 
regions largely account for inflation having held at 
a low rate, despite the oil price increases last 
year. In turn, this situation contributed to mone-
tary policies remaining fairly accommodative, 
while fiscal policies adopted a more expansionary 
stance. That said, there were notable differences 
in the room for manoeuvre available to the re-
spective national authorities and the use they 
made of it.
Against an international backdrop of globalisa-
tion, trade is an important conduit connecting the 
various countries’ economies. In this respect, it is 
telling that, following the stagnation of world trade 
the previous year, it should have grown only mod-
erately in 2002 – at a rate of 2.9% – and slowed 
during the second half of the year. The expansion 
of trade has thus been considerably less than that 
seen on average during the nineties (6.3%), and less 
too than might have been expected given the 
growth of the world economy last year. Significantly, 
despite progress in certain bilateral negotiations to 
boost trade liberalisation, the multilateral negotia-
tions under the Doha Round have come to some-
thing of a halt.
A key characteristic of the pick-up in 2002 is 
the high dependence of world growth on the US 
economy. Although the slowdown the previous 
year placed the three main developed areas in a 
synchronised position at the bottom of the cycle, 
recovery was more clear-cut in the United States 
(where GDP growth climbed from 0.3% in 2001 
to 2.4% in 2002). Meanwhile, in the euro area, 
growth was lower (0.8%, against 1.4% the previ-
ous year), and the Japanese economy remained 
beset by stagnation and deflation (see Chart II.1 
and Table II.1). The main Anglo-Saxon countries 
(United Kingdom, Canada and Australia) also of-
fered a relatively more buoyant performance in 
2002, as did the central and eastern European 
and, above all, the south-east Asian countries. 
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Conversely, Latin America saw its output shrink 
for the first time in 20 years.
Even in the most buoyant countries or regions in 
2002, the recovery was also weak and, in the second 
half of the year, growth turned downwards. There 
follows a brief review of the factors behind the slug-
gishness and wavering nature of the recovery (see 
Chart II.2).
Since the 11 September attacks in 2001, the 
world economy has moved in a climate of substan-
tial uncertainty, which has progressively under-
mined consumer and business confidence. This ef-
fect was amplified by the rise in oil prices, which 
climbed from $20 to $31 per barrel last year and 
reached $34 in the opening weeks of 2003. Follow-
ing the Iraq war, however, oil prices dipped to 
more moderate levels, albeit showing notable vola-
tility. The oil price hike was not solely attributable 
to the situation in Iraq but also to domestic politi-
cal problems in other producer countries, such as 
Venezuela.
The composition of demand in most industrial-
ised countries, which is very biased to consump-
tion to the detriment of investment, is one of the 
factors of concern regarding the fragile recovery 
under way. The slackness of investment is closely 
related to the excesses of the late nineties when, 
in a climate of euphoria over the booming new 
economy, particularly in the United States, compa-
nies built up a stock of capital which ultimately 
proved excessive. Despite the drastic adjustment 
of over-investment since 2001, there is uncertainty 
over whether this slack has been fully taken up, al-
though the low capacity utilisation levels, especially 
in the United States, suggest that the adjustments 
are not complete, at least in certain industries. In 
these circumstances, the processes of corporate 
financial restructuring have perhaps further curbed 
investment decisions.
The decline on stock markets was also initially in-
duced by the excesses of the second half of the nine-
ties. Compounding this further was the impact of a 
more uncertain international climate and the scandals 
concerning major corporations’ financial statements, 
especially in the United States. Under these circum-
stances, financial intermediaries and non-financial 
corporations had a greater preference for safer, more 
liquid assets, which explains the momentum behind 
public debt markets throughout the year.
Although some of the imbalances in the world 
economy have begun to be corrected (cases in 
point being the overvaluation of stock markets 
and the exchange rate of the dollar), others have 
worsened. The latter include most notably the in-
crease in current-account imbalances between 
the main economies (see Chart II.3), the risks 
that the strongly expansionary fiscal policies re-
cently pursued in certain countries entail for the 
medium- and long-term sustainability of public fi-
nances, and, finally, the high levels of household 
debt, associated in many cases with heavy increas-
es in house prices.
An additional factor that may have contributed 
to holding back recovery in 2002 has been the per-
sistence of problems in certain emerging econo-
mies, which are analysed in a subsequent section of 
this chapter. This characteristic has been a constant 
in the world economy since the Asian crisis broke 
in 1997, whereafter bouts of financial instability 
have successively occurred in emerging countries, 
albeit with different protagonists. These upheavals 
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have prompted extensive reflection on how to im-
prove crisis-resolution mechanisms (see Box II.1). 
There have since been notable improvements in 
the international financial system, however. These 
have led to greater transparency in respect of in-
formation from national authorities and to a better 
ability on the part of the financial markets to dis-
criminate between countries. Overall, the outcome 
has been less contagion. This was particularly evi-
dent last year, if regard is had to the discrepancies 
between developments in most of the Asian and 
central and eastern European emerging countries 
– whose debt differentials narrowed and whose 
currencies generally appreciated – and most of the 
Latin American countries, joined by Turkey in the 
second half of the year, where developments were 
in the opposite direction.
Although the central scenario of the outlook for 
2003 continues to point to a gradual pick-up in 
world activity, uncertainty over the situation in the 
Middle East is clouding the horizon. It is thus to be 
hoped that overcoming geopolitical tensions will 
contribute to creating a more propitious climate for 
entrenching the recovery during the current year. 
Nonetheless, for this to occur an orderly solution 
must also be found for the problems underlying the 
international economic situation.
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II.2.  THE MAIN INDUSTRIALISED 
ECONOMIES
II.2.1. United States
The US economy posted moderate growth of 
2.4% in 2002, following the previous year’s reces-
sion, which resulted in an increase in GDP in real 
terms of only 0.3%. The fact that this improved 
rate was attained under very difficult conditions, in 
general, largely reflects the flexibility of its eco-
nomic system. However, a more complete assess-
ment should note that the recovery witnessed last 
year had an irregular profile and was more luke-
warm than on previous occasions, a fact attributa-
ble in part to the particularities of the preceding 
recession (see Box II.2). Given below-potential 
GDP growth, inflationary pressures were generally 
contained, despite dearer oil, meaning that the in-
flation rate fell, in annual average terms, from 2.8% 
in 2001 to 1.6% in 2002.
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BOX II.1
Recent discussions on sovereign debt restructuring
Countries facing financial crises can cover their external financial shortfall in three ways: internal adjustment, official financing 
and private-sector participation in resolving financial crises. Internal adjustment measures do not, in many cases, suffice to offset 
heavy capital outflows. Therefore, the rest of the existing gap has to be bridged with – more or less voluntary – participation by 
the private sector and with official financing, generally from the IMF.
Private-sector co-operation in resolving crises is fully justified. For one thing, limited official resources are not enough to 
cover the volume of financing needed to resolve the current crises. For another, even if this were possible, it would not be desir-
able, given the increase in so-called “moral hazard” entailed on the part both of the creditor and of the debtor.
The debate surrounding private-sector participation in resolving financial crises has focused on seeking to ensure that debt 
restructuring processes are, when inevitable, undertaken as soon as possible and in an orderly fashion. Countries facing acute fi-
nancial crises are generally reluctant to embark on restructuring processes and delay this decision, which frequently makes the 
crisis worse, increases its costs and the scale of adjustment required, and leads to a greater delay in regaining access to capital 
markets.
One of the factors behind this belated reaction is uncertainty over the outcome of debt rescheduling, owing to the co-ordi-
nation problems between the debtor and its creditors and among the creditors themselves. The latter may, individually, try to re-
coup their debt as soon as possible or to block the restructuring process for their own benefit, instead of reaching a joint solution. 
In recent years, the increase in bond financing has hampered sovereign debt restructuring processes owing to the rise in the 
number of creditors and the variety of jurisdictions in which such bonds are issued.
The international financial community has attempted in recent years to establish a framework which: a) encourages the 
reaching of restructuring agreements and prompt dialogue between debtors and creditors; b) allows co-ordination and collective 
action problems to be resolved; c) properly safeguards creditors’ rights and the value of their assets; d) promotes equitable treat-
ment among the various creditors; and e) reduces the need for official financing, whether bilateral or multilateral.
The approaches for crisis-resolution currently under discussion may, though different, be considered as more complementary 
than alternative:
a) The inclusion of collective action clauses (CAC) in bond issuance contracts. Faced with the risk of a debt restructuring 
process grinding to a halt owing to a small minority of creditors, these clauses restrict their ability to block such agree-
ments; their use might therefore provide for more orderly restructuring. The inclusion of CACs is voluntary, so their 
implementation should be incentive-based. They are effective in resolving collective action problems between the debtor 
and the holders of the instrument that contains them, but they are not applicable to the rest of the debt. To maximise 
their use, they should be employed for all types of debt, their wording should be standard and interpretation by the 
courts should be uniform.
 The most frequent CACs are: majority action clauses, in which the restructuring terms agreed by a majority of creditors 
is also binding upon the dissident minority; collective representation clauses, which facilitate majorities being obtained by 
allowing bondholders to delegate to representatives; and sharing clauses, which mean that creditors who have managed 
to collect on their claims through litigation must share on a proportional basis with other bondholders.
b) The sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM). This IMF proposal would be applied to crisis situations involving 
unsustainable debt, in which obtaining a viable debt profile in the medium term would inevitably entail the reduction of 
its current net value. It would be based on a centralised framework with an international legal underpinning. Moreover, it 
is planned to set up a forum for resolving disputes, with administrative (notifications, creditors’ register, administration of 
voting, etc.) and quasi-legal (resolution of disputes between debtors and creditors, and among creditors) powers. The 
essential feature of the SDRM, and at the same time its principal advantage, is that it would enable the agreement adopt-
ed by the debtor and a majority of creditors to be binding on all the parties, thereby resolving the problems of discrimi-
nate application to different types of debt (the aggregation problem). The mechanism leaves the main decisions to the 
agreement between the debtor and the creditors. Further, to prevent litigation from hampering agreements being 
reached, the SDRM could include the temporary suspension of creditors’ rights to initiate legal proceedings against the 
debtor country. Likewise, the provision of new financing by the private sector could be encouraged, with a preferred 
creditor status being conferred. Despite the intense discussions it has sparked, there would not so far appear to be suf-
ficient support behind the SDRM as to advance its adoption in the near future.
c) There have also been proposals at recent IMF meetings to develop a code of good conduct for debt rescheduling. Based 
on a set of principles and good practices, such a code would clarify the role of all participants and allay uncertainty over 
the final outcome of the restructuring process. Some versions of this code include CACs and other elements for crisis-
resolution, such as consensual suspension of payments or voluntary fora for the resolution of debtor/creditor disputes. 
The code would be voluntary and its implementation would be based on incentives and on the idea that market pressure 
would drive its adoption and application. The code could be used in any type of crisis, with sustainable or unsustainable 
debt, in which rescheduling were deemed advisable.
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In terms of demand components (see Chart II.4), 
and apart from the technical rise in stocks in Q1, 
growth last year was essentially underpinned by the 
buoyancy of private consumption, which grew by 
3.1%. Acting in favour of this were the impulses 
stemming from very expansionary fiscal and mone-
tary policies, which provided, on one hand, for a sig-
nificant increase in personal income and, on the 
other, for the reimbursement of a portion of real-
estate capital, in a setting of lower mortgage interest 
rates and house price rises. These factors tended to 
counter the unfavourable impact on household 
spending of the deterioration in confidence, the 
stock market decline and the fall in employment.
Conversely, gross fixed capital formation contrib-
uted negatively to growth, in a year marked by the 
relatively unfavourable outlook for corporate earn-
ings, misgivings about the mechanisms for the gov-
ernance and control of major corporations and, 
generally, international political tensions. Finally, the 
external sector also contributed to reducing growth, 
as exports were hindered by the economic situation 
in the rest of the world, despite the depreciation of 
the dollar in effective terms.
The monetary policy stance remained very ac-
commodative during 2002. The absence of inflation-
ary risks allowed the Federal Reserve to hold its 
target interest rate at 1.75% as from the start of the 
year and, in November 2002, to cut it to 1.25% in 
the light of the evident signs of a slowdown in activ-
ity. The proximity of interest rates to zero, against a 
background of low inflation rates and downside 
growth risks, has prompted some concern about 
the limited margin for manoeuvre currently available 
to the monetary authorities to counter the adverse 
effects stemming from the possibility of such risks 
materialising.
The expansionary fiscal policy, which began with 
tax cuts in 2001 and continued with the stimulus 
package introduced in March last year, led to a rapid 
and considerable deterioration in public finances, 
where there was a turnaround from a surplus of 
1.2% of GDP in 2000 to a deficit of 3.6% in 2002. In 
2003, with the recently approved measures cutting 
taxes on dividends and capital gains and the bringing 
forward to this year of the tax cuts initially envis-
aged for subsequent years, as well as military spend-
ing in Iraq, the deficit is expected to far exceed that 
of 2002. In any event, the biggest problem with pub-
lic finances is their sustainability over the long run. 
In this respect, the recent stimulus measures would 
reinforce the pressures stemming from greater 
spending on health care and pensions and might 
prompt an increase in future deficits and higher in-
terest rates in the long term, as well as hampering 
the adjustment of the balance of payments. In turn, 
the legislative rules which, in the last decade, man-
aged to cap spending increases based on the growth 
of nominal GDP, are no longer in force. And there is 
no perceptible possibility of their being re-enacted, 
which further hinders control of the budget deficit 
in the future.
One favourable aspect of the recovery was the 
ongoing increase in productivity. It grew by 4.8% in 
2002, underpinned both by increases in the volume 
of output, the result in part of the technological 
improvements introduced in previous years, and by 
the flexibility of corporate staff adjustments (see 
Chart II.4). The rise in productivity had a clearly 
cyclical component last year. That said, this increase 
is in any event particularly notable if regard is had 
to the fact that the average for the last 20 years 
���
��
�
�
��
��
���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ����
���
��
�
�
��
��
�������
�����������
��������
���������� ���
� �
������� ����������� ��� �������� ����������
������ ������� ���� ������ ����������
������ ���������� ������
����� ����
������� �������� ���������� ��� �����
��� ��������������� ����� ����� ������� ���������
��
�
�
�
�
�
���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ����
��
�
�
�
�
�
������������
����������
� �
������������ ��� �������� ����������
36 37
BOX II.2
Characteristics of the current recovery in the United States
The current recovery in the US economy evidences 
specific characteristics distinguishing it from previous recov-
eries and which are rooted in the particular way in which 
the recession in 2001 was managed and in the authorities’ 
reaction at that time. The recession began after the longest 
upswing seen in the post-war period, which lasted 10 years 
from March 1991 to March 2001 (according to the National 
Bureau of Economic Research). This upturn was accompa-
nied by a likewise unprecedented speculative bubble on the 
stock markets. The bursting of this bubble, collapsing busi-
ness profits and the strong downward adjustment of the ex-
cess productive capacity that had built up were among the 
main causes triggering the 2001 recession. Adding to these 
characteristics is the geopolitical uncertainty that has been 
present throughout the recovery, which was reflected last 
year in the rise in oil prices and in the volatility on financial 
markets.
Unlike previous recoveries, characterised by a strong 
rebound in GDP in the year following the end of the reces-
sion, on this occasion GDP growth has been much more 
moderate, higher only than that ensuing after the 1991 re-
cession (see top panel). Moreover, the stock market has held 
on a clearly falling trend, when what would have been nor-
mal for an upswing would be a market rise (see second pan-
el). The loss of wealth entailed by the stock market decline 
has weighed on consumption. But this latter variable has 
held at a positive rate, supported by very expansionary mon-
etary and fiscal policies and by the refinancing of mortgages 
under better conditions thanks to historically low interest 
rates and to the strong rise in real-estate values.
The evident excess of productive capacity has condi-
tioned the reaction of business investment, which fell strong-
ly in the recession and regained slightly positive rates of in-
crease only after nine quarters. Reinforcing this sluggishness 
was the need for certain companies to undertake financial 
restructuring processes and the above-mentioned factors of 
uncertainty. The third panel shows the possible influence on 
this lack of recovery in investment of the very low capacity 
utilisation in this cyclical phase, compared with the average 
for similar cyclical phases in the 1975-1993 period. Further, 
there is sound evidence that the application of new technol-
ogies and the capacity for staffing adjustments have contin-
ued to have durable effects on productivity, which has shown 
high increases that are unusual when similar phases of previ-
ous cycles are analysed. Thus, the increase in average produc-
tivity in the first four quarters of the recovery was 4.8%, 
very similar to the average of 4.7% posted in the same peri-
od of the recoveries seen between 1954 and 1970 (during 
which years productivity grew forcefully), and higher than the figure of 3.2% recorded in the upturns from 1970 to 1991. Employ-
ment has still to resume a positive growth rate in this cycle, having recorded an average increase of 2.1% in the recoveries in the 
1954-1991 period.
Unlike in other recession phases, the external deficit was scarcely corrected in 2001 and it has subsequently continued beat-
ing past records (see bottom panel). The factors behind this increase in the economy’s imbalances were, during the slowdown, the 
strong increase in consumption and, more recently, the shift from a budget surplus to a budget deficit.
Finally, while in certain areas of the financial sector (such as insurance or semi-public mortgage bodies) an increase in fragility 
has been detected, in the latest recession market instability – especially the heavy stock market declines – has not translated into 
banking problems, as the various capital and risk ratios testify. The resilience of the banking sector is related to the development 
and extension of new credit securitisation and risk transfer markets, which has allowed risks to be spread and channelled towards 
the agents most prepared to assume them. However, debt as a proportion of household disposable income has risen to 110%, an 
all-time high which may condition the future growth of consumption.
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has been around 2%, and that even during the 
strong upturn in the second half of the nineties, it 
did not in any year exceed 3% in annual average 
terms. The course of productivity in recent years 
thus gives grounds for cautious optimism about 
GDP growth potential.
On the negative side, the relatively greater mo-
mentum of domestic demand led, against a sluggish 
international background, to the deterioration of 
certain domestic disequilibria and of the US cur-
rent-account deficit, which had scarcely been cor-
rected in the recessionary phase, as was habitually 
the pattern in the past. Hence, although the pri-
vate-sector saving ratio picked up slightly, the in-
crease in mortgage lending placed household debt 
at historically high levels. Low interest rates have 
hitherto contained the financial burden of the debt, 
but this high indebtedness increases vulnerability 
to potential interest rate rises, to more unfavoura-
ble employment and wage-income trends, or to a 
correction of house prices. Moreover, the rapid 
deterioration of the budget deficit contributed to 
widening the current-account deficit, which stood 
at 4.8% of GDP. In previous years, this deficit was 
comfortably financed thanks to capital inflows at-
tracted by high-yielding US assets. But last year 
signs of a change in the composition of capital in-
flows were detected, with an increase in short-
term and government securities, to the detriment 
of direct investment and the acquisition of private 
bonds and equities. In the absence of a change in 
the rate of expansion of demand in the United 
States and in its trading partners, the ongoing in-
crease in its net debit position vis-à-vis the rest of 
the world heightens the pressure on the correc-
tion of the current-account deficit taking place via 
an adjustment of the dollar exchange rate. And 
that, in turn, raises concerns as it would have a 
contractionary impact on economies in the rest of 
the world, at a time at which growth in many of 
them is low.
II.2.2. Japan
The Japanese economy remained beset by stagna-
tion and deflation in 2002, and there was scarcely any 
progress in resolving the banking-sector crisis. GDP 
growth was, at only 0.3%, very similar to that for 
2001 (0.4%), despite the positive contribution of ex-
ternal demand (see Table II.1 and Chart II.5). Domes-
tic demand, departing from a negative rate of change, 
picked up until Q3, but tended to flatten thereafter. 
Private consumption grew moderately, moving on a 
slowing trend in the second half of the year owing to 
the delicate labour market situation and to the de-
cline in wages, while there were strong annual de-
clines in private and public investment. Conversely, 
exports of goods and services grew notably, which 
made for something of an improvement in industrial 
production and contributed to widening the surplus-
es on the trade and current-account balances.
Sharp deflationary pressures continued through-
out the year and consumer prices posted a decline 
of 0.9%. Under these conditions, the Bank of Japan 
maintained its zero-interest-rate monetary policy 
accompanied by liquidity expansion targets, on 
which it had embarked in March 2001. On three oc-
casions last year it upped liquidity injection and also 
gradually increased monthly purchases of long-term 
government debt on the secondary market. Al-
though the monetary base grew 20% during the 
year, the money supply did so only at a rate of 2% 
and bank lending fell for the fifth year running. That 
evidenced the flawed functioning of the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism (see Chart II.5), 
against the background of the banking system’s 
strong reluctance to extend credit to the private 
sector in the light of the delicate situation of lending 
portfolios and the serious difficulties beleaguering 
companies.
Given the persistence of the banking industry’s 
serious problems, the Bank of Japan announced 
plans in September for a substantial purchase of 
shares held by banks directly from the institutions 
themselves. In principle, the purchase was to be at 
market prices over a period of two years. The Japa-
nese executive renewed for a further two years 
the full guarantee of sight deposits for banks de-
clared in crisis and, after extending the process of 
exceptional examinations of credit institutions 
over more than one year, it submitted last October 
a new banking restructuring plan aimed at reinforc-
ing and accelerating the ongoing elimination of bad 
debts. However, the associated quantitative objec-
tives are pending specification, and a clear timeta-
ble for the application of these arrangements to 
banks has not been proposed, raising fresh doubts 
about the pace at which the necessary reforms will 
finally be undertaken.
Lastly, the public finances position also continued 
to worsen last year. The budget deficit widened to 
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7.7% of GDP, despite the medium-term budgetary 
consolidation plans drawn up by the government. 
Moreover, the government has temporarily suspend-
ed the ceiling of 30 trillion yen on the annual volume 
of new public debt issues, owing to the deteriora-
tion of the Japanese economic situation and of the 
world context. Consequently, public debt will have 
risen to the worrying figure of 154% of GDP.
II.2.3. Other developed economies
Economic growth in 2002 in other developed 
economies was relatively high, in particular in cer-
tain Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United King-
dom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, but also in 
the Nordic countries. As in the United States, a se-
ries of factors in these countries combined to shore 
up the resilience of private consumption. Such fac-
tors included the effects of expansionary monetary 
policies and, in the cases of the United Kingdom and 
Australia, the strong rise in house prices. Moreover, 
the fairly healthy public finances position enabled 
these countries to pursue expansionary fiscal poli-
cies, with increases in public spending or tax cuts, 
which contributed to sustaining consumers’ dispos-
able income.
The particular case of the United Kingdom 
shows how the amplification of certain imbalances, 
such as high household debt and the strong rise in 
house prices, provided for sustaining private con-
sumption and economic growth, although this also 
gave rise to economic policy problems. The Bank of 
England’s monetary policy thus faced the dilemma of 
whether to cut interest rates, in the light of the 
sluggishness of external demand and of the industri-
al sector, or to retain a degree of monetary tight-
ness so as not to continue fuelling the increase in 
credit and the growth of house prices. Against this 
background, the Bank of England held its official in-
terest rate at 4% throughout 2002, until trimming it 
to 3.75% in February 2003 in the face of clear signs 
of weakness of economic growth.
In the other EU countries that are not members 
of the euro area, there was a moderate economic 
recovery on 2001 in Sweden and Denmark, thanks 
essentially to the support of private and government 
consumption, while inflation rates held stable at 
slightly over 2%. Budget surpluses were lower than 
in 2001, mainly because of tax cuts, but public fi-
nances continued to show a positive balance.
II.3.  THE INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES’ 
FINANCIAL MARKETS
Developments in financial markets in the main 
economies outside the euro area last year not only 
reflected the substantial uncertainty clouding the in-
ternational economic situation but also affected this 
situation through the impact that changes in prices 
and volumes of financial assets had on agents’ eco-
nomic decisions. Agents were less willing than in the 
past to take on high risk.
Following the correction initiated the previous 
year, equity markets continued to experience heavy 
losses in 2002 (see Chart II.2). International stock 
markets moved substantially in synchrony, with the 
exception of Japan. The Japanese market reacted 
more to home-grown factors, particularly the 
measures adopted by the authorities to tackle the 
persistent problem of deflation and the banking in-
dustry crisis, and it closed the year showing a de-
cline of 19%, below that of other developed mar-
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kets. The decline on the US markets was around 
23% over the year as a whole in the overall indices, 
and higher than 30% in the case of technology 
stocks. In relation to the peak reached in March 
2001, the overall index lost around 40% of its value, 
with the technology index down by over two-
thirds. After this correction, price/earnings ratios 
are at levels more in keeping with – though still 
higher than – their historical averages. Possibly, 
however, following the scandals involving certain 
corporations’ financial statements, the recent cor-
porate earnings figures are more realistic than in 
the past, which might justify a somewhat higher 
price/earnings ratio.
Volatility was high on stock markets in 2002. The 
international political uncertainty following the 11 
September attacks, which continued with the mili-
tary conflict in Afghanistan and with the heightening 
of tension in Iraq in the second half of last year, was 
compounded by economic and financial uncertainty. 
This stemmed from a lack of confidence in corpo-
rate governance and in the veracity of companies’ 
accounting information, and from doubts over the 
course of the recovery, its strength and the outlook 
for earnings.
The crises affecting Enron Corporation (in late 
2001), WorldCom, Conseco and Global Crossing, 
among others, all of which had very high volumes of 
assets as they went into bankruptcy, triggered far-
reaching mistrust in respect of the information in 
companies’ financial statements – companies which 
had withstood the previous overvaluation by the 
stock markets – and of the independence of audi-
tors and investment banks. At the same time, the 
adequacy of accounting regulations and of the infor-
mation supplied to the markets was called into 
question. The case of Enron in particular had ad-
verse effects on the workings of certain financial 
markets owing to the dominant role of this compa-
ny in the trading of certain financial derivatives and 
risk-transfer instruments.
Last year the sovereign bond markets saw a 
significant uptrend in prices and a downtrend in 
yields (see Chart II.6). In the United States, ten-
year yields stood in May 2003 at around 3.6%, a 
low for the past forty years, against levels of over 
5% at the start of 2002. This significant fall was as-
sociated to some extent with the decline in short-
term interest rates, against the background of a 
stable and moderate inflation rate; with the expec-
tations of a less robust recovery; and, above all, 
with the safe-haven role played by sovereign debt 
in the light of the poor performance of equity and 
the greater perception of risk by investors, who 
switched to safer, more liquid assets. The abnor-
mally high correlation between long-term interest 
rate movements and equity prices would, among 
other indicators, sustain this explanation of the 
rise in government bond prices, despite the deteri-
oration in public finances seen, as mentioned, in 
some of the main developed countries, principally 
in the United States.
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Spreads between corporate and government 
bonds fluctuated notably during the year as a whole, 
although they remained at a high level. After peaking 
in October and November, spreads narrowed signifi-
cantly in December and during the opening months 
of 2003. The performance of the poorest quality 
bonds was generally more volatile than that of high-
rated bonds.
In 2002 certain segments of the global financial 
system showed signs of weakness. In some coun-
tries, defined-benefit pension funds were adversely 
affected by the fall in equities, in which a substantial 
portion of their assets were placed. Insurance and 
reinsurance companies, one of the sectors most di-
rectly hit by the negative impact of 11 September, 
were also harmed by the stock market decline, al-
though this effect tended to be centred on certain 
European countries where some of the biggest 
companies are headquartered. A cause for concern 
in the United States is the high exposure to credit 
and interest-rate risk of two semi-public institutions 
(Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) that provide liquidity 
to the mortgage market through purchasing from 
lenders the loans they have extended and issuing 
mortgage-backed securities. In these circumstances, 
the soundness of banking systems in most devel-
oped countries is sufficient. However, the situation 
in certain countries such as Japan is worrying. Over-
all, the global financial system, the strength of which 
contributed forcefully to the 2001 recession proving 
shorter and milder than usual, has retained a nota-
ble capacity to withstand the turbulence seen, al-
though the aforementioned elements of fragility 
would advise continuing watchfulness and caution by 
the authorities.
Finally, on the currency markets, the year 2002 
was marked by the significant depreciation of the 
dollar, which lost around 8% of its value in nominal 
effective terms (see Chart II.3). The depreciation, 
which was heavier against the euro (33% between 
December 2001 and May 2003) than against the yen 
(10% over the same period), is in keeping with the 
movement that is to be expected given the current-
account balance positions of the three main regions. 
Nonetheless, the relative strength of the yen (which 
the Japanese authorities have sought to temper in 
certain periods through currency market interven-
tions) is an added difficulty for the correction of 
deflationary pressures in Japan. Moreover, the high 
dependence of the international economy on a US 
recovery means that the downward movement of 
the dollar arouses some concern. This is because it 
entails a diversion of world demand towards the US 
economy, at a time at which the economies of the 
rest of the world would not appear to be able read-
ily to replace the fall in exports towards the United 
States with greater domestic demand.
II.4. THE EMERGING ECONOMIES
In 2002, the emerging economies were, overall, 
somewhat more dynamic than the previous year, al-
though the situation differed greatly from one re-
gion to another. While already-high growth rates 
quickened in the south-east Asian countries and 
dipped only slightly in the EU accession countries in 
relation to 2001, Latin America posted a negative 
growth rate on the whole (see Table II.2).
Given the connection existing between the 
amount and composition of international capital 
flows and the situation of the emerging economies, 
regard should be had to the course followed by 
such flows during 2002 (see Chart II.7).
As far as their overall amount is concerned, the 
containment of the fall in bank loans contributed to 
an increase in total private capital flows towards the 
emerging economies in relation to 2001, despite the 
fact that the other two components trended very 
differently: foreign direct investment shrank signifi-
cantly and portfolio investment remained negative, 
albeit less so than the previous year. It is likewise 
worth noting the heavy reduction in official flows, 
from almost $40 billion in 2001 to $25 billion in 
2002.
The regional breakdown of private capital flows 
showed a shift towards the Asian emerging coun-
tries and the transition economies, to the detri-
ment of Latin America. In particular, private flows 
to Asia (mostly to China) practically quadrupled in 
relation to the previous year, while they almost 
doubled in the case of the central and eastern Eu-
ropean economies. Conversely, they fell by half in 
the case of Latin America. It is telling that, both in 
Asia and in central and eastern Europe, the in-
crease in flows should have had a similar profile, 
with greater growth in foreign direct investment 
than in portfolio investment (especially in Asia) and 
with a positive contribution by bank loans. In Latin 
America, by contrast, foreign direct investment – 
the component of the capital-account balance 
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which had been most buoyant in previous years – 
fell by almost half. These differences across regions 
were also apparent in the differing trend of finan-
cial indicators (see Chart II.8).
II.4.1. Latin America
Economic crises, political tensions and the diffi-
culties of gaining access to international financial 
markets all came to bear on Latin America in 2002. 
Admittedly, economic problems were fairly wide-
spread and there were bouts of contagion, from Ar-
gentina to its smaller neighbours and from Brazil to 
a good number of the countries in the area. But to 
talk of a regional crisis in the true sense of the term 
may be unwarranted, since most of the problems 
that emerged during the year had a markedly na-
tional background. Nonetheless, the outcome of the 
Argentine crisis contributed, especially in the first 
half of the year, to making international investors 
nervous about the possible reversal of reforms in 
the region.
Drawing on data from the eight main economies, 
Latin America is estimated to have seen a decline in 
output of 0.8% of GDP in 2002, the worst figure 
posted since 1983 (see Table II.2). Even if the de-
clines in activity in the countries beset by serious 
economic crisis were excluded (the case of Argenti-
na, Uruguay and Venezuela, where GDP has fallen by 
between 10% and 20%), economic growth in the 
rest of the region would scarcely have amounted to 
1.6% in 2002, compared with 0.8% the previous year. 
However, something of a rebound in activity has 
been observed in most of the countries in the clos-
ing months of 2002 and in 2003 to date.
The weak economic situation in the region, the 
difficulties in servicing debt or rescheduling it in cer-
tain countries and the fear that populist policies 
might be pursued in others prompted a fall-off of 
private capital flows. Against this background, the 
maintenance of official flows, largely routed through 
IMF support programmes, alleviated the effects of 
private flows drying up.
The crises in certain countries and the external 
financing difficulties faced by most Latin American 
economies led to forceful adjustments of current-
account balances, which moved from an overall 
deficit of 3.1% in 2001 to a situation close to bal-
ance in 2002. The adjustment mechanism generally 
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required a marked depreciation of exchange rates 
against the dollar. This was all the more notable in 
that it took place at a time the dollar was notably 
weak, which gave rise to significant gains in com-
petitiveness. The trade balance adjustment was in-
duced, first, by the contraction of imports, and 
more recently by the expansion of exports too. In-
deed, the external sector was by far the most 
buoyant demand component, contributing three 
points to GDP growth in the area. As a result, the 
fall in domestic demand (the negative contribution 
of which to GDP growth was –3.7 points) did not 
lead to a bigger fall in output.
However, the beneficial effect of exchange rate 
depreciations on the trade balance was partly coun-
tered by the pressure on the net external position, 
which in most Latin American countries is heavily 
on the debit side and denominated in foreign cur-
rency. As Box II.3 explains, devaluations in these cir-
cumstances entail an increase in the present and fu-
ture financial burden for the debtor country, which 
reinforces the scale of the depreciation required for 
a given adjustment of the current-account balance. 
The increase in foreign debt servicing arising from 
these devaluations has cast doubt on their sustaina-
bility in certain countries and has seriously curbed 
the headroom for pursuing counter-cyclical fiscal 
policies.
The heavy cumulative depreciations have also 
had unfavourable effects on price developments. De-
spite the fact the pass-through of the exchange rate 
to domestic prices has been relatively limited, 
against a backdrop of weak demand, inflation has 
risen as from the third quarter, virulently so in cer-
tain cases. That has prevented inflation targets being 
met in certain countries such as Mexico, Colombia 
and, above all, Brazil. Given financial turbulence and 
sluggish domestic demand, monetary policies did 
not react at first to the deteriorating inflation out-
look. In fact, in countries such as Mexico and Co-
lombia, monetary policy was eased. However, in the 
closing months of 2002 and early 2003, as the over-
shooting of targets became increasingly more pat-
ent, the monetary policy stance has tended to tight-
en in a growing number of countries.
Probably, the key event in 2002 was the outcome 
of the Argentine crisis, not only because of its scale 
but because the means of tackling it was particularly 
traumatic and involved a break with the reform-
based model of the nineties. The defence of convert-
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BOX II.3
Exchange rate adjustments, dollarisation of liabilities and vulnerability in Latin America
A characteristic of Latin American countries is 
that they maintain generally high levels of foreign debt, 
a substantial portion of which corresponds to the pub-
lic sector (see top panel). One of the fundaments of 
this debit position is the existence of a persistent neg-
ative gap between saving and investment, which trans-
lates into strong dependence on external financing, 
current-account deficits and a build-up in external lia-
bilities. Nonetheless, Latin America’s vulnerability de-
rives not so much from this dependence on external 
flows as from its financial track record, in which sus-
pensions of payments and other difficulties abound (1), 
and which largely determines the characteristics of its 
debt: persistently high risk premia, sudden stops in 
capital inflows and difficulties in borrowing long-term 
in local currency. This latter factor entails the dollarisa-
tion of financial liabilities, which is a characteristic of 
the region and which not only affects foreign liabilities 
but also many instruments issued on the local market, 
in dollars or dollar-indexed, by the banking system, 
companies or the public sector.
The dollarisation of liabilities hampers economic 
adjustment processes, especially in periods of financial 
turbulence such as that in 2002, which highlighted how 
these factors of vulnerability affect the area. Fewer 
capital inflows and dearer risk premia have triggered a 
vicious circle involving loss of confidence, fall-off of 
flows and increased premia, making a strong adjust-
ment of the foreign accounts necessary. A mechanism 
central to this adjustment has habitually been the de-
preciation of the exchange rate, which has its theoreti-
cal justification in balance of payments-based exchange rate determination models. These models show the long-run 
relationship between the real course of the exchange rate and the external position: to avoid an unsustainable dete-
rioration of the current account, the growing interest payments arising on the build-up of foreign liabilities will tend 
to be accompanied by a depreciation of the real exchange rate, prompting an improvement in the trade balance.
While the reduction in external flows has been the immediate trigger, the sharp currency depreciations last 
year in practically all Latin American countries, in both real and nominal terms, could arguably be in response to an 
adjustment of this type. True, the gains in competitiveness have allowed trade surpluses to be generated and the cur-
rent-account deficit to be corrected substantially. But when dollarisation of liabilities takes place, the depreciation of 
the exchange rate has an adverse effect on the sustainability of the external financial position and also on that of the 
industries incurring debt in dollars or through dollar-indexed instruments, since their revenue and assets are de-
nominated, in the main, in local currency.
Regarding the external position, the fall in domestic relative prices brought on by the depreciation of the ex-
change rate in real terms, which is steeper the more closed the economy is, substantially increases the amount of 
debt in terms of national income. As can be seen in the bottom panel, this is a particularly marked characteristic in 
the Latin American countries: real depreciations of the exchange rate are traditionally accompanied by increases in 
the debt/GDP ratio and this ratio is statistically significant. The increase in external debt also has consequences for 
exchange rate adjustment dynamics. Since this negative impact of depreciation on the external position also brings 
about a greater debt interest burden, the scale of the exchange rate depreciation needed to place the external posi-
tion on a sustainable basis will have to be greater than in the absence of a significant dollarisation of liabilities. The 
extreme case might arise where the negative effect on the stock of debt might counter the positive flow effect on 
the trade balance, in such a way that the external imbalances might not be corrected.
(1) See Eichengreen & Hausman (1999), Exchange rates and financial fragility, NBER Working Paper, No. 7418.
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ibility in 2001 and the abandonment of this regime 
in 2002 were accompanied by the adoption of nu-
merous unorthodox methods, breaches of contracts 
and legal, social and institutional unrest which gave 
rise to fears of political contagion to other coun-
tries in the region which, fortunately, have not mate-
rialised.
The withdrawal restrictions on deposits at end-
2001, known as the “corralito”, were followed by 
the abandonment of convertibility, the suspension of 
foreign debt payments, the asymmetrical “pesoifica-
tion” – at different exchange rates – of bank assets 
and liabilities, the partial freezing of prices and wag-
es, and the introduction of various financial and for-
eign exchange restrictions. The scale of the fall in 
GDP (10.9% in 2002, and 21% counting from 1999) 
gives some idea of the depth of the crisis. The fears 
of a return to hyperinflation did not materialise, 
however. This was partly because economic activity 
was depressed and also because of the rigid inter-
ventionist measures set in place. As a result, annual 
average inflation was 26%.
Agents’ diminished confidence was accentuated 
during most of the year by the little headway made 
in the process of economic restructuring. However, 
from the third quarter the economic depression 
began to show signs of having touched bottom. The 
production and sales indicators rose, bank deposits 
began to increase, the exchange rate rebounded and 
public finances also improved, albeit assisted by the 
non-payment of external debt, where scarcely any 
progress in rescheduling has been made. This incipi-
ent but precarious recovery, which may be explained 
in part by its very depressed starting point, has al-
lowed some economic and financial restrictions to 
be partially lifted and has been backed by the tem-
porary agreement reached with the IMF in January 
2003. Nonetheless, pending the measures the new 
government may carry out, institutional uncertainty 
persists.
The seriousness of the crisis in Argentina had a 
most adverse effect on some of its smaller neigh-
bours: Paraguay, Bolivia and Uruguay. In the latter 
economy, which is closely linked to Argentina eco-
nomically and financially through trade ties and the 
substantial volume of deposits traditionally held by 
Argentine residents in Uruguayan banks, contagion 
from the Argentine crisis was particularly evident. 
The depreciation of the currency, deposit withdraw-
als by non-residents and the fall in activity led to a 
deterioration of the financial system and the fiscal 
position, despite the IMF’s support programme.
The financial turbulence in 2002 particularly af-
fected Brazil, the region’s economic powerhouse. 
The imminence of elections and the fear that the 
new government might adopt unorthodox policies 
gave rise during the summer to a lack of confidence 
on international financial markets. The subsequent 
rise in risk premia and the depreciation of the ex-
change rate seriously deteriorated the outlook for 
public finances, since the servicing of Brazil’s sizable 
public debt is highly sensitive to both variables. That 
set in train a vicious circle in which worsening pub-
lic finances and deteriorating financial variables 
fuelled each over mutually. This spiral peaked in the 
summer, motivating the extension of a new IMF sup-
port programme. Backing by the IMF and, following 
the elections, the commitment by the new govern-
ment to market principles and economic discipline 
prompted a notable improvement in the climate on 
markets, which has continued into 2003 Q1. How-
ever, the authorities face the formidable challenge of 
raising Brazilian growth, which is currently below 
2%, to bring it into line with the country’s potential. 
At the same time, inflationary pressures must be 
controlled; these have become more evident at the 
onset of the current year and have been combated 
with a tightening of the monetary policy stance.
Chile and Mexico had relatively fewer difficulties 
during the year and retained a degree of responsive-
ness in the face of the slowness of the recovery. This 
was especially so in Chile’s case, whose monetary 
and fiscal policies were the most clearly accommo-
dative in the area. That said, the economic results in 
both countries were worse than expected at the 
beginning of the year, and they posted respective 
growth rates of 2.1% and 0.9%, a figure attributable 
in Mexico’s case to the hesitant US recovery. Capital 
flows fell, and this was reflected in the significant 
depreciations of the two countries’ currencies. In 
Mexico, inflationary expectations arising from the 
weakness of the peso led to a tightening of mone-
tary policy in early 2003. Finally, in Chile’s case, there 
was notable progress in trade liberalisation in the 
form of agreements with the European Union and 
with the United States.
As regards the Andean countries, developments 
were uneven. Peru posted the highest growth in the 
region (5.2%), while Colombia experienced greater 
difficulties, related in part to its precarious fiscal po-
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BOX II.4
The enlargement of the European Union
The enlargement of the European Union (EU) currently 
envisages the accession in the medium term of up to 13 coun-
tries, 10 of which (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) will 
be joining in May 2004 (1), as agreed at the Copenhagen Euro-
pean Council in December 2002. Previously, all the countries 
will have to ratify the Treaty of Accession, which was signed at 
the Athens European Council in April 2003.
This enlargement of the EU is the most ambitious to 
date in terms of both the number of countries, geographical 
span and the number of inhabitants (over 100 million), and of 
the structural and purchasing power differences between the 
current members and the acceding and accession countries 
(see accompanying table). The challenges thus facing these 
countries, and the EU as a whole, are manifold, although so 
too are the opportunities that a single market comprising 
almost 500 million people will offer.
Among the main challenges enlargement involves are, 
first, the need to reform Community institutions and policies 
to enable a 25-member EU to function. This reform will be 
considered at the next Inter-Governmental Conference in 
2004, on the basis of the conclusions reached by the Euro-
pean Convention. Second, the economic and social integra-
tion of these countries into the EU requires them to make 
as swift as possible headway in nominal and real convergence 
towards the current EU members, especially with a view to 
the future adoption of the euro. In this connection, they will 
have to show a satisfactory degree of sustainable conver-
gence, which will be evaluated in accordance with the Maas-
tricht criteria that were applied to the current Member 
States. One of these criteria is to have remained, for at least 
two years prior to the convergence examination, within the 
normal fluctuation margins established by the EMS exchange 
rate mechanism (ERM-II), without devaluations on the initia-
tive of the country concerned and free from serious pres-
sures. Consequently, the earliest date these countries could 
meet all the convergence criteria is 2006 and the first possi-
ble date for adopting the euro would be 2007. While all the 
acceding countries have expressed an interest in adopting 
the euro as soon as possible, it seems clear that the opti-
mum period for doing so will depend on the degree of con-
vergence they have achieved in nominal and real terms.
The progress in nominal convergence in these countries has been substantial to date in respect of inflation control and the re-
duction of long-term interest rates, but much more uneven in terms of fiscal consolidation. Further, some of the recent headway in 
nominal convergence might not be sustainable, in particular the maintenance of inflation at very low levels, as the liberalisation of 
regulated prices takes greater hold, especially if the strong appreciation of these countries’ currencies is reversed. Moreover, their high 
current-account deficits could pose financing problems if the burgeoning capital flows they currently receive grind to a halt or un-
dergo a change in sign. Indeed, a portion of these flows is related to privatisation processes, which are tapering off, and to taking ad-
vantage of the government debt interest rate spread over the euro area, which has almost been cancelled out in some cases.
The acceding and accession countries’ progress in real convergence has been modest, meaning that the per-capita income 
differential with the EU (2) remains very wide. As a result, real convergence will perhaps extend far beyond the first date possible 
for the adoption of the euro. It is estimated that with a growth rate of 4%, equivalent to the average attained by the acceding and 
accession countries in the past seven years, they would take almost 30 years to catch up with Spain’s and Portugal’s per capita in-
come relative to the EU average at the time these two countries joined (see accompanying chart). However, this process should be 
quickened as a result of the favourable impact of European funds, in particular structural funds, and the more so if the future mem-
bers undertake the reforms needed to make their markets more flexible, which would allow them to increase their growth poten-
tial. In addition, sustainable advances in nominal convergence, provided they are accompanied by the necessary structural reforms, 
should accelerate real convergence, and vice versa, since they are mutually reinforcing processes.
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(1) Entry for Bulgaria and Romania is scheduled for 2007. The possible date for the start of negotiations for Turkish accession is 2005.
(2) See “La adhesión europea: convergencia real y nominal”, Boletín económico, Banco de España, diciembre 2002.
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sition, although the recent budgetary adjustment 
programme and the agreement with the IMF pro-
vided for something of an improvement. Lastly, the 
deterioration of the political and social situation in 
Venezuela, particularly in the second half of the year, 
had a deeply adverse effect on activity; oil produc-
tion and exports fell and private enterprise ground 
to a halt, leading to a decline of 8.8% in GDP in 
2002. The worsening of the situation in the opening 
months of 2003 prompted the introduction of rigid 
exchange controls and the start of an internal public 
debt restructuring process, in the light of the public 
sector’s servicing difficulties.
II.4.2. The EU accession countries
The key event for these countries last year was 
the agreement reached at the Copenhagen summit 
on EU accession for an initial group of 10 countries 
in 2004 and the possibility of a further two joining 
in 2007 (see Box II.4).
Real GDP growth held at a relatively high level in 
most of the accession countries last year, although it 
slowed slightly on 2001 owing to the lack of buoy-
ancy of external demand (see Table II.2). Generally, 
the resistance of the economies of these countries 
to a slowdown in the face of an adverse interna-
tional environment was based on the strength of 
domestic demand, underpinned by foreign direct in-
vestment inflows and by expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies, which boosted consumption. 
Overall, growth differentials with the EU widened 
slightly in favour of the accession countries in 2002. 
However, the degree of convergence of per capita 
income levels with the EU in recent years remained 
limited (on average, the GDP per capita of the ac-
cession countries stood in PPP terms at around 44% 
of the EU average), suggesting that the process of 
real convergence will probably continue for a 
number of years after EU accession.
Significant headway continued to be made in the 
process of disinflation, to the extent that, at the end 
of the year, the average inflation rate of the 10 coun-
tries that will be joining the EU in 2004 was, in gen-
eral, comparable with that of the euro area. None-
theless, factors of an exceptional nature were quite 
important in 2002. These included most notably the 
favourable trend of food prices, delays in price de-
regulation and the appreciation of exchange rates. 
Given the absence of inflationary pressures and the 
appreciating trend of their currencies, official inter-
est rates were cut in most of these countries.
In respect of public finances, there was a notable 
deterioration last year in certain countries of this 
group. As a result, the deficit of around 6% of GDP 
was posted in the three biggest economies (Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary). If the exceptional 
business and banking restructuring measures are in-
cluded, the deficit rose in certain cases, such as 
Hungary, to 10% of GDP. The deterioration was due, 
in most cases, to discretionary measures. Hence, in 
the future, it will be vital for these countries to 
make sound progress in fiscal consolidation and to 
restructure their spending accordingly. This is be-
cause, on one hand, they will have to face heavy in-
vestment and growing expenditure pressures within 
the EU and, on the other, they already have fairly 
high current-account deficits, and these may prove 
difficult to finance if the forceful capital inflows relat-
ing to privatisation are curbed or stopped.
The prospects of EU accession influenced finan-
cial markets in central and eastern Europe and, to a 
certain extent, protected them from the turbulence 
beleaguering Latin America. That provided for a nar-
rowing of the sovereign spreads on external debt to 
historical lows. Stock markets trended moderately 
downwards or held stable, while the exchange rate 
of the main currencies of this area tended to appre-
ciate against the euro. In Hungary’s case, the massive 
inflow of speculative capital made intervention on 
the foreign exchange market necessary in order to 
defend the +15% fluctuation band set for its unilat-
eral exchange rate regime against the euro, along 
with heavy interest rate cuts.
Turkey, a country aspiring to join the EU in a 
more distant future than the foregoing countries, 
posted notable GDP growth in 2002 of 7.8%, fol-
lowing a deep recession in 2001. Contributing sig-
nificantly in this respect were domestic demand 
and the foreign sector, assisted by the strong de-
preciation of the Turkish lira. The financial markets 
rallied during most of the year, thanks to fairly 
strict compliance with the IMF programme. How-
ever, in the second half of the year the markets (for 
money and foreign exchange in particular) re-
mained highly sensitive to political events, against a 
background of doubts over whether the fiscal drive 
was sufficient to ensure the sustainability of debt 
and also over problems in the banking industry be-
ing resolved.
48 49
II.4.3. South and East Asia and Russia
The great majority of South and East Asian 
countries saw their growth rates accelerate last 
year, the outcome in most cases of positive contri-
butions by external demand not only from the de-
veloped countries but also from the region itself, 
where bilateral trade has increased notably in re-
cent years, particularly with China (see Table II.2). 
Notable too in several countries in the region 
were the positive contributions of domestic de-
mand, assisted by the moderate expansionary im-
pulses of fiscal policies and by greater domestic 
and financial market stability. In the particular case 
of China, whose estimated output growth was 8%, 
both the contribution of exports and the strong 
momentum of domestic investment (chiefly gov-
ernment investment) are notable, accompanied by 
high direct investment inflows. However, in the 
opening months of 2003, the picture for countries 
in the region has worsened, partly as a result of 
the SARS outbreak.
Overall in 2002, the price moderation witnessed 
in previous years remained a constant in the econo-
mies in the region. In most countries the annual av-
erage increase in consumer prices did not exceed 
3%, and in some cases a downward trend in prices 
persisted, namely in Hong Kong (–3%), China (–0.7%) 
and Singapore (–0.3%). However, deflation in these 
latter countries is characterised by complex and 
specific features in each case, generally different 
from those in Japan. Thus, in China’s case it is due to 
the combination of strong increases in productivity, 
against the background of a fixed nominal exchange 
rate regime against the dollar, and spare capacity, 
along with the impact of tariff dismantling further to 
World Trade Organisation membership. Given the 
weight of China in the region’s trade, the fall in the 
price level in this country has fed through in differ-
ing degrees to the price levels of its neighbouring 
economies via trade.
The performance of the financial markets was 
generally positive, in step with the strong growth in 
the region. This prompted sovereign debt spreads to 
hold at low and stable levels over the year as a 
whole. The stock markets withstood the first half of 
the year relatively well, although there was a gradual 
deterioration thereafter, which heightened in 2003 
Q1. The countries with fixed exchange rates against 
the dollar (China, Hong Kong and Malaysia) benefit-
ed from a direct improvement in competitiveness 
against the other countries in the area, whose ex-
change rates tended to appreciate, at least initially, 
against the dollar; at the same time, however, they 
depreciated in effective terms against their trading 
partners as a whole, owing to the relative strength 
of the yen.
Finally, economic growth in Russia was relatively 
sustained in 2002. Russian GDP grew by 4.3%, de-
spite slowing for the second year running from 9% 
in 2000 and 5% in 2001. Of note were the contribu-
tion of private consumption and the progressive im-
provement in investment, in line with rising oil pric-
es, given the close link in Russia between fixed in-
vestment and crude oil output and exports. Fresh 
headway was also made in reducing inflation, which 
dipped from 20.7% in 2001 to 16% in 2002.
CHAPTER III
THE EURO AREA AND THE COMMON MONETARY 
POLICY
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III.1.  ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
IN THE EURO AREA
In 2002, the rate of expansion of euro area out-
put was very weak, for the second year running, at 
just 0.8%. The downturn in economic activity that 
commenced in mid-2000 bottomed out, in terms of 
quarter-on-quarter growth rates, in late 2001. The 
subsequent recovery has been characterised, how-
ever, by a notable lack of momentum, disappointing 
the expectations that existed at the beginning of last 
year. In fact, the growth rates of all the final demand 
components, with the exception of government 
consumption, fell significantly, so that only 0.2 per-
centage points of the small increase in GDP corre-
sponded to domestic spending, the rest being attrib-
utable to the external sector, despite the modesty 
of the increase in exports. In 2002, therefore, the 
euro area showed little domestic vitality and a high 
degree of sensitivity to external developments.
Despite the loss of momentum in private spend-
ing, inflation held at over 2%, owing to certain ad-
verse supply shocks, but also to the presence of ri-
gidities in certain markets which hampered the nec-
essary adjustment of income to the worsening in 
the economic outlook. Against this background, 
macroeconomic policies helped moderate the slow-
down, although the downward stickiness of inflation 
and the scant effort made to consolidate finances in 
the upturn left little scope for monetary and fiscal 
policy to stimulate demand in the euro area. 
III.1.1. Activity and employment
Annual GDP growth in the euro area was more 
subdued in 2002 than at any time since the start of 
Monetary Union, as the expected recovery in activi-
ty to close to trend, following the slowdown from 
mid-2000, failed to materialise. The favourable signs 
that, at the beginning of the year, had fuelled expec-
tations of a progressive recovery, gave way to a 
modest, faltering improvement. 
The contribution of domestic demand (excluding 
stockbuilding) to GDP growth was only 0.3 percent-
age points (p.p.) (see Table III.1). The negative contri-
bution, of more than half a percentage point, from 
gross fixed capital formation, was particularly nota-
ble here. The significant contraction in investment in 
equipment (by around 4%) reflects, in the first in-
stance, the adverse effects of the high level of uncer-
tainty currently prevailing. Moreover, business invest-
ment was negatively affected by the moderation in 
margins and, in some cases (especially in the tech-
nology and telecommunications sectors), by the 
need to use surpluses to strengthen balance sheets, 
given the high levels of debt carried as a conse-
quence of the expansion decisions of recent years. 
At the same time, despite the low level of real inter-
est rates, other cost components of business liabili-
ties remained relatively high. The risk premiums re-
quired on the bonds issued by non-financial corpo-
rations barely fell, and were still significantly above 
the levels prevailing before 11 September 2001, 
while the steepening of the decline in share values 
tended to make it more difficult and more expen-
sive to finance investment projects. Finally, there are 
signs that credit institutions have adopted more cau-
tious lending policies. Meanwhile, the significant fall 
in construction investment (which contracted by 
2.5%) reflected the impact of uncertainty over fu-
ture levels of household disposable income, against a 
backdrop of gradual deterioration in employment 
prospects. 
Private consumption grew by 0.6% in 2002, 
about half the rate of real disposable income, so 
that there was an increase in the savings ratio. As in 
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the case of residential investment, this stemmed 
from greater caution on the part of households in 
their consumption decisions, linked to the gradual 
slowdown in the demand for labour and to the gen-
eral increase in uncertainty over economic pros-
pects (see Chart III.19). In addition, the fall in share 
prices helped to reduce households’ propensity to 
spend through its impact on financial wealth and 
confidence, although this effect was offset in some 
countries, at least partially, by the increase in real 
wealth entailed by the house price boom. 
Trade flows between the euro area and the rest 
of the world slowed further in 2002, although the 
pattern over the year was different (see Table III.1). 
Export growth (1.2%) was held down for the second 
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year running by weak growth in world trade, which 
was exacerbated by the appreciation of the euro (see 
Box III.1). Meanwhile, the slackness of final demand in 
the euro area meant that imports declined by 0.4%, even 
though their prices fell relative to national products. 
As a result of these developments in exports and im-
ports, net external demand made a positive contribu-
tion of 0.6 p.p. to output growth, very similar to those 
seen in previous years. The current account balance 
improved, to a surplus of 1.1% of GDP. 
The countries of the area have generally dis-
played a high degree of synchrony in the current cy-
clical downturn. In 2002, GDP slowed in all of them, 
with the exception of Austria and Finland. However, 
there were notable differences in GDP growth and 
in its composition. The economies whose growth 
was most clearly above average (Greece, Spain, Ire-
land and Finland) were also those with the highest 
potential growth rates. As for the composition of 
growth, there were notable cross-country differenc-
es (see Chart III.2). The weakness of domestic de-
mand was more acute in the Netherlands, Austria, 
Portugal and Finland, and most especially in Germa-
ny, where capital goods purchases fell by more than 
9%, while investment in construction continued to 
decline at a rate close to 6%. The mediocre per-
formance of the German economy in the last two 
years stems from the cyclical downturn affecting the 
area as a whole and, most especially, from its own 
structural weaknesses, which have become evident 
during the process of absorption of the effects of 
reunification. Significant here is its low potential 
growth, often attributed to causes such as the high 
tax pressure and the generation of perverse incen-
tives by social protection systems. Given Germany’s 
financial system, in which credit institutions play a 
particularly important role in the financing of busi-
ness (and which also suffers from certain structural 
weaknesses), the increase in the risk of the assets of 
the banking sector has possibly been a further fac-
tor which, in conjunction with those described for 
the area as a whole, has generated a particularly ad-
verse scenario for business expansion.
The slowdown in activity in the euro area was 
gradually reflected in labour market developments 
during 2002. The rate of unemployment increased 
by 0.3 percentage points to 8.5% of the labour 
force at the end of the year, while employment 
slowed more sharply than output, with growth in 
the year as a whole of 0.4%. As a result, apparent 
labour productivity grew at a positive rate (also 
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0.4%) which, although very modest, was higher 
than in 2001. In the first half of the year, as in 2001, 
employment growth was relatively sustained, given 
the lags with which this variable usually responds 
to fluctuations in activity. However, the perception 
on the part of employers that the loss of momen-
tum in activity might be temporary may also have 
played a part here. In any event, the low sensitivity 
of wages to changes in economic conditions and 
continued weak output growth meant that employ-
ment grew at year-on-year rates of almost zero in 
the second half of the year. As a result, apparent 
labour productivity recovered significantly, growing 
at rates of more than 1% in the final quarter (see 
Chart III. 3). 
The economic outlook for the coming months 
hinges on how the unknowns surrounding the geo-
political situation and developments on the financial 
and oil markets are resolved. In the short term, it is 
likely that agents’ spending will be curbed by the 
need for firms to continue their financial restructur-
ing and, in the case of households, by the worsening 
labour market conditions. In principle, if the financial 
and foreign-exchange markets soon become more 
stable, now that the military conflict is over, output 
will foreseeably gain momentum from the middle of 
this year and the growth rate of euro area GDP will 
progressively draw closer to its potential. These 
prospects are favoured by the absence of wide-
spread macro-financial imbalances in the area, given 
that the household savings ratio is high and that the 
current account is almost balanced. The main risk 
threatening this scenario is the possibility that new 
complications may arise in the Middle East, which 
could lead to a further deterioration in agents’ con-
fidence. Also, the employment outlook is highly un-
certain; in the absence of sufficient wage modera-
tion, the consequent growth of unit labour costs 
and extended demand weakness could prompt firms 
to make greater staff adjustments than they have in 
the past. 
III.1.2. Prices and costs
The path of inflation in the euro area in 2002 
was marked by the upward impact of various supply 
shocks and by the downward stickiness of wages 
and non-tradables prices, despite the weakness of 
demand. In addition, the dispersion of national infla-
tion rates, which has been notably persistent in re-
cent years, increased slightly in 2002. 
The rate of increase in the final demand deflator 
fell by more than half a percentage point in 2002, 
largely as a consequence of the sharp reduction in 
the prices of imported goods and services, since 
domestic prices, approximated by the GDP deflator, 
grew at the same rate as in the previous year (see 
Table III.1). The imports deflator reflected both the 
moderate increases in the export prices of Spain’s 
main trading partners in their own currencies and 
the appreciation of the euro. As regards domestic 
costs, the strong growth in net indirect taxes per 
unit of output prevented the GDP deflator slowing 
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BOX III.1
Differential effect of the euro’s appreciation on exports by euro area countries
In 2002 and the first few months of 2003 the euro 
exchange rate appreciated sharply both in nominal and 
real effective terms. This trend may lead to a diminished 
buoyancy of exports outside the euro area, which would 
adversely affect the rate of expansion of the area’s GDP. 
Moreover, the appreciation of the euro may have uneven 
effects on economic activity across countries, depending 
on the disparities in their production and trade struc-
tures, and on the differences in the workings of their 
factor markets.
In particular, just how much the exports of euro 
area countries are affected by the euro’s appreciation will 
turn basically on three factors. The first is the geographi-
cal structure of trade, since it can be expected that, if a 
higher percentage of a euro area country’s sales is to 
non-euro area countries, the euro’s appreciation will feed 
through more fully to its nominal effective exchange 
rates. Second is the extent to which exporters respond 
by reducing their euro-denominated prices to offset the 
currency’s appreciation and thereby maintain export 
markets. And third is the response of demand for ex-
ports to changes in relative prices.
The first of the adjacent panels shows that the share 
of non-euro area exports in total exports ranges from 
60% for Ireland, Greece and Finland to somewhat below 
40% for the Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium and Spain. 
Also, there is notable disparity among countries in how 
their exports respond to changes in competitiveness. The 
second panel compares the estimated elasticities of de-
mand for each euro area country’s manufacturing ex-
ports to changes in competitiveness, using data series for 
the period 1975-2002. It can be seen that manufacturing 
exports scarcely vary in response to changes in the real 
exchange rate in Belgium and the Netherlands, but are 
very sensitive in Finland and Spain. This heterogeneity re-
flects, in addition to specific factors in each country, the 
differences in export structure. Notable among the idio-
syncratic factors is the considerable significance in Bel-
gium and the Netherlands of re-exports, i.e. tradable 
goods with origin and destination in third countries, 
which have a price elasticity of nearly zero.
To assess the differences in how each country’s for-
eign sales respond to an appreciation, it has been assumed, 
for the sake of simplicity, that export prices in euro re-
spond to an appreciation in the same proportion in all 
countries. Therefore the differential effect of the apprecia-
tion on exports derives directly from the two variables mentioned in the previous paragraph: the share of non-euro area ex-
ports and price elasticity. The third panel shows the differential effect of an appreciation of 10% (expressed as deviations of 
the impact on each country from the average). The largest decreases in foreign sales are in Finland and Greece, countries in 
which high price elasticity is combined with a significant share of non-euro area trade. At the opposite extreme are Belgium 
and the Netherlands, due to low price elasticity.
Lastly, the first panel shows the share of manufacturing exports in GDP or the degree of openness of each member 
country. This variable also exhibits marked differences across countries, since it exceeds 50% in Belgium and Ireland and is 
below 20% in Greece and Spain. The low degree of openness of the latter two countries can be expected to notably miti-
gate the extent to which the estimated decline in their exports translates into GDP changes. However, the effect of ap-
preciation on the GDP of the various countries, in addition to depending on how exports perform, is determined by many 
other factors, such as the response of imports and the impact of the appreciation on other macroeconomic aggregates, 
employment or domestic prices.
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further. In fact, the value-added deflator which ex-
cludes the direct impact of most of the net indirect 
taxes fell more sharply, as a consequence of the 
slower growth of unit labour costs and of the gross 
operating surplus per unit of value added.
The slowdown in unit labour costs stemmed 
from the slight recovery in productivity, since wages 
grew at the same rate as in 2001, but it was not suf-
ficient to allow profit margins to widen (see Chart 
III.3). In fact, although the sustained increase in 
nominal wages (partly reflecting multi-year settle-
ments signed at a more favourable stage of the busi-
ness cycle) enabled household purchasing power to 
improve, it also reduced the buoyancy of employ-
ment. The slowdown in the gross operating surplus 
is consistent with the progressive weakening of de-
mand pressure, although margins performed very 
differently across the various industries, narrowing 
significantly in those that are more sensitive to in-
ternational competition and increasing in the more 
sheltered ones (see the lower panel of Chart III.3).
The average rate of change in the Harmonised 
Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) was 2.2% in 2002, 
0.2 percentage points less than in the previous year. 
The behaviour of the HICP during the year was de-
termined by its more volatile components and dis-
played two very different trends: a continuous de-
cline in year-on-year rates during the first half, to 
1.8% in June, as a consequence of a reduction in the 
effects on the food component of the period of ad-
verse weather, and a subsequent pick-up, as the oil 
price increased. The rate of increase in the prices of 
the group of products whose prices tend to be 
more stable (known as the IPSEBENE) rose from 2% 
in 2001 to 2.5% in 2002, although the trend during 
the year was slightly downward. Services prices in-
creased, on average, at the highest rate and, although 
they were less buoyant from September, their rate 
of increase never dropped below 3%.
The studies carried out to estimate the effect on 
inflation of the introduction of euro notes and coins 
all highlight the moderate importance of this phe-
nomenon. The increase in prices may have been at-
tributable to the existence of price adjustment costs 
(menu costs), which prompted firms to concentrate 
their price changes at the time of the change in 
their denomination. Also, the setting of attractive or 
round prices may have had an upward impact. How-
ever, most of the impact seems to have arisen from 
the passing through of the costs of the changeover 
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from producers and retailers to consumers and, in 
some cases, from an attempt by firms to widen their 
profit margins, as is evidenced by the fact that the 
effects on prices were mainly concentrated in cer-
tain services sectors, where suppliers have greater 
market power.
In 2002, the rate of change of the prices of the 
HICP items most affected by the changeover stead-
ied, so that the repercussions on inflation will fore-
seeably prove to be temporary, although further ef-
fects may still arise. Although consumers perceived 
an inflation increase in 2002 above that reflected in 
the HICP (which they attributed to the conversion 
of prices to euro, as shown by the significant in-
crease in the level of the perceived inflation indica-
tor compiled by the European Commission), medi-
um-term inflation expectations have held steady, 
which suggests that consumers consider that the ef-
fect on prices of the launch of the euro will prove 
to be temporary.
As mentioned above, the dispersion of inflation 
rates across the euro area countries was relatively 
wide (see Chart III.2). Although the different cyclical 
position of each country seems to explain part of 
the differences in inflation, this is not sufficient to 
explain the level and persistence of the observed 
inflation differentials. In fact, in addition to factors 
associated with the process of convergence in price 
and income levels that may have some medium and 
long-term influence, the observed differentials seem 
to be closely related to differences in the degree of 
flexibility in factor and goods and services markets, 
which amplify the effect of demand shocks (whether 
common or idiosyncratic) on national price indices. 
The different behaviour of wages and margins in 
each country’s price formation process suggest that 
stickiness in the adjustment of nominal variables to 
shocks and the differences in the degree of compe-
tition in goods markets give rise to significant differ-
entials that may have lasting effects on the competi-
tiveness of each national economy (see Box III.2).
The inflation rate rose again at the beginning of 
2003, largely on account of the rise in the price of 
oil as a result of heightened international political 
tension, while the most stable components remained 
on the downward trend that commenced at the end 
of last year. Accordingly, the process of price mod-
eration can be expected to resume, once the factors 
that have driven the increase in the price of energy 
unwind. Moreover, the delayed effects of the cumula-
tive appreciation of the euro in 2002 and in the first 
few months of 2003 will probably have a moderating 
effect on the prices of some components.
III.2.  FISCAL AND STRUCTURAL 
POLICIES IN THE EURO AREA
III.2.1. Fiscal policy
Public finances in the euro area deteriorated 
considerably last year. The budget deficit increased 
by 0.6 percentage points from 2001, to 2.2% of GDP. 
This was the result of a 0.3 percentage point decline 
in the share of total revenues in GDP and a 0.5 per-
centage point increase in the weight of primary 
spending (in particular on current transfers), while 
interest payments fell by 0.2 percentage points (see 
Chart III.4). According to European Commission 
calculations, half of the deterioration was attributa-
ble to the impact of the economic downturn on tax 
revenues and on spending on unemployment benefit. 
The cyclically adjusted primary surplus is estimated 
to have fallen by 0.3 percentage points of GDP in 
2002. Budget balances deteriorated, relative to the 
previous year, in all the Member States, except for 
Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal, while only Belgium, 
Spain, Luxembourg and Finland either fulfilled or 
else narrowly missed the targets set in their respec-
tive stability programmes, both in nominal and cycli-
cally adjusted terms.
Analysis of the national budget results for 2002 
confirms the existence of two groups of countries 
whose public finances have diverged since 1999 (see 
the middle panel of Chart III.4). Until that year, in 
general terms, all the countries of the area had 
made efforts to move towards a budgetary position 
close to balance. However, the group of four coun-
tries that still have significant imbalances today, in 
terms of actual budget balances (i.e. Germany, 
France, Italy and Portugal), failed to capitalise in 
1999 and 2000 on the economic upturn to intensify 
the consolidation drive, while the slowdown in ac-
tivity in the following two years was accompanied 
by a further increase in the deficit. Meanwhile, the 
other eight countries continued, on aggregate, to 
draw nearer to a position close to balance, which 
they attained in 2001 and maintained in 2002. The 
failure of the first group of countries to attain a 
budget position consistent with the requirements of 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), postponing the 
attainment of balance in their successive stability 
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programmes, has restricted the scope for fiscal poli-
cy to perform its potentially stabilising role in the 
current situation.
This deterioration of the budget balance in vari-
ous countries of the area, to the point where the 
deficit limit of 3% of GDP laid down by the Treaty 
on European Union was initially put in jeopardy and 
subsequently breached, led to application of the 
mechanisms envisaged in the SGP. Thus, in January 
2002, given the risk that the German and Portu-
guese deficits would exceed the 3% limit, the Euro-
pean Commission initiated the early warning proce-
dure for both countries. However the ECOFIN 
Council decided not to adopt the Commission’s 
recommendation in view of a commitment by both 
Member States to take the necessary measures to 
avoid a breach of the deficit limit.
However, the new budget-outturn information 
emerging during the course of the year in both 
countries led the Commission to activate the 
provisions of the SGP again. In July, the results of 
a revision of the Portuguese public accounts for 
2001 were released, according to which the defi-
cit had been 4.1% of GDP that year, and not 2.2% 
as notified in the spring by the Portuguese au-
thorities. Likewise, in the autumn, the European 
Commission forecast a German deficit for 2002 
clearly in excess of 3% of GDP. As a result, the 
ECOFIN Council recognised, in November 2002 
and January 2003 respectively, the existence of an 
excessive deficit in Portugal and in Germany, and 
recommended to the authorities of both coun-
tries that they take the necessary measures to 
resolve the situation. In the case of Germany, the 
government promised (with the approval of the 
Council) to adopt, if necessary, the budget meas-
ures needed to achieve the target deficit of 2.8% 
of GDP in 2003, provided that economic growth 
is not significantly below the 1.5% level forecast in 
the programme for this year.
Finally, in November, the Commission initiated 
the early warning procedure for France, when the 
French government estimated that the deficit would 
reach 2.7% of GDP in 2002, greatly limiting the mar-
gin available to absorb additional minor shocks with-
out breaching the 3% limit. In fact, after the adoption 
by the ECOFIN Council of the related recommen-
dation in January, the French authorities announced 
that the deficit had reached 3.2% of GDP. This led 
the Commission, in April, to initiate an excessive 
deficit procedure against this country too.
Experience since the entry into force of the SGP, 
spanning two quite different stages of the business 
cycle, has served to demonstrate that this is an in-
strument that sets appropriate targets for the public 
finances of the area. From a short-term viewpoint, 
the SGP is excessively restrictive for countries that 
have failed to fulfil the requirement of maintaining a 
position of balance on average over the cycle. How-
ever, achieving such a position affords automatic 
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BOX III.2
Inflation differentials in the euro area
The irrevocable exchange rates set between the euro area countries have not eliminated the possibility that relative prices 
between member countries will continue to change, thus generating inflation differentials which, in a monetary union, are tanta-
mount to variations in the bilateral real exchange rate. To analyse the determinants here, the historical variations in the real ex-
change rate can be broken down into, on the one hand, the tradable sector price growth differential with prices expressed in the 
same currency and, on the other, the inter-country growth differential of relative prices of non-tradable versus tradable goods. 
The top panel shows the average growth of the bilateral real exchange rate (RER) for the economy as a whole, of the real 
exchange rate for the tradable sector (RERT) and of the differential of the relative prices of non-tradable versus tradable goods 
(pNT/pT) of France, Italy and Spain with respect to Germany. The panel distinguishes between the period 1989-1994 (before the 
creation of the euro area) and the latest period on which data are available, 1995-2001. The data are annual sectoral figures taken 
from the OECD STAN database. In no country is the growth of the real exchange rates of tradable goods equal to zero, as should 
be the case if the single price law holds. In fact this component explains most of the total real exchange rate behaviour in the first 
period, although its contribution diminishes in later years as a logical consequence of progress towards the single market. The 
panel also reflects significant growth differentials between the relative prices of non-tradable versus tradable goods in these coun-
tries, particularly in the later years, when they became the factor that best explains the change in the real exchange rate or, what 
amounts to the same thing, the inflation differential, from 1999. 
Relative price growth can also be broken down into the growth of its determinants: margins, wages and apparent labour pro-
ductivity. The lower panel shows these relative price growth differentials with respect to Germany as well as the contributions to 
this differential growth of its three components. According to the Balassa-Samuelson convergence theory, long-term inflation dif-
ferentials reflect changes in the relative productivity of the tradable sector with respect to the non-tradable sector and therefore 
do not affect a country’s competitiveness. However, for the overall period analysed, the behaviour of sectoral productivity differen-
tials does not sufficiently explain the changes in relative prices. In the last period analysed (1995-2001), only in the case of France 
is the sectoral productivity differential the main component of the price differential. In the case of Spain, the price differential with 
respect to Germany is mainly accounted for by margins and, in the case of Italy, by relative wages. 
This evidence reflects the existence of persistent deviations in inflation differentials that are unrelated to the process of 
structural adjustment. If these wage or relative margin growth differentials persist over time in any of the euro area countries, in-
flation differentials will continue to be generated which may reflect the existence of different degrees of rigidity in goods and la-
bour markets and may affect the competitiveness of these economies. 
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stabilisers sufficient margin to operate freely. A con-
sensus has progressively been forged, as a result of 
this experience, around the idea that the fiscal rules 
established for the area so as to provide a frame-
work for disciplining budgetary policies are generally 
appropriate, although they need to be applied more 
symmetrically over the cycle and in accordance with 
each country’s specific circumstances. This convic-
tion led the ECOFIN Council to approve a report 
on the strengthening of fiscal policy co-ordination 
(subsequently subscribed to by the European Coun-
cil of March 2003) which, without modifying the 
rules of the SGP, tries to clarify its interpretation. 
According to this report, achievement of the targets 
in national programmes should be assessed on the 
basis of cyclically adjusted balances, countries with 
high levels of debt should reduce them quickly, steps 
will be taken to ensure that policies are not pro-cy-
clical during upturns and more attention will be giv-
en to the way in which population ageing affects the 
long-term sustainability of each country’s fiscal situa-
tion. Also, it was reaffirmed that countries whose 
budgets are still far from being close to balance 
should follow a strategy based on an annual im-
provement in their underlying budget position of at 
least 0.5% of GDP.
Finally, a fundamental ingredient for the exist-
ing mechanisms to function satisfactorily is the 
rapid availability of high quality budget statistics. 
Although undoubted progress has been made in 
this area in the last few years, some recent epi-
sodes involving significant revisions to certain 
countries’ data, incomplete information on certain 
transactions and delays in receipt of the six 
monthly notifications of budgetary data from the 
Member Sates have shown that there is room for 
further improvement. Moreover, recognition of 
the importance of using cyclically adjusted bal-
ances in the procedures to supervise develop-
ments in fiscal policy requires an improvement in 
the analytical tools available to calculate them. So 
far this has led to adoption by the European 
Commission of a new method to obtain such bal-
ances, which could still be improved.
III.2.2. Structural policies
In 2002, the EU structural reform process did 
not generally advance at the speed necessary to 
achieve the goals set at the Lisbon Council for 2010 
to raise EU potential growth to 3%. The weakness of 
the pace of reform may have been related to the 
cyclical position of the European economy and of 
public finances in some countries and also, in the 
odd case, to factors of a political kind. In March 
2003, the European Council, meeting in Brussels, 
thus gave fresh impetus to the Lisbon programme, 
reaffirming its importance in view of the forthcoming 
expansion of the union. The Council specified a 
number of concrete actions that should be taken 
during the next twelve months in the areas of em-
ployment and social cohesion, innovation and entre-
preneurship, connecting Europe and strengthening 
the internal market and, finally, environmental pro-
tection for growth and jobs.
With regard to employment, measures have 
been adopted in recent years to stimulate labour-
market participation and the adjustment of worker 
profile to the demands of firms (employability). Such 
measures have been uneven and, generally, unambi-
tious, yet they do seem to be gradually influencing 
the behaviour of euro area labour markets. In par-
ticular, female participation continues to be promot-
ed in some countries, measures have been taken to 
adapt the education and ongoing training system to 
the needs of the labour market and public place-
ment services have been modernised. This has 
helped the rate of employment to grow regularly in 
recent years, although on the latest information 
available, it is still more than 5 p.p. below the 70% 
target set at Lisbon (see Table III.2).
However, the reforms of tax and social benefit 
systems to stimulate employment have been few 
and incomplete, most of them affecting taxes rather 
than reforming subsidy systems. Also, little progress 
has been made in eliminating barriers to geographi-
cal mobility, in particular in relation to the housing 
market. In any event, the slowdown in employment 
in the final part of the year and the downward 
stickiness of wage growth in 2002 illustrate the per-
manent nature of imperfections in the workings of 
the labour market which require more far-reaching 
reforms. The recent Brussels European Council es-
tablished an Employment Task Force to analyse the 
European labour market, in order to identify practi-
cal reform measures so that the targets set can be 
achieved. Its conclusions will be published in the 
spring of 2004.
A basic component of the Lisbon strategy, em-
phasised in the conclusions of the recent Brussels 
Council, is the transition to an information and 
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knowledge-based society. This embraces some 
highly diverse initiatives, such as the eEurope 2005 
Action Plan, the creation of a European Research 
Area and policies to promote innovation and edu-
cation, especially in the area of new technologies. 
Advances have been made, above all, in Internet 
penetration, despite the delay in the widespread 
availability of broad band services. In other areas, 
such as human capital development, R&D invest-
ment and information and communication technol-
ogies, progress has been scant (see Box III.3). The 
existence of a genuine Community patent, a most 
important institutional factor for R&D activity and 
its productive application, is hindered by the exist-
ence of significant technical barriers. However, the 
European countries reached an agreement in 
March 2003 for the Community patent to become 
a reality in 2005, at a significantly lower cost than 
under the current system. This will facilitate regis-
tration and, therefore, stimulate the development 
of industrial and scientific inventions.
The achievements have not been satisfactory 
either as regards the functioning and integration of 
product markets. On the tenth anniversary of the 
Internal Market a certain increase in the directive 
transposition deficit has been noted. After falling 
from 1992 there has recently been a rise, so that 
the percentage of directives overdue for transposi-
tion stood at 2.1% at the end of 2002, as against 
1.8% in May. Moreover, effective application of the 
transposed regulation is far from satisfactory, given 
that the number of infringement proceedings open 
is holding steady at around 1,500 cases, without 
any decline in this figure in 2002. In any event, eco-
nomic integration, the objective of the internal 
market programme, has slowed somewhat in cer-
tain fields, judging by the indicators available on in-
tra-Community trade and cross-border direct in-
vestment.
In the network industries, liberalisation is pro-
ceeding somewhat indecisively, with significant 
cross-country differences. In telecommunications, 
the former monopolies still have high market 
shares (around 80% in twelve Member States). 
Given these limitations, and the fact that six years 
had passed since the sector was liberalised, in Feb-
ruary 2003 the European Commission established 
a new regulatory framework to extend competi-
tion in this market. Likewise, the high industrial 
concentration in the gas and electricity sectors is 
conducive to a certain degree of downward price 
stickiness, which shows that the level of competi-
tion is still insufficient. It should be recalled that 
2004 was the deadline set at the Barcelona Coun-
cil for freedom of choice of supplier for non-
household gas and electricity consumers, while 
2005 was the date set for cross-border electricity 
interconnections to reach at least 10% of produc-
tion capacity. The conclusions of the Brussels 
Council included an express reference to the need 
to complete the reforms pending in this area.
Possibly the clearest progress has been made in 
the financial sphere. Thirty of the forty-two meas-
ures included in the 1998 Financial Services Action 
Plan have been finalised, notable progress having 
been made in securities markets. In 2002, the ar-
rangements proposed in the Lamfalussy Report to 
speed up the production of harmonised legislation, 
by means of the establishment of two new com-
mittees of regulators and supervisors, were put 
into operation. Also, the initiative to transfer these 
arrangements to the sphere of banking and insur-
ance was approved, so that in future new commit-
tees will also start to function in these fields, the 
objective being to achieve full integration of all fi-
nancial services markets in 2005. Finally, the Finan-
cial Services Committee (replacing the former Fi-
nancial Services Policy Group) was set up in March 
2003, with responsibility for advising the ECOFIN 
on the most important financial issues. The crea-
tion of this Committee is an acknowledgement of 
the growing importance of factors relating to fi-
nancial stability in the debate of the European eco-
nomic authorities.
Also noteworthy were the initiatives taken in 
Europe to promote the better functioning of capi-
tal markets, to make up for investors’ loss of confi-
dence as a result of the accounting irregularities 
detected in recent years in certain US firms and 
also, albeit to a lesser extent, in European ones. 
Following the informal ECOFIN meeting in Oviedo 
in April 2002, the European Commission, along 
with the Member States, began to analyse issues 
relating to the quality of the financial information 
provided by firms, the behaviour of analysts and 
rating agencies, the need for audit firms to be inde-
pendent and the need for firm’s internal govern-
ance practices to be improved. The European 
Commission, in May of this year, published a Com-
munication detailing the specific measures that may 
be applied in the near future in relation to some of 
these issues.
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BOX III.3
Productive specialisation of Europe in comparison with the United States
In the 1990s European manufacturing industry record-
ed moderate growth rates in comparison with those ob-
served in the United States (see first panel). This disparity in 
manufacturing growth rates in the two economies re-
emerged in 2002, after the sharp fall in value added in the 
United States in 2001. Thus the gross value added of Euro-
pean manufactures, expressed at constant prices, rose by 
1.2% on average in the period 1990-2002, compared with 
2.7% in the United States in the same period. Analysis of the 
characteristics and transformations of the pattern of pro-
ductive specialisation in these regions could help to explain 
the reasons for such disparate behaviour.
The second panel shows the composition of gross val-
ue added at constant prices of the EU and the United States 
for 2000 (the latest year for which information is available), 
grouping the various industries by technological intensity. As 
can be seen, the structure of European manufactures was 
characterised by the predominance of medium-high technol-
ogy industries, including most notably motor vehicles, elec-
trical and electronic machinery, mechanical machinery and 
equipment and chemicals. The traditional industries with low 
technological requirements, particularly food, beverages and 
tobacco, also represented a high proportion of European in-
dustry, while those based on more advanced technology ac-
counted for a small share. In the composition of US manu-
factures, production by medium-high technology industries 
was also significant, but particularly notable was the higher 
relative importance of manufactures involving the use of new 
technologies, such as the office materials and IT equipment 
and the electronic and communications materials sectors.
The transformations during the 1990s indicate that the 
productive structure of both areas shifted towards the high-
er technology sectors to the detriment of the so-called tra-
ditional activities. However, the increase in the share of high-
technology manufactures in the productive structure of the 
EU, which amounted to 2.7%, was more moderate than that 
registered in the United states (5.6%), thereby widening the 
traditional gap between the United States and Europe in the 
relative weight of these sectors. Also the share of medium-
high technology industries in the productive structure of the 
United States rose significantly – with particularly notable 
rises in electrical machinery and mechanical machinery – and 
in 2002 their weight was similar in the two areas. This con-
trasts with the relative position at the beginning of the 
1990s, when the EU showed a certain relative specialisation 
in this type of production.
In all, the expansion of manufactures with greater tech-
nological requirements in the US economy has, on average, 
been much more marked than in the EU. Consequently, in 
2000 the industrial structure of the EU as a whole continues, 
in comparision with the United States, to focus more on the 
lower technology sectors. The fact that European industry is 
more oriented towards traditional industries characterised 
by less buoyant world demand and higher competitive pres-
sure from the more recently industrialised countries, may, 
among other factors, help to explain the reduced buoyancy 
of the European manufacturing sector in those years.
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III.3.  THE COMMON MONETARY POLICY 
AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL 
CONDITIONS IN THE EURO AREA
III.3.1. Monetary policy decisions
In 2002, the growth of activity and, in particular, 
of domestic demand remained weak in the euro 
area for a large part of the year. This, along with 
some downward stickiness in inflation, made the 
monetary policy decision making process more 
complex, yet the ECB was still able to keep mone-
tary conditions conducive to economic activity and 
compatible with its priority objective of preserving 
price stability.
In 2001, the existence of a relatively favourable 
inflation outlook had enabled the ECB to accommo-
date its policy to the downturn in the euro area. In-
terest rates were lowered by 1.5 percentage points 
that year, to 3.25% in November. In the first few 
months of 2002, the economic indicators were 
pointing to a gradual increase in real GDP growth 
over the year, helped by the improvement in the in-
ternational environment. On the side of prices 
though, certain inflationary pressures were begin-
ning to be discerned. These stemmed, in part, from 
the incipient economic recovery and from the be-
haviour of the less volatile components of the price 
index. As a result, the markets began to anticipate a 
change in stance towards a more restrictive mone-
tary policy (see Chart III.5). However, the Governing 
Council of the ECB, even though it perceived cer-
tain inflationary risks at that time, decided to main-
tain a cautious approach, in view of the continued 
weakness of the economic recovery.
In the summer, it began to transpire that the re-
covery was not progressing as rapidly as expected, 
either in the euro area or in its external environ-
ment, while the time at which GDP growth in the 
area was expected to reach its potential rate reced-
ed to 2003. There was thus a deterioration in the 
confidence of economic agents which, along with 
further falls in stock values, had a negative impact on 
private spending decisions. The subdued tempo of 
economic activity, together with the appreciation of 
the euro (linked to the international tension, the 
imbalances in the US economy and the excessive 
depreciation of the European currency since 1999) 
relieved price pressures, although these were still 
being fuelled by the rise in oil prices and – despite 
the weakness in activity – continued wage inertia.
�
�
�
�
�
������ ������ ������ ������ ������ ������
�
�
�
�
�
������� ��������
�������� ������� ��������
� �
��� �������� �����
�����
��� ������ ������������
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
� � � � � � � � � � �� �� �� �� �� ��
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
���
�����������
�����������
�����������
�����������
�����
���� ������ ����� ���
���
���
���
���
���
���
� � � � � � � � � � �� ��
���
���
���
���
���
���
����������� �����������
����������� �����������
�����������
�����
���� ��������� �� ���������
������� ����� ���
�������� ����� �� ������ ��� ����
��� ���� ���� ����� ������� �����
��� ���� ���� ����� ����� ������ �����
���� ���� �������� �����
����� �����
66 67
In the latter months of the year, growth expecta-
tions in the euro area deteriorated further. The ap-
preciation of the euro intensified, mitigating the up-
ward effect on prices of the rise in the dollar price 
of a barrel of oil, and the less volatile components of 
inflation began to abate for the first time in the year. 
Meanwhile, the further falls in stock values and the 
high level of risk premiums on private fixed income, 
along with the rise in the euro, meant that financial 
conditions were tighter than the level of interest 
rates and the rate of expansion of monetary aggre-
gates implied (see Chart III.6). All this led the ECB, 
at its meeting of 5 December 2002, to reduce the 
rate on its main refinancing transactions by 50 basis 
points to 2.75%. In the opening months of 2003, glo-
bal economic conditions deteriorated further, owing 
to the worsening of the political crisis associated 
with the war in Iraq and the consequent increase in 
instability on the financial and foreign-exchange mar-
kets. Against this background, the ECB again eased 
the stance of its monetary policy, on 6 March, low-
ering its policy rate at 2.50%.
As regards the implementation of monetary pol-
icy, there were certain moments in 2001 and 2002, 
marked by strong downward expectations, when 
the amounts demanded in the liquidity tenders were 
less than the Eurosystem’s estimated liquidity re-
quirements, hampering the smooth functioning of 
money markets. As a result, the ECB has proposed a 
change in the operational framework, which will 
come into force in 2004 (see Box III.4).
Also, in the first few months of 2003 the Eu-
rosystem carried out a detailed evaluation of the 
performance of the monetary policy strategy during 
the four years since the start of Stage Three of EMU. 
The Governing Council concluded, on the basis of 
this evaluation, that the strategy had functioned sat-
isfactorily and it confirmed its definition of price 
stability as “a year-on-year increase in the HICP for 
the euro area of below 2%”. In addition, it clarified 
that in the pursuit of price stability it aims to main-
tain inflation rates at levels close to 2% over the 
medium term, in order to guard against the risks of 
deflation, while taking into account the possible 
measurement bias in HICP and the implications of 
national inflation differentials within the euro area. It 
also confirmed that its monetary policy decisions 
will continue to be based on a comprehensive analy-
sis of the risks to price stability founded on a two-
pillar framework. It resolved, however, to restructure 
the President’s public statements, in order to stress 
the existence of a unified assessment of the outlook 
for prices based on the parallel evaluation of macro-
economic and monetary developments. The eco-
nomic analysis identifies the short to medium-term 
inflationary risks. It is cross-checked with the mon-
etary analysis, which is conducted from a medium to 
long-term perspective. The latter will continue to 
cover a wide range of indicators, including M3 
whose reference value will no longer be reviewed 
by the Governing Council on an annual basis.
III.3.2.  Financial developments
in the euro area
Developments on money and debt markets in 
2002 were largely governed by the change in growth 
expectations for the area. Up until May, interest 
rates on interbank deposits increased, the longer 
the term the larger the rise, so that the slope of the 
yield curve changed with respect to December 
2001. The improvement in the world economic out-
look also helped to raise long-term interest rates in 
the euro area, in line with the movements seen in 
other economic areas. However, from June, pessi-
mism on the future performance of activity led to 
falling yields. The decline in long-term rates was, to 
some extent, a result of financial shifts from equities 
towards safer assets, against a background of high 
uncertainty. Likewise, the exchange rate of the euro 
displayed two different trends. Following the weak-
ness that it continued to display up until April, in 
May it embarked on an upward path that it remained 
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on in early 2003. Thus, between end-2001 and mid-
May 2003 the euro appreciated by 30% relative to 
the US dollar (see Chart III.7).
The path of interest rates applied by credit and 
deposit institutions vis-à-vis their customers during 
the year was similar to that of interbank market 
rates (see Chart III.8). The interest rate on loans to 
enterprises with a maturity of more than one year 
stood in December 2002 half a percentage point 
below its end-2001 level, although it is likely that the 
deterioration in borrower creditworthiness was re-
flected in greater caution on the part of institutions 
when extending finance. Indeed, the increase in risk 
premiums on private fixed income and the notable 
fall in share prices for the third year running made it 
more difficult for firms to finance their investment 
projects (see Chart III.9). European indices fell by 
more than those of other areas, largely as a conse-
quence of the deterioration in profitability prospects 
for significant projects in the IT and telecommunica-
tions field, the significant weakening of the macro-
economic outlook, and the unfavourable perform-
ance of European insurance companies, which were 
heavily penalised for certain disasters (such as 11 
September and the floods of summer 2002) and for 
the decline in value of their own marketable assets 
(see Box V.2).
The significant shifts in agents’ portfolios were 
also reflected in a strong rise in the demand for liq-
uid assets, so that M3 growth held at high rates of 
around 7% throughout the year (see Chart III.10). 
Given that this greater preference for liquidity was 
not based on any need to carry out transactions, 
but rather stemmed from portfolio adjustment, the 
ECB considered that the strong increase in liquid 
assets did not in itself pose a risk to price stability, 
within its two-pillar strategy framework, so it did 
not bear on the decisions taken to ease monetary 
policy.
Financing to the private sector from Monetary 
Financial Institutions (MFIs) grew at a moderate rate 
throughout 2002 (4.7%). The more subdued eco-
nomic activity in the euro area and the desire on 
the part of non-financial corporations to rebuild 
their balance sheet offset the effect of the reduction 
in interest rates.
A sectoral analysis reveals a loss of momentum 
in lending to non-financial corporations and an in-
crease in lending to households, owing to the 
strength of loans for house purchase. Household 
debt thus increased again in 2002, to 51% of GDP, 
which is below the current ratio in the United 
States, Japan and the United Kingdom. By contrast, 
the level of debt of non-financial corporations 
(which, besides credit, includes corporate bonds and 
pension fund reserves) was more buoyant than bank 
loans, although it also slowed in 2002. Even so, the 
sector’s debt-to-GDP ratio stood at historically high 
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BOX III.4
Measures to enhance the efficiency of the operational framework of monetary policy
The single monetary policy operational framework 
includes, as one of its basic tenets, a minimum reserve 
ratio whereby credit institutions are required to maintain 
for a specific time period (known as the maintenance 
period) a set average liquidity balance in their accounts 
with the central bank of the country in which they oper-
ate. In addition, the Eurosystem provides the bulk of li-
quidity through its main refinancing operations (MROs) 
which, since June 2000, have been conducted via a varia-
ble-rate tender (American or multiple-rate method) with 
a minimum interest rate for bids.
This means of establishing minimum reserves has a 
stabilising effect on money market interest rates since, if 
faced with an unexpected liquidity shortage (surplus), in-
stitutions are not obliged to turn immediately to this 
market to remedy it – which would drive interest rates 
up (down) – but can make use of their central bank de-
posits and offset, over the following days, the effect that 
this may have had on their average balance (1). However, 
this stabilising property is weakened when expectations 
(on occasions unfounded) of changes in the Eurosystem 
intervention rate become widespread. The second of the 
adjacent panels illustrates this by drawing on the experi-
ence of the four MROs in 2001, in which, as a result of 
the market’s conviction about the imminent easing of 
monetary policy, the quantities demanded fell below the 
system’s estimated liquidity requirements.
Thus, if an institution expects a rate cut, it will wish 
to reduce its balance with the central bank now, when li-
quidity is relatively more expensive, with the intention of 
replenishing it after the cut. This will lead to downward pressure on interbank interest rates. The table shows how, in the 
days preceding those tenders, the spread between the EONIA and the minimum bid rate indeed tended to stand below 
the average level. In addition, the institution will demand fewer funds in MROs. If these expectations become general, the 
quantitites demanded in the tender will, overall, be insufficient to cover the system’s needs and the lack of liquidity will 
become apparent immediately after the tender. This means that, as confirmed by the table, money market rates will tend to 
stand above their average. In short, expectations cause rates to be more volatile than would be desirable.
This is the background against which one must view the measures recently adopted by the ECB Governing Council 
to change the scheduled maintenance periods and reduce the MRO maturity period from two weeks to one week (2). 
Together with the decision adopted in autumn of 2001 whereby the assessment of the monetary policy stance – and 
possible intervention rate changes – will generally only take place in the first of the Governing Council’s two meetings 
each month, these changes will enable the destabilising effects of money market expectations to be eliminated.
Following the new measures, each maintenance period will commence with the first MRO after the Governing Coun-
cil meeting held to assess the single monetary policy stance, and end just before the equivalent tender the following month. 
Also, MROs will cease to overlap as they have done to date, so none of them will provide liquidity that can be used to 
cover minimum reserve requirements relating to two consecutive maintenance periods. Consequently, at the beginning of 
each maintenance period, the institutions will know the minimum bid rate that will be in force for all the tenders in which 
liquidity can be obtained to cover the minimum reserve requirements for that particular period. Thus, even if, at a given 
time, the institutions expect a change in the minimum rate, they will know that the change will not occur until the current 
maintenance period has ended and, therefore, will not have any incentive to change either the management of their depos-
its with the central bank or the volume of their bids in Eurosystem liquidity tenders.
(1) Table 1 shows, for illustrative purposes, the short-term interest rate volatility that has resulted from the different monetary policy opera-
tional frameworks in the euro area, the United States and the United Kingdom. 
(2) Their entry into force is planned for 2004 Q1.
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levels (around 60%), largely as a result of the 
considerable increase in debt to finance mergers 
and acquisitions activity and the purchase of third 
generation (UMTS) mobile telephony licences be-
tween 1998 and 2000. Nonetheless, the debt service 
burden of non-financial corporations was lower at 
end-2002 than at the beginning of the 1990s, owing 
to the decline in interest rates.
Across countries, the behaviour of lending to the 
non-financial private sector also varied widely. Those 
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economies in which nominal interest rates fell most 
as a result of participation in Stage Three of EMU 
and those in which property purchases remained 
buoyant, were also those with the highest rates of 
growth of financing (see Chart III.10). At the other 
extreme, the case of Germany was notable. Its unfa-
vourable cyclical position, combined with greater 
caution on the part of institutions in their lending 
policy, partly related to certain structural weakness-
es in the sector, led to stagnation in lending to the 
private sector.
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The moderate rate of expansion of lending, to-
gether with the increase in bank deposits, enabled 
credit institutions to increase their net external assets 
considerably.  As a result, net loans from euro area MFIs 
to the rest of the world totalled about €137 billion last 
year, which contrasts with the large flows of financing 
raised abroad by MFIs in 1999 and 2000. In 2002 there 
was also an increase in the net inflows of portfolio in-
vestment and a significant reduction in outflows of di-
rect investment. In terms of the basic balance (defined 
here as the current and capital account balance, to-
gether with the net stock of direct and portfolio in-
vestment), these movements meant that the euro area 
recorded a surplus in 2002, for the first time since the 
start of Stage Three of EMU, which may have helped 
the euro to rise during the year.
CHAPTER IV
THE SPANISH ECONOMY
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IV.1. ECONOMIC POLICIES
IV.1.1. Monetary and financial conditions
Throughout 2002 relative financing conditions, 
which are analysed in greater detail in the following 
chapter, were considerably generous in Spain, to a 
greater extent than in the euro area on average. 
Despite the prevailing uncertainty, households and 
companies retained their confidence that a frame-
work of macroeconomic stability would firm. As a 
result, the generosity of financial conditions led pri-
vate-sector agents to resort to greater debt to fi-
nance their spending decisions, thereby contributing 
to limiting the intensity and scale of the current cy-
clical downturn.
As discussed in the previous chapter, money 
market interest rates in the euro area resumed 
from mid-2002 the declining path that characterised 
their behaviour throughout 2001. They were influ-
enced by the expectations of a cut in the ECB offi-
cial intervention rate, which came about in Decem-
ber and, again, in March this year. In Spain, banks’ 
lending and deposit interest rates moved in the 
same direction, although the decline was more 
marked in the case of the former which ended the 
year 46 basis points (b.p.) below the related figure 
as at December 2001; deposits rates, for their part, 
fell by 16 b.p.. This trend has continued into the 
opening months of 2003.
Spanish long-term government debt yields also 
declined substantially during 2002, ending the year 
at around 4.4% in the case of 10-year bonds, with a 
virtually zero spread over the related German bund. 
This trend has also been maintained in the early 
months of the current year. However, the pass-
through of these movements to the financing costs 
relevant to business decisions would not seem to be 
complete, since the risk premia of the biggest Span-
ish corporations traded on the credit derivatives 
markets increased, and some even saw their credit 
quality downgraded.
The impact of short- and long-term interest rate 
cuts on the habitual indicators of monetary and fi-
nancial conditions was heightened by the increase in 
the inflation rate compared with the previous year. 
Conversely, the gradual appreciation of the euro 
during 2002, discussed in detail in the previous chap-
ter, operated in the opposite direction, as did move-
ments in stock market prices.
In fact, for the third year running the main do-
mestic stock market indices fell back (by 28.1% in 
the case of the IBEX 35), by a similar proportion to 
those in the United States, but less so than was the 
case in most European centres. These lower prices 
were accompanied, moreover, by high volatility, 
which ran into the opening months of 2003. This 
reflected the substantial uncertainty still prevailing in 
most of the main developed economies.
The adverse impact of the fall in share prices on 
Spanish household wealth tended to be offset by the 
favourable effect derived from rising house prices, 
the main asset held by households. The average 
price of appraised houses grew in 2002 by 16.6% ac-
cording to official Spanish data (Ministerio de Fo-
mento), 1.2 p.p. up on 2001, giving a cumulative in-
crease of more than 70% over the past four years. 
This increase is largely due to changes in the funda-
mental determinants of house prices, such as in-
come and interest rates. Nevertheless, the presence 
of an element of overvaluation is increasingly evi-
dent, though it is likely this will gradually be cor-
rected in the future, as was the case following the 
last expansionary phase of the house market at the 
beginning of the nineties.
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In these conditions, the annual growth of financ-
ing received by Spanish households stood in 2002 at 
around 15%, up on the rate a year earlier. As to the 
annual growth rate of financing raised by non-finan-
cial corporations, this was around 14%, although the 
figure shows a slowdown on the previous year, in 
line with what is to be expected of the compara-
tively more pro-cyclical nature generally characteris-
ing business credit (see Chart IV.1).
The expansionary course of financing to the 
non-financial private sector in 2002 led households’ 
and companies’ debt ratios to increase to high lev-
els. The associated financial burden, however, held 
relatively stable (it even fell slightly in the case of 
households), thanks to the above-mentioned trajec-
tory of interest rates. While the increases in their 
liabilities were compatible with continuing sound fi-
nancial positions in both sectors, higher debt levels 
entail a greater exposure of Spanish households and 
firms to potential disturbances that may adversely 
affect their revenue, their wealth or their financial 
costs.
IV.1.2. Domestic macroeconomic policies
Fiscal policy in 2002 was geared, for the second 
year running, to attaining a balanced budget, and this 
was duly reflected in the State budget. Nonetheless, 
the budget was drawn up at a time of great uncer-
tainty in respect of the international macroeconomic 
scenario, following the 11 September attacks. This 
prompted the implementation of a series of meas-
ures to boost activity and innovation. The Updated 
Stability Programme for the period 2001-2005, 
which was unveiled in December 2001, already in-
corporated a GDP growth forecast in 2002 of 2.4%, 
a somewhat more moderate figure than the initial 
budget projection, although it did reiterate the zero-
deficit target.
The budget estimated that the achievement of a 
balanced position in respect of the general govern-
ment non-financial transactions account would be 
obtained on the basis of a State deficit of 0.5 p.p. of 
GDP, a balanced Territorial Government position 
and a surplus on the Social Security System, also of 
the order of 0.5 p.p. of GDP. It was thus envisaged 
that the drive by the different government tiers to 
achieve a balanced budget would be maintained in 
2002, although the latest available data for 2001 and, 
as will be seen later, also for 2002 indicate a lesser 
fiscal effort by the Regional Governments, coun-
tered by more favourable Social Security results.
Numerous discretionary fiscal measures were 
applied in 2002 in seeking to meet various objec-
tives. First, the measures which in recent years had 
underpinned the reduction in primary current ex-
penditure (principally, the updating of civil service 
wages on the basis of the official inflation forecast 
and the continuing freeze on public-sector vacan-
cies) were extended so as to remain in force, at the 
same time that a more dynamic schedule for gov-
ernment investment was laid down. Further, the 
personal income tax schedule and the amount of 
the related personal and family tax-free allowances 
were frozen, certain indirect taxes were revised up-
wards (dues and fees, the standard VAT rate on toll 
roads, motorcycles and propane and butane, and 
excise duties on alcohol, beer and tobacco), and a 
new tax on retail sales of fuel was created, as part of 
the reform of regional government financing ar-
rangements. Lastly, a series of measures was intro-
duced, mainly via corporate income tax, with the 
aim of boosting activity, fostering innovation and 
promoting the use of new technologies, along with 
achieving greater neutrality in the treatment of cor-
porate concentrations. The measures included new 
deductions from gross tax payable (relating to in-
vestment in assets intended for R+D activities and 
technological innovation and to companies’ contri-
butions to employee pension schemes), the exten-
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sion of the scope of application of tax incentives to 
SMEs and the reduction of the tax on retained earn-
ings which, as will be seen in section IV.7, had a very 
positive temporary effect on corporate income tax 
takings during 2002.
This set of fiscal policy measures was expected 
to exert a moderate restraining influence in 2002 
that would, for the second year in succession, enable 
a balanced budget or a budget surplus to be at-
tained, in compliance with the requirements of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. On the fiscal projections 
of the Updated Stability and Growth Pact (2001-
2005), this position would be consolidated over the 
projection period with surpluses on the general 
government account in 2004 and 2005 of 0.1% and 
0.2% of GDP, respectively. This improved fiscal posi-
tion over the medium term would be accompanied 
by a significant decline in the public debt/GDP ratio 
from 55.7% in 2002 to 50% in 2005.
Regarding other aspects of general government 
conduct, new financing arrangements for the ordi-
nary-regime regional (autonomous) governments 
were set in place in 2002. These are very important 
in view of their repercussions in terms of furthering 
decentralisation and fiscal co-responsibility. The 
adoption of the new arrangements – which became 
permanent and particular to all the regional govern-
ments- entailed undertaking a far-reaching reform of 
the previous system, since it provided for the inte-
gration of the financing of health care and of social 
services into the overall system of financing, broad-
ened the territorial tax base underpinning regional 
government spending and conferred greater ena-
bling power on the regional governments in relation 
to the taxes assigned. The implementation of the 
new arrangements entails, however, new challenges. 
If they are to work properly, the transparency of the 
regional governments’ budgetary outturn must be 
reinforced and co-ordination between the different 
general government tiers must be stepped up.
Turning to pension systems, 2002 saw the intro-
duction of a series of measures stemming from the 
application of the Resolution for the improvement 
and development of the social protection system, 
signed a year earlier. Some of the measures (which 
were included in the 2002 budget) were intended to 
improve widows’ and orphans’ pensions, along with 
certain minimum pensions, and thus had an expan-
sionary effect on welfare benefit spending. Measures 
were also taken to strengthen the financial position 
of the Social Security System over the long term, 
including most notably the incorporation into the 
budget of a new provision for the reserve fund for 
pensions (totalling EUR 1.2 billion) and a series of 
measures to increase the rate of employment and 
the participation rate of the elderly. The latter meas-
ures were implemented mainly through two means: 
a cut in employers’ Social Security contributions, 
and the setting in place of a gradual and flexible re-
tirement system which, among other developments, 
makes the retirement pension compatible with part-
time work (1). There was no overhaul, however, of 
the pension system, as had been called for owing to 
the risks arising from the foreseeable ageing of the 
Spanish population for the future sustainability of 
public finances. The European Commission and 
ECOFIN made an announcement in this connection 
in their evaluation of Spain’s Updated Stability Pro-
gramme (2001-2005), while favourably assessing the 
fiscal consolidation drive undertaken in recent 
years.
Employment policy remained geared to the 
promotion of stable employment and to the em-
ployment of groups with the highest unemploy-
ment rates, through the extension of the employ-
ment-promoting permanent contract and continu-
ing rebates on social security contributions. More-
over, the government decided in May on a reform 
of the unemployment benefit system, and its asso-
ciated agricultural component. This was covered by 
Royal Decree Law 5/2002 on urgent measures for 
the reform of the unemployment protection sys-
tem and on improvements in employability, which 
was partly revised during its passage through Par-
liament. Among other aspects, the Royal Decree 
amended the general conditions for qualifying for 
unemployment and maintaining the attendant ben-
efits, requiring of the unemployed a signature com-
mitting themselves to labour activity, extending the 
definition of suitable employment and establishing 
a stricter sanctioning regime, applicable in the 
event of a job deemed suitable not being accepted. 
Further, it restricted the access of new beneficiar-
ies to the agricultural benefit system in place until 
then for casual labourers in Andalusia and Extrem-
adura, and introduced a new contributory system 
adapted to the characteristics of agricultural em-
(1) As regulated in Royal Decree-Law 16/2001 of 27 Decem-
ber 2001; in Law 35/2002 of 12 July 2002, and in the subsequent 
regulatory implementation thereof via Royal Decree 1132/2002 
of 31 October 2002.
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ployment, extensive to all Spanish regions. More 
recently (2), an assistance-based system has been 
established for new casual agricultural labourers in 
Andalusia and Extremadura, which seeks to allevi-
ate some of the main shortcomings of the previous 
system. This raft of measures attempts to strength-
en the link between the receipt of benefits and 
job-search by the unemployed, thereby increasing 
their employment potential. Conversely, no head-
way was made in reforming collective bargaining.
Finally, policies to liberalise and increase com-
petition in the markets for goods and services fo-
cused once again on the implementation of certain 
measures from the June 2000 liberalisation package 
still pending (mainly the unbundling of the share-
holder base of the companies owning the liquid 
hydrocarbons and gas distribution networks, and 
the implementation of an integrated economic sys-
tem for the gas industry). Measures were also 
adopted to bolster fair competition, by means of 
the amendment of the legal nature of Spain’s fair 
trading watchdog agency – which became an inde-
pendent body in 2002 – and the strengthening of 
its financial autonomy.
IV.2. DEMAND
Against the background of the monetary and fi-
nancial conditions and of the economic policies de-
scribed in the previous section, domestic expendi-
ture continued to slow in 2002, while the weakness 
prevailing in the international environment led to 
lower growth in goods and services exports. Over-
all, final demand grew by 2.1%, against 2.9% in 2001. 
It moved on a clearly slowing profile in the first half 
of the year, and improved slightly in the second half, 
mainly on the basis of the pick-up in exports (see 
Chart IV. 2). Under national demand, which grew by 
2.2% in 2002, 0.5 p.p. down on the previous year, in-
vestment in capital goods was cut substantially, while 
spending on construction and government con-
sumption continued to underpin activity.
The growth of household final consumption 
spending moderated in 2002, although its rate of 
change tended to stabilise in the closing months of 
the year. The annual average increase in this variable 
was thus 1.9%, 0.6 p.p. less than in 2001, when it had 
(2) On 11 April, further to the approval of Royal-Decree 
426/2003.
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slowed sharply (see Table IV.1). In terms of the end-
uses of spending, the loss of steam affected non-du-
rable consumption and, under durable goods, car 
purchases (new car registrations fell by more than 
6.5%), while purchases of other durables linked to 
housing picked up notably.
Among the factors contributing to the increase 
in consumption in 2002 were, first, disposable in-
come, which accelerated slightly on the previous 
year. In fact, despite the increase in the inflation rate, 
gross disposable income grew by 2.6% in real terms, 
0.3 p.p. up on the related figure for 2001 (see 
Chart IV.3). This moderate pick-up was due to the 
bigger general government contribution and to the 
improvement in the contribution of net property 
income. In turn, the favourable influence of the pub-
lic sector on household income was a consequence 
of a higher contribution by welfare benefits. By con-
trast, the contribution of wage income (excluding 
social security contributions) fell slightly, reflecting a 
more moderate – albeit still positive – pace of job 
creation. In any event, wages and employment re-
mained the most important factors behind the in-
crease in disposable income.
As indicated, the interest rate cuts in 2002 ex-
erted a restraining influence on households’ net fi-
nancial burden. This effect has added to that habitu-
ally arising through the substitution of future con-
sumption and the lesser incentive to save.
Household spending decisions were also influ-
enced by changes in their net worth. As previously 
mentioned and reflected in Chart IV.3, two effects of 
differing signs combined here. On one side, there 
was a reduction in the value of households’ net fi-
nancial wealth which added to those incurred in 
previous years, bearing negatively on their spending 
capacity. On the other, the notable rise in real-estate 
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wealth in recent years has tended to offset the re-
strictive effect on consumption of the losses in fi-
nancial wealth.
Finally, the turbulence on international financial 
markets, growing uncertainty over the future course 
of the world economy and the risks inherent in the 
geopolitical situation all influenced consumer confi-
dence, which deteriorated notably throughout the 
year (see Chart IV.4). This loss of confidence may 
have adversely affected consumption, favouring pre-
cautionary saving, although it is difficult to specify 
the actual contribution. Overall, the information 
available indicates that the household saving ratio 
stood at 10.6% in 2002, several tenths of a point up 
on its level in 2001. Box IV.1 analyses the determi-
nants of the course of private consumption and of 
the saving ratio over a longer time span running 
from the start of the nineties to the present day.
The pace of domestic residential investment by 
households continued to moderate last year, after 
having expanded notably in the 1998-2000 period 
(see Chart IV.5). Among the factors behind the di-
minished buoyancy of house purchases in 2001 and 
2002 are the lower growth of household disposable 
income and the cumulative increase of 50% in the 
relative price of housing between 1998 and 2002. 
This notable price rise has been reflected in the de-
terioration in the affordability indicators (such as 
the real household income/house-price ratio or 
wage costs) and in the ongoing increase in the effort 
required to buy a house through bank financing, de-
spite the reduction in nominal interest rates. The 
discouragement effects arising from dearer housing 
may have proven particularly significant for house-
holds seeking a dwelling for habitual residence pur-
poses.
However, house-price increases, insofar as they 
have fuelled expectations of a rise in the value of 
real-estate assets, may have also stimulated the de-
mand for housing as a means of wealth placement, 
especially in view of the continuing low return of-
fered by alternative placements in financial assets in 
2002, below, indeed, the return arising from house 
rental (see Chart IV.5). In this respect, the vigour of 
second-home purchases and the fact that a signifi-
cant proportion of dwellings remain unoccupied, ac-
cording to the latest census, would indicate that this 
type of demand has been most substantial in recent 
years. Likewise, the demand by non-residents, though 
it showed clear signs of slowing, continued to exert 
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BOX IV.1
Factors explaining the slowdown in private consumption
The slowdown in the final consumption expenditure of 
Spanish households that began in 2000 continued over the 
course of 2002. During the upturn, between 1997 and 1999, 
household consumption had expanded rapidly, at an annual 
average rate of 4%, well above the rates recorded in the 
other euro area countries and close to the rate of growth 
of consumption in the United States (see adjoining table). 
The factors explaining this rapid growth and the subsequent 
slowdown are closely related to the cyclical position of the 
Spanish economy and the changes in household wealth or 
net worth, and in accordance with the main determinants of 
aggregate consumption suggested by economic theory. At 
any rate, that is what is indicated by the results of the con-
sumption equation of the Banco de España’s quarterly model 
(MTBE).
The theoretical literature which analyses household 
spending decisions within a framework of inter-temporal 
choice indicates that aggregate consumption expenditure 
depends on income and non-human wealth, i.e. on the net 
worth that households have invested in real and financial as-
sets. Also, the real rate of interest affects the time profile of 
household spending, through its bearing on the rate of sub-
stitution between present and future consumption. Interest 
rate changes indirectly generate an income effect on con-
sumption, the sign of which depends on households’ balance 
sheet position (credit or debit), and a wealth effect, through 
their effect on the market value of real and financial wealth. 
Finally, the degree of uncertainty is a further factor influenc-
ing household consumption and saving decisions.
The consumption equation of the MTBE incorporates 
these determinants, although the degree of uncertainty sur-
rounding household decisions is only incorporated insofar 
as it affects other variables in the equation. The adjoining ta-
ble shows the contributions of these factors to annual con-
sumption growth over the course of the 1990s and the first 
few years of the current decade, distinguishing between 
phases of stronger and weaker growth in this variable. Real 
income is seen to be the main determinant of household fi-
nal consumption, although the time profile of this aggregate 
is significantly affected by other variables. During the last 
economic upturn (1997-1999) the growth of household 
consumption was significantly higher than that of the contri-
bution from real income, essentially because of the rise in 
the real value of the sector’s wealth. The behaviour of finan-
cial wealth, stemming from the rise in the value of financial assets, explains the high growth in household net worth between 1996 
and 1999 (see adjoining chart). Subsequently the notable increase in real-estate wealth has sustained the growth of total wealth, 
albeit at a lower rate, since the value of net financial assets has declined over the last two years. These developments in household 
net worth meant that the contribution of wealth to consumption growth between 2000 and 2002 was smaller. This largely explains 
the slowdown in consumption, even when the contribution of disposable income held unchanged. Meanwhile, the progressive de-
cline in real interest rates since the mid-1990s tended to be conducive to consumption growth. Even though the direct contribu-
tion from this factor was generally moderate, a significant part of the rise in the value of wealth was in fact attributable to the fall 
in interest rates, so that the contribution through this indirect channel may have been much larger.
The bottom panel of the chart shows the implications of the developments in consumption and its main determinants for the 
household saving ratio. The strong growth of household wealth in the second half of the 1990s, insofar as it was passed through to 
consumption expenditure on goods and services, partly explains the increase in the average propensity to consume and the grad-
ual decline in the saving ratio in this period. Also contributing to this decline were the reduction in the real interest rate and the 
favourable effect of the prospects of membership of the Monetary Union on consumer expectations. However, the decline in the 
saving ratio moderated and came to an end in 2002, as the main factors driving it (increase in real and financial wealth, decline in 
real interest rates) petered out and the prospects for the future situation of the economy became more uncertain.
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pressure on the Spanish property market last year, 
as highlighted by the increase in foreign investment 
in property.
In 2002 as a whole, corporate gross fixed capital 
formation is estimated to have increased by 0.4%, 
extending the ongoing slowdown embarked upon by 
this aggregate in 2000 into its third consecutive year. 
As Table IV.1 shows, business investment last year 
was the result of an uneven performance of its re-
spective components. Whereas investment in con-
struction maintained high growth, holding stable at 
around 6.2% throughout the year, investment in 
capital goods fell substantially, at a negative rate of 
–4.8% in annual average terms, although the rate of 
deterioration was checked in the closing months of 
the year. Regarding investment in construction, al-
though non-residential building was considerably 
robust in 2002, the thrust of investment in civil engi-
neering works by the major state-owned companies 
was particularly notable, as was the sizable volume 
of spending on railway infrastructure, which Nation-
al Accounts record as business investment.
The scant vigour of private productive invest-
ment last year was primarily due to the sluggishness 
of final demand which, as shown in Chart IV.6, in-
creased by scarcely 2.1%. Compounding this, moreo-
ver, was the continuing climate (since the second 
half of 2001) of notable uncertainty over the inter-
national economic environment, which continued to 
affect business expectations in 2002, particularly 
sharply so in the first half of year. Set against this, the 
user cost of capital, which reflects the difference 
between nominal interest rates and the increase in 
the prices of investment goods, fell as a result, partly, 
of the lower increase in the price of these assets, 
which may have influenced their expansionary ef-
fect.
The weakness of final demand was reflected in a 
reduction in capacity utilisation in industry, which 
stood at around 76% during the first three quarters 
of the year, clearly below its historical average 
(78.2%). Drawing on information from the half-yearly 
investment survey, the investment forecasts for 2002 
for industrial companies were systematically scaled 
back as from autumn 2001. Nonetheless, as indicat-
ed, investment in capital goods improved somewhat 
from the second half of the year, as their rate of de-
cline fell. This was in keeping with the export-led 
greater buoyancy of final demand in the second half 
of the year. Both the business confidence indicator 
and the results of the autumn 2002 half-yearly in-
vestment survey reflected this improvement, and 
also projected a modest recovery for the current 
year (see Chart IV.7). Likewise, capacity utilisation in 
industry increased in the closing months of last year 
to 79.3%, above its historical average.
As earlier mentioned, the user cost of capital fell 
in 2002, whether measured in relation to the GDP 
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deflator or compared with the cost of the labour 
factor (see Chart IV.6). Broadly, financing conditions 
for Spanish companies remained favourable last year. 
On CBQ information, the weight of financial costs in 
corporations’ cost structure declined considerably 
as a result of the fall in interest rates. Combined 
with the increase in the return on net assets, this 
made for a substantial widening of the differential 
between the two. Lower interest rates helped offset 
the effect of the slight increase in the corporate 
debt ratio on the associated financial burden.
As regards the potential domestic investment 
shift effect that new investment opportunities 
abroad – essentially in Latin America – may have had 
in the past, outward foreign direct investment flows 
have fallen considerably since 2001 relative to the 
extraordinary level they reached in 2000. As a result, 
they stood at 2.8% of GDP in 2002 compared with 
9.5% two years earlier.
The relative slackness of investment by Spanish 
corporations has contributed to the Spanish econo-
my’s low productivity growth and may hamper real 
convergence with the core EU economies. In this 
connection, Box IV.2 analyses the contribution of a 
specific type of investment, namely that in ICT prod-
ucts, to the growth of output and productivity. The 
foregoing analysis infers that Spanish companies are 
recording high levels of return and are sustaining 
healthy financial positions, which pose no obstacle 
whatsoever to the recovery in investment, although 
the debt levels reached could curtail the intensity 
with which new projects are undertaken in less fa-
vourable financing conditions. In these circumstanc-
es, if investment is to gain greater momentum it is 
necessary not only that the climate of notable eco-
nomic uncertainty should abate and that growth 
prospects improve, but also that the workings of the 
economy should be sufficiently flexible and efficient 
for companies to pursue their expansion opportuni-
ties to the full.
In 2002 the contribution of stockbuilding to 
GDP growth was positive (0.1 p.p.), in step with 
the counter-cyclical behaviour of this variable. The 
monthly business survey reflected an increase in 
the involuntary stockbuilding component in the 
second half of the year, in response to the build-up 
in inventories in the intermediate goods industry 
and, more markedly, in the consumer goods indus-
try. Conversely, however, stocks in the capital 
goods industry moved on a declining path, in line 
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with the pick-up in investment observed in the 
second half of 2002.
With respect to general government demand in 
2002, final consumption spending by this sector 
grew by 3.8% in real terms compared with 3.1% the 
previous year (see Table IV.1). In nominal terms, the 
acceleration was on a similar scale, with growth of 
7%. This performance is due to a significant expan-
sion in net purchases by the public sector (partly as 
a result of spending arising from the sinking of the 
oil tanker “Prestige”) and in social transfers in kind, 
which offset the lesser pace of expansion of public-
sector employee compensation. Employee compen-
sation grew by 5.2%, one point down on the previ-
ous year, owing to the slower pace of job creation in 
the public sector, since the growth rate of employee 
compensation held unchanged. Public investment re-
mained highly buoyant, posting real growth of 6.2%. 
This is related to the implementation of the infra-
structure investment plan.
Moving to the analysis of external demand, it 
should be recalled that the year 2002 began against 
a backdrop of international uncertainty. As a result, 
the contractionary course on which real goods and 
services exports had ended the previous year 
turned further down at the start of 2002 (see 
Chart IV.2). In mid-2002, however, as foreign markets 
picked up, exports gathered notable momentum, 
which firmed in the final months of the year. In the 
year as a whole, exports in real terms increased by 
1.4%, two points down on 2001. In terms of compo-
nents, the behaviour of goods and services differed 
greatly. While goods sales increased at a similar rate 
to that in 2001 (2.3%), albeit with an opposite pro-
file, exports of services slowed appreciably, by 0.6%. 
The slippage in tourism receipts in real terms (-4%) 
was the main reason behind this poor performance.
During 2002, foreign markets remained sluggish, 
in line with the previous year; that said, develop-
ments across the economic regions were uneven. 
While the deterioration in the euro area markets 
intensified, with a slight contraction, markets in the 
rest of the world emerged from the recession at the 
beginning of the year and embarked on a modestly 
dynamic course. Against this background, real goods 
exports in the opening months of the year contin-
ued on the contracting trend on which they had 
moved at the end of the previous year, showing a 
moderately positive trend from Q2 onwards which 
firmed in the second half of the year, taking average 
growth to a rate of 2.3%. In any event, the growth of 
exports in recent years has been less than that re-
corded in the previous decade, which highlights the 
dampening effect that the recent cyclical slowdown 
concurrently affecting the different regions has had.
Another significant factor for evaluating the 
scant increase in goods exports in 2002 was the 
worsening of the competitive position of Spanish 
products. This was a progressive deterioration which 
occurred as the rise of the euro bore on the appre-
ciation of relative prices and costs indices (see 
Chart IV.8). The loss of competitiveness came about 
despite export prices being contained, which made 
for an appreciable squeeze on exporters’ margins, as 
discussed in section IV.6. It should be borne in mind 
that changes in the exchange rate affect competi-
tiveness not only in non-euro area markets but also 
in the euro area itself, where Spanish products com-
pete with imports from other regions.
The uneven picture across the economies com-
prising Spain’s foreign markets led to the export 
performance differing according to the economic 
region involved. On Customs figures, real goods 
sales to the EU posted zero growth in 2002, in line 
with the slackness of this market, despite its picking 
up in Q3. In nominal terms, exports to our main 
trading partners trended at a more moderate rate 
than the previous year, and sales to Germany de-
clined. Conversely, goods exports to the rest of the 
world took off prior to those of the euro area – in 
Q2 – and, boosted by the surge in demand in cer-
tain regions, they quickened notably at the end of 
the year, growing by 5% in real terms and gaining 
market share. As has occurred in recent years, sales 
to the EU acceding and accession countries were 
notably firm, in step with the buoyancy of these 
economies. There was also a significant increase in 
exports to OPEC countries and, on a lesser scale 
but with a gradual increase in share, in that in ex-
ports to China and Mexico. However, sales to the 
US continued to contract, picking up only at the end 
of the year, as did those to Japan and, above all, to 
South America, whose economies are mired in a 
deep recession.
World tourism in 2001 had been affected by the 
worsening economic outlook and, most particularly, by 
the heightened uncertainty that followed the 11 Sep-
tember terrorist attacks. These factors – which appear 
in certain respects to be altering tourist behaviour – 
continued to disrupt the normal course of tourist 
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BOX IV.2
The contribution of new technologies to growth in the Spanish economy
During the second half of the last decade there was an acceleration in the diffusion of new information and communication 
technologies (ICT) across the Spanish productive sector. This was evident in a notable increase in investment in ICT equipment, 
which was boosted by the price falls and quality improvements affecting such goods. On the evidence available, the rapid accumula-
tion of this kind of capital contributed significantly to the growth of output and labour productivity.
To evaluate the differences in the pattern of incorporation of ICT capital goods in the productive processes of the manufac-
turing and market services sectors it is helpful to decompose the growth of output and apparent labour productivity into the 
contributions from the various productive factors (identifying among them the endowment of capital linked to the new technolo-
gies) and from total factor productivity (TFP). The contribution of each factor is in turn given by the product of its rate of change 
and the share of its cost in the total factor cost. Likewise, the growth of apparent labour productivity can be decomposed into 
factor contributions and TFP. In this case, the contribution of each factor is the product of the rate of change in the ratio of that 
factor to labour and of the share of its cost in the total factor cost. Given the lack of aggregate information to analyse the contri-
bution of ICT capital to growth (in particular, the absence of an adequate measurement of the ICT capital stock), a sample of firms 
from the Banco de España’s Central Balance Sheet Data Office for the period 1992-2001 was used as the source of information. 
The decomposition of growth for the major sectors was obtained by aggregating the results of the decomposition of growth for 
each firm in the sample (1).
The results may be summarised as follows. First, the contribution of ICT capital to output and productivity growth, although 
modest in absolute terms, was notable in both sectors. The contribution was especially high in the market services industries, in 
which, over the period as a whole, the accumulation of ICT capital accounts for somewhat more than 20% of labour productivity 
growth. Second, the high rate of accumulation of ICT capital in the period 1997-2001 explains the observed increase in the contri-
bution to economic growth of this kind of capital, despite the fall in the cost of ICT capital relative to total costs. Again, this feature 
was more marked in services, where ICT capital contributed 0.42 p.p. to value-added growth in the period 1997-2001, as against 
0.17 in the period 1992-96. In manufacturing, the increase in this contribution was more modest. The fact that the main user indus-
tries of the new technologies are in the services sector (communications, business services, distribution) is consistent with the 
rate of accumulation of ICT capital and the contribution to growth being higher in services than in manufacturing.
This growth decomposition exercise also reveals the notable increase in the contribution of labour to output growth during 
the period 1997-2001. This stemmed from the significant employment creation that took place in the second part of the sample 
period and from the increase in the share of labour compensation in total costs. At the same time, TFP has decelerated slightly in 
manufacturing and accelerated somewhat in services, although without reaching the rate of growth in manufacturing.
(1)  The bias inherent in the composition of the sample used, which makes the aggregation of the results obtained for each individual firm dif-
ficult, means that the evidence obtained must be interpreted with some caution.
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flows in 2002. That said, the WTO reported that the 
number of international travellers increased by 3.1%, 
compared with the fall of 0.5% recorded in 2001. By 
geographical region, the destinations that grew above 
the average included most notably China and several 
central and eastern European areas, where tourism 
can be seen to be increasingly buoyant.
Demand for Spain as a tourist destination, meas-
ured in terms of the number of visitors, trended 
more modestly, although it also posted higher 
growth than that of world tourism. Indeed, accord-
ing to the FRONTUR figures, the number of foreign 
visitors entering Spain across borders in 2002 rose 
by 3.4%. Nonetheless, other figures substantially 
qualify this first result, and are more in line with the 
QNA data on non-resident consumption, in real 
terms, which fell by 4%. The flow of visitors lodged 
in regulated accommodation thus slowed notably, 
while overnight stays in hotels and similar establish-
ments fell by 5%. There was a decline in 2002 in the 
number of tourists from Germany (for the third 
year running), the United States and Japan, and a 
slowdown in tourists from the United Kingdom. 
Conversely, numbers from France, the Netherlands 
and Ireland showed considerable buoyancy. The 
tourism figures generally reveal a change in the aver-
age tourist profile, with a fall-off apparent in tourists 
from the countries furthest away and a shift in the 
goods and services demanded, such as type of trans-
port and accommodation, which appears to have 
borne negatively on the recipient country’s receipts.
Another factor which may have adversely affect-
ed tourism is the loss of competitiveness shown by 
the relative price indicators, both against client 
countries and competitor countries (see middle 
panel of Chart IV.8). Although price is not the only 
factor influencing competitive position, the sustaina-
bility of certain Spanish tourism segments might be 
affected by adverse relative price trends. In this re-
spect, a fresh mention should be made of the nota-
ble robustness of tourist flows towards other Medi-
terranean countries, especially some of those which 
will be joining the EU in 2004. The geographical cen-
tre of the EU is shifting towards these countries, 
whose starting point is a highly favourable price-
based competitive edge.
As described throughout this section, the pace 
of both national demand (consumption and invest-
ment) and exports lessened in 2002. As a result, the 
growth of final demand in the Spanish economy was, 
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at 2.1%, 0.8 p.p. down on 2001. The lesser thrust of 
final demand detracted from the buoyancy of goods 
and services imports, which slowed slightly more 
sharply over the year as a whole, posting growth of 
2.2% compared with 3.5% the previous year. None-
theless, during the year real imports of goods and 
services overcame the contractionary course of the 
first two quarters and moved on to a notably dy-
namic path in the second half of the year, on the 
same track as final demand (see Chart IV.2).
Following a sharp slowdown in 2001, the growth 
rate of real goods imports was once again checked 
in 2002. The reduction in their rate of change – 
down 0.8 p.p. to 2.2% – was, however, more con-
tained (see bottom panel of Chart IV.8). As with the 
aggregate of goods and services, the contraction 
marking merchandise purchases at the end of the 
previous year stepped up in the opening months of 
2002, weighed down by the sluggishness of industrial 
activity and exports. Significant growth in this varia-
ble was recovered as final demand gained greater 
momentum. Import prices were on a declining trend 
throughout the year, making for greater penetration 
by imported products in the Spanish market; in fact, 
in the second half of the year the imports/unit of fi-
nal demand ratio resumed the rising path that had 
characterised it prior to 2001.
According to itemised Customs figures, real 
goods imports from both the EU and the rest of the 
world grew at a rate of 3.8%. In terms of regions, 
purchases from the central and eastern European 
countries were buoyant, growing at over 20%, while 
those from Latin America edged slightly upwards. By 
type of product, the pattern of imports was similar 
to the previous year and in step with the course of 
demand components. As a result, both consumer- 
and intermediate-goods imports grew above the av-
erage, in real terms, while capital-goods imports de-
clined appreciably. Nonetheless, this caption picked 
up modestly from Q3, and ended the year growing 
at a rate of 1.3% year-on-year. Energy imports in-
creased quite vigorously, although in nominal terms 
they actually fell owing to the decline in oil prices in 
euro. Finally, tourism expenditure was adversely af-
fected by the weakness of the economic setting and 
the low level of consumer confidence, and grew by 
4.2% in real terms over the year as a whole, against 
7.6% the previous year.
As real exports of goods and services grew by 
1.4% in 2002, below the rate of increase of imports 
(2.2%), the external sector subtracted 0.3 p.p. from 
GDP growth (following a negative contribution of 
0.1 p.p. in 2001). This contributed to slowing GDP, 
which posted growth of 2% over the year as a 
whole, compared with 2.7% the previous year (see 
Chart IV.2).
IV.3. PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY
As indicated, the rate of increase of domestic 
output, which was less intense than in 2001, was 
trimmed by 0.7 p.p. in 2002. The year ended with 
real GDP growth standing at 2%, to which the value 
added of non-market services contributed signifi-
cantly, its growth having accelerated by 0.6 p.p. to 
3.5%. The gross value added (GVA) of the market 
branches slowed by 1 p.p. to 1.7%. As a result, the 
difference between market GVA and its potential 
level – the so-called output gap – narrowed in 2002, 
though it retained a positive value (see Chart IV.9).
From a disaggregated perspective, the loss of 
momentum across the branches of activity in 2002 
was very generalised. This was not the case, howev-
er, in the primary sector, where activity continued to 
contract, albeit at a lesser pace than in 2001. For the 
year on average, value added in real terms thus 
posted a negative rate of –2.1%. Agricultural output 
was beset by scant rainfall, which affected most 
crops, while livestock production was more robust 
than in 2001, boosted by the increase in animals 
slaughtered for meat, since the production of animal 
derivatives (milk and eggs) diminished in vigour.
In 2002 as a whole, there was a continuation of 
the slackness marking industry and energy in 2001, 
with real growth at 1% compared with 1.4% the pre-
vious year. The factors behind the slowdown in 2001 
– the lesser momentum of domestic demand and the 
sluggishness of export markets – were still present at 
the onset of 2002. However, after beginning the year 
on a contractionary course, industrial activity began 
to pick up, driven by the recovery in exports. This 
boost was checked, especially in the second half of 
the year, by the strengthening of the euro against the 
dollar and, in general, by the marked uncertainty of 
the international economic environment. At a more 
detailed level, energy output was on an expanding 
course whereas the strictly industrial branches were 
less robust, especially the medium-technology indus-
tries. Among these activities, the manufacture of capi-
tal goods was markedly contractionary, in line with 
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the decline in this demand component not only in 
Spain but also in most of the industrialised countries 
(see bottom panel of Chart IV.9). Conversely, activity 
in the branches geared to the manufacture of low-
technology products, which are more closely related 
to private consumption, increased over the year as a 
whole, unlike in 2001. The leading-edge technology 
branches were in an intermediate position, rising to 
some extent from the summer after having been the 
first to lose momentum.
The resilience of construction activity continued 
to characterise developments in the market econo-
my in 2002. For the fifth year running, this was the 
most vigorous industry. Notwithstanding, GVA in 
this sector slowed by 0.5 p.p., taking its annual 
growth to 4.9%. Behind this expansionary behaviour 
were civil engineering works and non-residential 
building, although the vigour of the former dimin-
ished somewhat during the year while that of the 
latter intensified. Conversely, residential building, the 
growth rate of which had already moderated sub-
stantially in 2001 according to National Accounts 
estimates, held at a low rate of increase, though it 
did not actually contract.
Markets services slowed notably in 2002, with 
their growth rate falling by 1.4 p.p. to 1.9%. This 
sluggishness was extensive to all activities. The slow-
down in the ICT branches steepened and, under this 
category, IT and R+D activities contracted. Among 
the more traditional activities, tourism performed 
poorly, with a knock-on effect for other services 
such as transport (especially air transport) and the 
hotel and catering trade. In this case, the start of 
2002 was marked by the impact of the events of 11 
September, which was compounded by the eco-
nomic weakness of the countries from which tour-
ists emanate and by the heightening of political ten-
sion in the Middle East.
IV.4. THE LABOUR MARKET
Employment slowed notably in 2002 in relation 
to 2001, in line with the lower growth of economic 
activity. In QNA terms, the rate of net job crea-
tion (3) for the economy as a whole was 1.3%, 1.1 
p.p. down on the previous year. Employment moved 
on a mildly declining path as from the second quar-
ter of the year (see Chart IV.10). The deceleration in �������� ��� ��� ����� �� �������
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(3) Measured by the number of full-time equivalent jobs.
88 89
employment was slightly greater in the case of the 
market economy, which grew by 1.2%, against 2.4% 
in 2001. As a result, the growth rate of apparent la-
bour productivity increased, but remained modest 
(0.7% for the economy as a whole and 0.6% for the 
market economy). Apparent labour productivity thus 
retained the counter-cyclical nature characterising it 
since the mid-eighties, when the use of temporary 
employment contracts became widespread.
The slowdown affected to a greater extent the 
self-employed, whose numbers fell by 2.1%, while 
dependent employees increased by 2%, both in the 
economy as a whole and in the market economy. As 
regards contracts, lower job creation was absorbed 
essentially by temporary dependent employment, 
which fell from 3.1% in 2001 to 0.6% in 2002, ac-
cording to EPA (Labour Force Survey) (4) figures, 
with the attendant year-on-year rate of change even 
turning negative in the second half of the year. In 
contrast, permanent dependent employment con-
tracts continued to grow at a notable pace (3.8%, 
0.8 p.p. down on 2001). Contributing to this were 
both the rebates applicable to social security contri-
butions and the lower firing costs in respect of em-
ployment-promoting permanent contracts, whose 
validity was extended indefinitely in March 2001. Ac-
cordingly, the ratio of temporary to permanent em-
ployees dipped by 0.7 p.p., although it continued to 
stand at twice the average for the EU (31%). That 
highlights the need to continue introducing meas-
ures aimed at reducing the duality of the Spanish la-
bour market. In apparent contrast to the changes in 
permanent and temporary employees, INEM statis-
tics showed lower growth in the number of employ-
ment contracts registered in 2002 (0.9% against 
1.6% the previous year). This was due to the change 
in the number of permanent employees, which fell 
by 1.5% after having grown 8% in 2001, further to 
the large-scale conversion of temporary into em-
ployment-promoting permanent contracts. Lastly, 
the growth rate of both full-time and part-time 
wage-earners declined in 2002, meaning that the lat-
ter as a proportion of total employees increased by 
0.1 p.p. to 8.2% (half the EU average).
The slowdown in employment was extensive to 
all branches of activity, according to QNA figures, 
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Q1, with notable effects on all the variables addressed by this 
survey. The April 2002 edition of the Boletín económico featured an 
article explaining in detail these changes, along with their impact 
on the most relevant variables.
90 91
with considerable job destruction in agriculture 
(–5.3%) and a notable deceleration in the construc-
tion industry, where the rate of net job creation was 
halved (2.7%, compared with 5.4% in 2001), moving 
on a declining path throughout the year. Neverthe-
less, construction remained the most dynamic indus-
try, followed by services, and the growth rate of 
employment dipped by only 0.1 p.p. (to 2.3%). In-
deed, employment in market services quickened 
slightly in 2002 to 2.5%, 0.2 p.p. up on the preceding 
year. Finally, employment in industry and energy de-
clined by 0.5% (after having grown by 1.4% in 2001), 
although the progressive pick-up in industrial activity 
during the year was reflected in employment, which 
grew by 0.4% in the second half of the year.
Undoubtedly, one of the key aspects of Spanish 
labour market developments in 2002 was the high 
growth of the labour force, despite diminished eco-
nomic momentum. According to EPA figures, the la-
bour force grew by 3%, essentially as a result of the 
increase in the participation rate by 1.1 p.p. to 54% 
of the population aged over 16. The increase was 
even more notable if the participation rate is calcu-
lated for the population aged 16-64, as it stood at 
67.1% (still 3 p.p. lower than the EU average). Higher 
labour market participation was centred principally 
on women, the participation rate for whom edged 
up from 40.3% in 2001 to 41.8% last year. The ex-
tensive system of rebates for the permanent hiring 
of women, along with other measures adopted to 
help reconcile working and family life, undoubtedly 
influenced this result. The male participation rate 
also increased in 2002, but by only 0.7 p.p. to 66.9%. 
The difference in this connection between men and 
women thus narrowed.
The sharp growth of the labour force, along with 
the lesser pace of net job creation, led to an in-
crease in the unemployment rate, for the first time 
since 1994 (see Chart IV.10). On EPA figures, the 
number of unemployed increased by 214,000 during 
2002, which translated into a rise in the unemploy-
ment rate of almost 1 p.p., to 11.4% of the labour 
force. Likewise, the official INEM (National Employ-
ment Office) figure showed a significant increase in 
registered unemployment of 6% in annual average 
terms, which continued into 2003, albeit at a some-
what lesser pace. On 2002 data, the Spanish unem-
ployment rate continues to exceed the EU average 
by more than 3 p.p., with this variable having ceased, 
moreover, to converge as it had in recent years. The 
rise in unemployment affected all groups of workers, 
with a particularly notable increase in the female 
unemployment rate to 16.4%, against 15.2% the pre-
vious year. This development is in response to the 
considerable advance in women’s participation in 
the labour market, which the growth of employment 
was unable to absorb. Also significant was the rise in 
the rate of youth unemployment which moved from 
16.8% in 2001 to 18%, departing from the markedly 
declining course of previous years.
Long-term unemployment remained on the same 
trend seen for several years with a fresh decline in 
the overall figure for 2002, standing at 37.5% of the 
total unemployed. However, for the first time in sev-
eral years, there was an increase in the proportion 
of long-term to total unemployed in Q4. Combined 
with the scant response by nominal wages to the 
slowdown in employment (see Chart IV.11), this 
might be indicative of weakness in the process of 
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reduction of the structural unemployment rate, de-
spite the fact that its level is still very high. All these 
developments would underscore the need to fur-
ther the course of reform of the Spanish labour 
market pursued to date. In this respect, the reform 
of unemployment insurance in 2002, the main objec-
tive of which – as described in the first section – 
was to offer incentives for more active job-search 
by the unemployed, is along the right lines although 
it is still too soon to evaluate its results (5).
During 2002, wage increases agreed under col-
lective bargaining moderated, with average wage set-
tlements standing at 3.1%, against 2.5% the previous 
year (see Chart IV.11). The source of this restraint 
was the revision of the pluriannual agreements en-
tered into prior to 2002, since newly signed agree-
ments were affected by agents’ rising inflation ex-
pectations during the year, as the inflation rate pro-
gressively increased, and incorporated higher wage 
increases (of 3.6%). Bargaining in 2002 was against 
the background of the signing of the Inter-Confed-
eral Agreement for Collective Bargaining, which was 
aimed, in principle, at anchoring wage settlements at 
2%, plus a degree of drift (no more than 1 p.p.) for 
productivity gains. The application of this agreement, 
against a backdrop of a rising inflation rate, gave rise 
to the widespread use of wage indexation clauses to 
counter deviation by inflation from the official 2% 
forecast. The actual deviation at the end of the year 
(totalling 2 p.p.) entailed a substantial upward revi-
sion of wage settlements in 2002 (by about 0.8 p.p.), 
compared with the related rise (0.2 p.p.) attributable 
to the same cause in 2001.
QNA estimates show that the growth of com-
pensation per employee – which includes wage drift 
and non-wage costs along with wage settlements – 
moderated slightly in 2002 to 4%, in both the econ-
omy as a whole and in market activities, compared 
with respective increases of 4.1% and 4.2% the pre-
vious year. After having been deflated by the value-
added deflator in the market economy, the profile of 
compensation per employee remained very moder-
ate (see bottom panel of Chart IV.11). However, 
these estimates do not include the effect of the ap-
plication of the wage indexation clauses in 2002 
which, as mentioned, is particularly substantial and 
will lead to a significant increase in the growth of 
compensation per employee in 2003. This revision 
qualifies the moderation of labour costs discussed 
previously, since it may involve a rise in real wages in 
the current year, which already appears to have been 
factored in by companies. These developments high-
light the effects of indexation clauses on wage dy-
namics: such clauses initially allow wage settlements 
based on moderate inflation references to be 
achieved, but once these references are exceeded, 
as occurred in 2002, they ultimately pass through 
the higher inflation to wages, even when the source 
of such inflation is transitory, thereby hampering the 
absorption of shocks.
With a view to 2003, the signing of a new Inter-
Confederal Agreement for Collective Bargaining by 
the social partners entails the extension of the wage 
bargaining framework in place in 2002. And that, 
along with the expected slowdown in inflation, might 
contribute to wage moderation this year. That said, 
the current bargaining arrangements fail substantially 
to offer efficient results in terms of the flexibility 
and wage differentiation needed for the proper 
functioning of the labour market (see Box IV.3). It 
thus remains necessary to alter the collective bar-
gaining system in such a way as to relate wages 
more closely to the specific circumstances of com-
panies and employees.
IV.5. COSTS AND PRICES
During 2002, the inflation rate in Spain held at a 
similar level to that of the previous year. In terms of 
the annual average increase in the CPI, inflation was 
3.5% in 2002 compared with 3.6 % in 2001. This was 
the result of the combination of a significant reduction 
in import prices – in line with the moderate inflation 
rates of our main trading partners and with the depre-
ciation of the dollar against the euro – and an accelera-
tion in the domestic component of prices. Behind this 
behaviour are, on one hand, the rise in certain indirect 
taxes at the beginning of the year and the effect of the 
introduction of the euro on the prices of certain goods 
and services; and, on the other, a greater expansion in 
operating margins in certain industries. In the closing 
months of the year, the external determinants of prices 
worsened, as commodity prices (energy and non-en-
ergy alike) rose, and inflation ended the year on a rising 
path (see Chart IV.12).
The increase in the CPI in 2002 was, at 3.5%, 0.1 
p.p. down on the previous year. In terms of compo-
(5) A detailed description of the content of this reform can 
be found in Box 3 in the “Quarterly Report on the Spanish 
Economy” in the April 2003 Economic Bulletin.
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nents, the higher growth of services and processed 
food prices was only partly offset by the slight im-
provement in the prices of non-energy manufac-
tured goods, the related index of which (IPSEBENE 
by its Spanish name) posted average growth of 3.7%, 
compared with 3.5% the previous year. Specifically, 
services prices climbed by 4.6% in 2002, moving on 
a rising trajectory in the first half of the year. Coin-
ciding with the introduction of euro banknotes and 
coins, price increases in certain services such as res-
taurants and bars, personal care and repairs were 
far higher than those recorded in previous years 
(see Box IV.4). Nonetheless, there were further re-
ductions in telephony prices and hotel rates moder-
ated in the face of diminished tourist demand. With 
an increase of 2.5% in 2002, somewhat down on the 
previous year, there was an increase in the variability 
of non-energy manufactured goods prices. This had 
to do with the methodological changes introduced 
into the CPI at the start of the year and, in particu-
lar, with the inclusion of sales prices in the calcula-
tion of the index. The components most influenced 
by sales, such as clothing, footwear and household 
textile articles, showed marked changes around the 
time of the two annual sales periods; likewise, they 
accelerated significantly in annual average terms. 
Conversely, the fall in the prices of video and sound, 
photographic and computer equipment steepened. 
Lastly, processed food prices ceased to move on the 
rising course seen the previous year, although their 
average growth was 4.3%, against 3.4% in 2001.
Among the CPI components not included in the 
IPSEBENE index (which strips out fresh food and oil 
prices), energy prices were virtually unchanged in 
2002, set against the reduction of the previous year, 
moving on a rising path throughout the year which 
passed through to the overall index. Adding to the ef-
fects of the increase in indirect taxes were those de-
rived from the upward trend of crude oil prices on 
international markets (the average price of oil stood 
at $25 per barrel, although at the beginning of the 
year it was $19, while at year-end it had reached $28), 
which were only partly mitigated by the 5.5% appre-
ciation of the euro against the dollar over the year on 
average. Further, fresh food prices rose by 5.8% in 
2002, against 8.7% in 2001. Meat prices slowed, after 
putting behind the health crises affecting livestock in 
2001. Contrary to this, fruit and vegetable prices 
moved on a strongly rising trajectory.
The inflation rate improved substantially in the 
first four months of 2003 (standing at 3.1%), as the 
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BOX IV.3
Effects of the scope of collective bargaining on its results (1)
In Spain, the collective bargaining system covers 
practically all private-sector employees, meaning its study 
is fundamental to any explanation of the functioning of 
the labour market. One of the most marked features of 
the system is its division into different levels of bargain-
ing. As can be seen in the adjoining table, bargaining is 
basically carried out at the industry level, with different 
geographical scopes of application (national, provincial or 
regional), the most important being the industry-provin-
cial, where labour conditions are set for more than 50% 
of the workers affected by collective bargaining. Compa-
ny agreements only affect just over 10% of workers, 
their relative importance having shown a slight down-
ward trend over the last few years.
Various theoretical studies have stressed the im-
portance of the degree of centralisation of bargaining in 
explaining its results. In general, it is argued that when 
bargaining takes place at an intermediate level of cen-
tralisation the results, in terms of the adjustment of 
wages to labour market conditions, are usually less effi-
cient than at other levels of bargaining. At a highly cen-
tralised level bargainers are usually more sensitive to the 
incorporation of macroeconomic constraints into the 
bargaining. On the other hand, at the most decentralised 
level, namely that of the individual enterprise, bargaining 
achieves wage increases best adapted to the economic 
and financial situation of each firm, which is perceived 
more directly by the bargainers. Also there may be cases 
combining two levels of bargaining, in which wages are 
set by the more decentralised one. 
Empirically, various studies have confirmed the rela-
tionship between the degree of centralisation and the 
results of collective bargaining, although in most cases 
this finding was obtained on the basis of comparisons 
across countries with different degrees of centralisation. The availability of information on the individual collective agree-
ments signed in Spain during the whole of the 1990s has enabled the influence of the different features of the agreements 
on the wage settlements to be analysed, in particular identifying the effect of the level of bargaining. For this purpose, re-
gressions have been estimated relating the settlement to the level of bargaining, taking into account other characteristics of 
the agreements, such as the industry, the time of the bargaining, the term of the agreement, the level of unrest during the 
bargaining, the presence of indexation clauses and other terms. 
The main results of this analysis are presented above in the lower of the two charts, which shows the different effect 
on the average settlement attributable to each level of bargaining, with respect to that reached at the industry-provincial 
level (which, during the period 1990-2001, is normalised to zero). First, the effect of the level of bargaining on its results is 
significant. As for the sign of this effect, both at the enterprise level (distinguishing here between public and private-sector 
firms and among the latter according to size) and at the most centralised level (industry-national) settlements have been 
lower than those obtained at the intermediate level of bargaining. Only in firms with fewer than 30 workers is this result 
not confirmed, although the percentage of such firms with their own agreement is very small. Also notable is the lower 
level of wage settlements in public-sector firms.
Thus, empirical analysis of information on individual agreements confirms the theoretical effects identified in the lit-
erature regarding the impact of bargaining at intermediate levels of centralisation on wage growth. This is particularly rele-
vant in the case of Spain, given its distribution of bargaining levels, with industry agreements with a provincial scope in the 
majority.
(1) This box is a summary of the Banco de España Occasional Paper No. 0302 entitled “El sistema de negociación colectiva en España: Un 
análisis descriptivo con datos individuales de convenios” by Mario Izquierdo, Esther Moral and Alberto Urtasun.
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effects arising from the increase in excise duties and 
from the introduction of the euro in the opening 
months of 2002 were stripped out. Into April, the 
heavy rises in energy prices last year were likewise 
stripped out, adding to which has been a substantial 
cut in these prices in recent months. The inflation 
rate is expected to remain on a slowing path in the 
coming months, against a background of moderating 
import prices, driven by the low inflation rates of 
our main trading partners and by the appreciation 
of the euro.
The rate of increase of the final demand deflator 
fell back in 2002 to 3.1%. However, both the private 
consumption deflator – the average growth of which 
was 3.6%, in line with the CPI – and the gross capital 
formation deflator, with an increase of 5.6%, acceler-
ated in relation to the previous year. Consequently, 
it was export prices, whose growth rate declined by 
2.7 p.p. until holding stable, which gave rise to the 
slowdown in final prices. Both the moderate trend 
of competitor countries’ goods prices and, in the 
second half of the year, the appreciation of the euro 
against the dollar account for the stability of export 
prices which, in fact, trended much more moderately 
in the case of sales outside the EU. Under gross 
capital formation, the construction deflator quick-
ened once again, in the wake of house-price rises 
showing no signs of turning around, despite the fact 
that housing demand was considerably contained. 
Also, the stockbuilding deflator displayed burgeoning 
growth, associated with the management of stocks 
of oil products. By contrast, there was a limited in-
crease in capital goods prices, similar to that in 2001 
(1%), owing to the sizable weight of imports in the 
demand for these products.
In fact, the imports deflator posted a decline of 
0.9% in 2002, compared with the increase the previ-
ous year (0.6%). For the year on average, the sharp-
est decline was in energy-product prices, although 
dearer crude oil prices in the second half of the 
year meant that marked increases were observed in 
the final quarter. The prices of the remaining imports 
– of intermediate goods and certain consumer 
goods – also declined.
Unlike foreign prices, domestic inflation, proxied 
by the growth of the GDP deflator, increased by 0.2 
p.p. in 2002 to 4.4% (see Chart IV.12). This accelera-
tion was the result of three factors. First, a signifi-
cant increase in indirect taxes net of subsidies per 
unit of output that was sharper than the rise in cer-
tain excise duties at the beginning of the year would 
warrant. Next, the considerable moderation of the 
deflator of non-market services, which grew by only 
2.1% in 2002, despite the increase in compensation 
per employee in the public sector and costlier in-
vestment in construction. And finally, a minimal slow-
down – of only 0.1 p.p. – in the market economy 
value-added deflator, which grew by 4.5%.
The bottom panel of Chart IV.12 shows that, 
among the components of the GVA deflator in the 
market economy, unit labour costs (ULCs) increased 
by 3.4% in 2002, 0.5 p.p. down on the previous year. 
This slowdown was attributable both to greater ap-
parent labour productivity gains, the growth of 
which nevertheless remained very moderate (0.6%), 
and to the slight slowdown in compensation per 
employee (discussed in the previous section). That 
said, it should be recalled that these estimates do 
not include the impact of the application of the in-
dexation clauses in 2002. The gross operating sur-
plus per unit of value added increased significantly, 
giving rise to a fresh widening of the unit margin 
(proxied by the difference between changes in the 
GVA deflator and those in ULCs), although this in-
crease would be less sizable if the impact of the in-
dexation clauses were taken into account. As the 
analysis by branch of activity shows in the following 
section, the widening of margins was fairly general-
ised, albeit with certain key exceptions.
IV.5.1.  Costs and prices: the productive 
branches
As indicated, the unit operating margin widened 
significantly during 2002, as was generally the case 
across the different branches of activity. Exceptions 
were market services, where the margin stabilised, 
and industry, where it shrank, such that the increase 
in margins in industry and energy was centred on 
the latter.
As Chart IV.13 shows, in the primary sector the 
value-added deflator slowed markedly throughout 
the year, despite which it grew by 3.2% on average. 
This behaviour was the result of the adverse effects 
occurring in 2001 being stripped out of the attend-
ant calculation, the consequence of the health crises 
in specific products, which translated into a 7.7% in-
crease in the deflator. Despite ULCs accelerating 
throughout the year, the unit margin widened in re-
lation to 2001.
94 95
BOX IV.4
The effect of the euro cash changeover on inflation
The changeover to euro banknotes and coins in Janu-
ary 2002 entailed the redenomination in euro of all prices 
previously expressed in pesetas. In principle, this process 
merely involved the application of a conversion factor and 
the legally established rounding rule, and the aggregate im-
pact on the CPI should have been practically nil. However, 
the conversion to euro was accompanied by additional price 
adjustments, attributable to a number of causes, some relat-
ed to the process of conversion itself (such as recovery of 
the costs arising from this process and the search for attrac-
tive prices in euro) and others not directly related to con-
version (such as using the occasion of the necessary change 
in prices to euro to make other pending adjustments, de-
ferred on account of the existence of menu costs, to cover 
changes in production costs or simply to modify unit mar-
gins). In sum, the change in currency seems to have been ac-
companied predominantly by upward price changes, with a 
positive – albeit moderate – impact on the rate of inflation, 
as measured by consumer prices.
An ex-post analysis of the impact of the launch of the 
euro on prices should ideally be based on a broad sample of 
individual prices that enable the price adjustments presuma-
bly arising from conversion to the euro to be distinguished 
from those attributable to other factors. However, suitable 
databases of individual prices are not available for this pur-
pose, so the analytical approach has to use other channels 
that enable the set of items consumed by households to be 
covered with the maximum possible degree of disaggrega-
tion.
As a result, the analysis has had to be based on a set of 
117 CPI time series, re-compiled by the DG Economics, Sta-
tistics and Research using the new 2001 base year method-
ology. First, the set of items was identified for which extraor-
dinary changes were recorded in 2002, especially in the first 
few months of the year, which were unusual for the dates 
considered. Then, those changes for which factors existed to 
explain the extraordinary movements, such as changes in 
taxes or administered prices, were rejected, as were increas-
es determined by changes in production costs or prices at source. The other extraordinary changes were assumed to be related 
to the conversion of prices to euro and they were used to form auxiliary variables. These were introduced into the models of 
behaviour of the main components of the CPI to estimate the effect of the change of currency.
The top panel shows the cumulative impact on the total index of the changeover to the single currency, estimated using the 
procedure described above. The total amount of the estimated effect on the annual rate of change of the CPI in December 2002 
is 0.4 p.p., the effect on the annual average of this index being practically the same amount. This estimate is at the upper limit of the 
range obtained ex-ante for non-extreme upward adjustment scenarios (0.2-0.4 p.p.). The time pattern of the effect is as expected: 
the impact was greatest in the initial months of the year, subsequently falling to become practically imperceptible by mid-year. By 
component, the largest effect corresponds to services. Bars and restaurants, which account for practically half of the estimated 
effect on services as a whole, and hotels were particularly notable. The impact was considerably more moderate in the case of 
non-energy industrial goods. Finally, in the case of food the effect was not significant.
This estimate − which should be interpreted as an approximation − does not seem to correspond to the perceptions of 
consumers, who associate the changeover to the euro with large price increases. This at least seems to be implied by the results of 
surveys carried out by the European Commission, which canvass consumers’ perception of prices. As seen in the middle panel, 
perceived inflation has historically followed the CPI closely, but since January 2002 it has been much higher than actual inflation. A 
plausible explanation for this divergence is that the public’s perception of inflation is determined to a large extent by the prices of 
the commodities consumed most frequently. The bottom panel shows the relationship between perceived inflation and a price in-
dex which only includes the most frequently consumed goods and services (food, energy, urban transport, newspapers and maga-
zines, bars, cafés and restaurants and recreational, sporting and cultural services). It seems clear that consumer perceptions must 
have been influenced by the predominance of high rises in the unit prices of these commodities.
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In industry and energy, the value-added deflator 
grew by 4.1%, 1.7 p.p. up on 2001. The acceleration 
was progressive and affected both energy prices and 
those in industry. ULCs, by contrast, slowed consid-
erably on the previous year, since job destruction 
gave rise to a notable pick-up in apparent labour 
productivity. Nonetheless, this phenomenon was 
mainly apparent in the energy branches, while pro-
ductivity fell in industry. Accordingly, the widening of 
unit margins at the aggregate level was consistent 
with a contraction in the industrial branches and a 
consequent widening in the energy branches. This 
result highlights how the Spanish economy’s inflation 
differential with our European partners might be 
beginning to impair the profitability of those compa-
nies most exposed to foreign competition.
In construction, the value-added deflator posted 
very high growth (5.7%), meaning that the widening 
of the unit margin seen in recent years continued. 
Unlike in previous years, ULCs grew moderately 
since, as was seen in the previous section, employ-
ment slowed significantly, providing for a forceful re-
covery in apparent labour productivity.
Finally, the growth of the deflator in market 
services was 4.4%. Despite this high inflation, the ac-
celeration in ULCs, in a setting in which employ-
ment was outgrowing activity, fed through only in 
part to prices, whereupon the unit margin stabilised. 
In any event, against a background of limited demand 
pressure, a greater adjustment of margins might 
have been expected. This might be highlighting the 
need for further reform in the markets for these 
products that makes prices more sensitive to de-
mand conditions.
IV.6. COMPETITIVENESS
In 2002 the Spanish economy’s price-competi-
tiveness and cost-competitiveness indicators against 
the developed countries worsened further. Contrib-
uting to this were both price and cost differentials 
and the nominal exchange rate component (see 
Chart IV.14). Since 1999 losses in competitiveness 
have been building up in these indices. Such losses 
are more sizable when calculated with consumer 
prices and with manufacturing unit labour costs, and 
less pronounced in terms of manufacturing or ex-
port prices. In this setting, the sluggishness of foreign 
demand, which is characterising the current cyclical 
downturn, has further eroded the foreign trade bal-
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ance, and the gains in market share of Spanish prod-
ucts abroad have been checked. National Accounts 
data show that, as a percentage of real GDP, the net 
external balance of real flows of goods and services 
was –2.3% in 2002, 0.2 p.p. more than in 2001 and 
0.5 p.p. more than in 1999. Customs figures show 
that the merchandise trade balance, in real terms, 
stood at –7.4% of GDP last year.
The share of Spanish exports in the developed 
countries as a whole, in real terms, stands at a 
similar level to that of four years ago; however, on 
the information available, growth in exports slightly 
outpaced that in export markets in 2002. By geo-
graphical area, the share of exports to the euro 
area in the region’s trade fell slightly. Conversely, 
and despite the substantial appreciation of the 
euro, exports to non-euro area countries grew at 
higher rates than the market. Exclusively in terms 
of manufacturing trade, the performance of Spanish 
exports has been less favourable since, in the past 
two years, their rate of change was negative and, 
according to the OECD, notably less than that of 
overall imports.
Among the indicators of competitiveness vis-à-
vis the euro area, the consumer prices-based index 
was that which appreciated most sharply in 2002. 
The other relative prices indices were more moder-
ate and the indicator of relative export prices de-
clined slightly. In the case of the indicator calculated 
with manufacturing ULCs, the loss in competitive-
ness during the year was relatively minor, as the 
growth differential of costs (which nevertheless re-
mained higher in Spain) narrowed significantly owing 
to the greater increase in apparent labour produc-
tivity in our country.
The competitiveness indices against the devel-
oped countries not belonging to the euro area, for 
their part, showed losses in competitiveness across 
the board, as the strength of the euro combined 
with the deterioration in price differentials. Although 
the gains that came about in the nominal compo-
nent of these indices, in the two years following the 
introduction of the euro, continued to show a cer-
tain competitive edge against these countries, the 
persistent increase in the price differential and, 
above all, in the cost differential is gradually eroding 
this advantage. A notable development in 2002 was 
the growth of relative export prices: set against 
more buoyant external demand in the non-euro 
area, this seems to indicate that Spanish exports 
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tended to set different prices in different markets so 
as to offset, in part, the decline in margins in trade 
with the euro area.
Indeed, analysis of the behaviour of Spanish ex-
porters’ operating margins shows that while they 
held stable in the period 1995-1999, in the past two 
years they shrank appreciably. It can also be seen 
how, on comparing manufacturing export prices 
with the value-added deflator for these products 
(which is an overall indicator of manufacturing pric-
es in the economy), export prices have in the past 
two years grown appreciably below domestic out-
put prices. Moreover, comparing both the latter with 
ULCs reveals that costs have outgrown final manu-
facturing producer prices. The lesser profitability of 
exports would explain why exporting industries 
have focused on maintaining their share in foreign 
markets, and not in opening new markets, switching 
their output as far as possible towards the domestic 
market. The contraction of relative manufacturing 
export margins vis-à-vis the EU has stepped up in 
the past two years.
In addition to the unfavourable performance of 
exports in terms of profitability, the weaknesses in 
the Spanish economy’s pattern of trade specialisa-
tion may also have checked penetration by Spanish 
products on international markets. As Chart IV.15 
shows, the structure of Spanish exports displays a 
degree of specialisation in the lower technology-in-
tensive industries. And, generally, world demand is 
less buoyant here and the competitive pressures 
from the newly industrialised countries are greater. 
Conversely, the high-technology industries, where 
many of the technological advances in recent years 
are concentrated, account for a very small propor-
tion of Spanish exports, relative to the EU. Another 
distinctive feature of the Spanish economy’s pattern 
of specialisation is the excessive concentration of 
foreign sales in the car industry, which currently ac-
counts for around 25% of total exports, meaning a 
degree of vulnerability to trade results. In the case 
of imports, there is a lesser relative share in the 
high-technology industries, which are the main 
transmission channel for technical progress in those 
countries with insufficient internal generation of 
technology.
But beyond considerations pertaining to trade 
results, the competitive capacity of an economy is 
ultimately reflected in its ability to increase produc-
tive efficiency and the well-being of its people. In 
this respect, and as discussed in Chapter 1 of this 
Report, the Spanish economy continued in 2002 to 
reduce its differences in income levels relative to its 
European partners, with its GDP per capita standing 
at around 83% of the EU average. The characteris-
tics of this convergence process are allowing a por-
tion of the unemployed labour force to be absorbed, 
thereby contributing to sustaining household in-
come and spending. But they also comprise some 
less favourable aspects and, in particular, insufficient 
capitalisation and a very low productivity growth 
rate (see Chart IV.2).
As earlier mentioned, this moderate increase in 
productivity and the persisting positive differential in 
the growth rate of compensation per employee vis-
à-vis the EU countries are gradually eroding the 
competitive advantages traditionally enjoyed by the 
Spanish economy in terms of its ULC levels. And 
that against a background of growing globalisation 
and liberalisation of international trade that is 
heightening the competitive pressures exerted by 
other newly industrialised countries in the relatively 
unskilled labour-intensive industries which, as seen, 
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account for a high proportion of the Spanish econo-
my’s output and exports. Notably, then, EU enlarge-
ment poses a challenge for the medium and medi-
um-high technology sectors in which Spanish indus-
try has tended to specialise in recent years. Here, 
efforts aimed at increasing productive efficiency by 
means of a greater diffusion and absorption of tech-
nical progress and more skilled human capital are of 
particular importance. The indicators in Table IV.2 
summarise the distance relative to the EU average 
still to be covered by the Spanish economy in terms 
of adopting new technologies, and they also reveal a 
slowdown in R+D. In addition, labour skills, proxied 
by the proportion of the population of working age 
who have completed higher studies, are still lower 
than those observed in our main trading partners.
IV.7.  GENERAL GOVERNMENT 
CONDUCT
The general government deficit stood at 0.1% of 
GDP in 2002, marginally off the initially planned bal-
anced budget target (see Table IV.3). The primary 
balance posted a surplus of 2.8% of GDP, 0.2 p.p. 
down on the previous year, while the public debt/
GDP ratio was 54%, appreciably down on the figure 
of 56.9% recorded in 2001.
The State and its agencies posted a deficit of 
0.5% of GDP, as initially budgeted. The Social Securi-
ty System, for which a surplus of 0.5% of GDP was 
initially forecast, ran a surplus of 0.7% of GDP. Once 
again, the Regional (Autonomous) Governments 
were considerably off target, recording a deficit of 
0.3% of GDP as opposed to the balanced budget 
scheduled. Local Governments, however, achieved a 
balanced budget as foreseen.
The relatively favourable performance of the 
general government balance, all the more significant 
in a year of economic slowdown, was essentially due 
to the sound behaviour of revenue, which grew by 
7.6% (in National Accounts terms) on the previous 
year, raising its share in GDP by 0.4 p.p. to 40%. This 
increase was, in turn, based on the substantial 
growth of tax revenue, while the weight of non-tax 
revenue in GDP fell appreciably. Public spending 
grew by 7.4% on the previous year, increasing its 
share in GDP by 0.3 p.p. to 40.1%. This was due 
both to primary current expenditure and to capital 
expenditure, while interest expenses declined signifi-
cantly.
The rise in tax revenue is attributable both to 
taxes on production and imports and to current in-
come and wealth tax. The former grew by 9.2% in 
relation to 2001, raising their share in GDP by 0.3 
p.p.. This performance was largely due to two events. 
On one hand, the financing arrangements for the EU 
budget came to depend to a greater extent in 2002 
on the GNP resource contributed by the Member 
States, and to a lesser extent on the VAT resource. 
This means that the portion of VAT takings assigned 
to Spanish general government is greater, explaining 
approximately 0.1 p.p. of the increase in the weight 
of the total for taxes on production and imports in 
relation to GDP, the counterpoint to which is the 
increase in current transfers paid arising from the 
GNP resource. Further, the tax revenue data show a 
substantial increase in transfer tax and legal docu-
ments tax, both assigned to the regional govern-
ments, which can be related to developments in the 
housing market. Finally, indirect tax revenue was fa-
voured in 2002 by the entry into force of the new 
tax on hydrocarbons.
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The growth of current taxes on income and 
wealth was even greater, at 11.3% in relation to the 
previous year. As a result, their weight in GDP in-
creased by 0.4 p.p.. Once again, this is largely due to 
a particular circumstance: namely, the higher corpo-
rate income tax takings arising from the use by 
companies of the third transitory provision of the 
law accompanying the 2002 budget, relating to rein-
vested capital gains (6). This temporary effect may 
account for the increase by almost 0.3 p.p. in the 
weight of direct taxes in GDP. Nonetheless, the 
cash-basis data also indicate a sound performance 
by personal income tax, the related revenue from 
which grew by around 7% on the previous year, with 
an increase in withholdings on income from labour 
of 8.5%, largely reflecting the relatively favourable 
behaviour sustained by employment in 2002.
Revenue from social security contributions in-
creased by 6.2% last year, having slowed significantly 
from the 8.9% rise recorded in 2001. That has en-
tailed a very slight loss in the weight of social secu-
rity contributions in GDP, reflecting a relatively fa-
vourable trend in the number of social security reg-
istrations, albeit with a growth rate of 3%, down on 
the previous year’s rate of 3.9%. Lastly, non-tax rev-
enue was largely determined by the decline in reve-
nue relating to Banco de España profits.
Under primary current expenditure, spending on 
final consumption quickened appreciably, with 
growth of 7%, against 6.3% the previous year, with 
the weight of this variable in GDP increasing by 0.1 
p.p.. This acceleration was due to the components 
other than compensation of employees in the serv-
ice of general government, as this latter caption in-
creased by only 5.2%, having slowed from a rate of 
6.1% the previous year. The data on non-market 
services indicate that this slowdown is due to the 
number of employees, while compensation per em-
ployee has held at virtually the same growth rate as 
the previous year. Notable among the remaining 
components of general government final consump-
tion is the growth of imports (purchases of goods 
and services), with a rate of 9.7%. This is related to 
some extent to the acceleration in the second half 
of the year, owing to the expenses incurred in the 
Prestige accident. Social transfers in kind also accel-
erated significantly, climbing from growth of 6.6% in 
2001 to 9.6% in 2002. These transfers are essentially 
related to health and State-subsidised private educa-
tion spending.
Welfare benefits in cash increased by 8.9%, quick-
ening considerably on the 6% growth the previous 
year, and with their weight in GDP rising by 0.3 p.p.. This 
reflects, first, the extraordinary payment made to 
pensioners for the deviation of the CPI from the ini-
tially forecast inflation target and, further, the increase 
in unemployment benefits. Spending on unemploy-
ment benefits increased by 15% in 2002 (compared 
with 11% in 2001), with the number of beneficiaries 
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(6) As a complementary measure of the 2002 Budget, the effec-
tive rate applicable under corporate income tax to reinvested capital 
gains was reduced from 35% to 18%. These capital gains are now 
taxable, moreover, in the tax period in which the gains are reinvested. 
As a result, the previous regime was discontinued, which had allowed 
the capital gain to be apportioned in equal parts in the tax bases of 
the tax periods ending in the seven years following the close of the 
tax period in which the term for reinvestment concluded, but paying 
tax at the standard rate of 35%. On a temporary basis, however, it 
was possible, in relation to the income subject to the previous re-
gime and pending integration, for companies to opt in 2002 to avail 
themselves of the new regime, including all outstanding capital gains 
in the tax base for fiscal year 2002 and paying tax at 18%, or, alterna-
tively, to retain the previous regime and continue paying tax at 35%. 
Most companies will have chosen the first option, which accounts 
for the strong growth of revenue that year.
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growing by 12.3% on average for the year. The growth 
in the number of beneficiaries was far greater than 
the increase in non-farm registered unemployment 
among those with previous jobs, which stood at 7.4% 
on average for the year. That signifies a substantial in-
crease in the net eligibility ratio, which edged up, on 
average, from 68.5% in 2001 to 71.6% in 2002, follow-
ing the trend of recent years. Nonetheless, it should 
be pointed out that this ratio peaked in the summer 
months of 2002, declining thereafter. Actual interest 
payments by general government fell by 2.4% on the 
previous year, meaning a fresh decline of 0.2 p.p. in 
respect of its weight in GDP, against a background of 
falling interest rates and a diminishing public debt/
GDP ratio.
Turning to public investment, the buoyancy of 
this variable remained strong in 2002, with a nomi-
nal growth rate of 10.7%. The reason behind this is 
largely the 2000-2007 Infrastructure Plan, which is 
currently being pursued. As a result, the weight of 
public investment in GDP has increased by 0.1 p.p. 
this year. It should be pointed out that this increase 
in public investment does not reflect in its entirety 
the greater drive undertaken in the construction of 
infrastructure in 2002, owing to the significant in-
vestment channelled in this area via the business 
sector, either through State-owned companies or 
through private concessionaires.
In sum, 2002 may be characterised as a year in 
which there was a halt in the downward trend of 
public spending, in terms of GDP, that had been seen 
in previous years. Primary current expenditure in-
creased significantly, due largely to the growth of 
government consumption and of unemployment 
benefits. However, the decline in the interest burden 
and the relatively favourable trend of revenue, in-
cluding specific one-off developments such as that 
which affected corporate income tax revenue, ena-
bled an overall general government budget balance 
close to zero to be maintained and, in turn, a high 
growth rate of public investment to be sustained.
Against a backdrop of economic slowdown, the 
indicators of fiscal policy revealed a restrictive 
stance in 2002, tighter indeed than had been ex-
pected on the basis of the initially approved Budget. 
However, if the one-off nature of the increase in 
revenue brought about by the measures affecting 
corporate income tax is taken into account, the 
broad fiscal policy stance may be qualified as virtual-
ly neutral. In any event, the fiscal policy implemented 
has provided for continuing fulfilment of the aim of 
placing the general government balance, in cyclically 
adjusted terms, close to zero or in surplus, which is 
the criterion used by the European Commission in 
its assessment of compliance with the Stability and 
Growth Pact.
IV.8.  THE ECONOMY’S REST OF THE 
WORLD ACCOUNT AND CAPITAL 
ACCOUNT
In 2002 the nation’s net borrowing declined to 
1.6% of GDP, 0.5 p.p. down on the previous year. 
Practically all the balances contributed to this im-
provement, with their shares in output increasing or 
stabilising. The exception was the tourism balance, 
whose surplus fell by 0.4 p.p. to 4.2% of GDP (see 
Chart IV.16).
The deficit on the merchandise account balance, 
which had peaked at 6.2% of GDP in 2000, declined 
for the second year running to 5.3% of GDP. The 
nominal growth of both receipts and payments 
eased significantly (to 0.9% and 0.7%, respectively) 
owing to the slowdown in trade transactions and to 
price developments. The correction of the deficit 
was essentially in the first half of the year and was 
driven by the improvement in the terms of trade 
and the strong slowdown in real imports. Nonethe-
less, this advance turned around in the closing 
months of 2002, amid escalating oil prices, the con-
tinuing fall in export prices and the sharp pick-up in 
real trade flows. The weight of the balance on serv-
ices account in GDP declined by 0.2 p.p. to 3.8% as 
a result of the deterioration in the tourism balance, 
while the deficit on other services improved slightly.
Net property income continued to post a deficit, 
but one smaller than the previous year. The deficit 
stood at 1.6% of GDP, 0.1 p.p. less than in 2001. Af-
ter several years of strong increases, income re-
ceived diminished significantly in 2002, due to the 
widespread decline in yields which was only partly 
offset by the increase in the stock of financial assets. 
Income paid also declined over the year as a whole, 
due likewise to the fall in yields, which was not off-
set by the moderate increase in the stock of liabili-
ties. Finally, the weight of net capital transfers in 
GDP increased by 0.2 p.p., reflecting a notable rise 
in most of the structural funds received from the 
EU, namely the Cohesion Funds and the EAGGF-
Guidance Fund.
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The reduction in the nation’s net borrowing was 
the result of the pick-up in the economy’ saving ra-
tio, which provided at the same time for an increase 
in the share of investment in output (see 
Chart IV.17). However, this increase in investment 
arises from the bigger build-up in stocks recorded in 
2002, whereas gross fixed capital formation grew at 
the same rate as output. Across the various sectors, 
the nation’s lower deficit was the outcome of the 
improvement in households’ and non-financial cor-
porations’ lending capacity, while the general gov-
ernment budget remained in deficit to the tune of 
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0.1 p.p. of GDP. The following chapter analyses in 
greater financial detail how this deficit position has 
been corrected.
This stabilisation of the budget balance in terms 
of GDP was the result of an increase in gross saving 
and of an investment drive. Households’ lending ca-
pacity improved slightly in 2000 to around 0.15% of 
GDP, thereby discontinuing the path of continuous 
decline witnessed in recent years. As mentioned, this 
improvement came about as a result of the pick-up 
in the household saving ratio, which had reached 
historical lows. This recovery allowed for a continu-
ing financing of investment in housing that was 
slightly higher, in terms of GDP, than that of the pre-
vious year.
Finally, Spanish companies reduced their net bor-
rowing to around 2% of GDP. This was mainly the 
result of the behaviour of non-financial corpora-
tions, which recorded a reduction in their deficit 
balance to 3.2% of GDP. In the case of non-financial 
corporations, an improvement in gross saving arose 
from a bigger gross operating surplus and from a 
smaller financial burden, while the share of invest-
ment in output held stable.
CHAPTER V
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN
107
In broad terms, the main trends that character-
ised Spain’s financial flows, markets and intermediar-
ies in 2001 continued to hold sway in 2002, though 
naturally they were influenced by the international 
environment. The latter was marked by continued 
uncertainty over the scope and duration of the 
downturn in the main industrialised economies, by 
the emergence of a number of financial scandals 
which damaged the credibility of the public accounts 
of listed companies and by geopolitical tensions that 
had built up in various areas.
Spanish corporations and households again in-
creased their debts to sustain their spending. The fi-
nancing they raised grew at rates of around 14% 
and, consequently, their debt ratios rose to around 
the average level in the euro area. Liabilities in-
creased more sharply in the case of households, 
whose debt reached 83% of their gross disposable 
income. This behaviour reveals the strengthening of 
the framework of greater macroeconomic stability 
which the Spanish economy has progressively moved 
into, while it also shows the role played by the finan-
cial system in channelling flows of funds between 
agents and in the inter-temporal allocation of their 
resources.
The increase in liabilities obtained by households 
and corporations was primarily underpinned by the 
decline in short- and long-term nominal interest 
rates, the decline in real rates being greater owing 
to the increase in inflation. Thus, despite the growth 
in debt, the debt-service burden borne by agents 
held steady. In the case of households, the expan-
sionary effect of the fall in rates was amplified by 
the rise in their wealth, although this was the net 
result of countervailing movements in its financial 
and property components. In the case of corpora-
tions, however, the effects of lower interest rates 
were moderated by the rise in the risk premiums 
negotiated on the markets, in some cases linked to a 
downgrading of credit ratings, and by the deteriora-
tion in financing conditions on stock markets.
Developments in the net financial wealth of the 
non-financial private sector were driven by the fall 
in share values, although this was actually less pro-
nounced on Spanish stock exchanges than on other 
European bourses. The decline in share values, along 
with the continued high degree of price volatility on 
these markets, prompted a fresh shift in investors’ 
portfolios towards more liquid and less risky finan-
cial assets. Likewise, equity issues lost ground to the 
bond issues of general government and financial 
corporations (while non-financial corporations actu-
ally made a net redemption of bonds in 2002). Turn-
over in fixed-income instruments grew significantly, 
in contrast to the stagnation recorded for equities 
and the reduction in derivatives turnover.
By contrast, the value of the main component of 
household wealth, housing, again increased in 2002, 
by around 17% in nominal terms. The price of this 
real asset thus showed signs of overvaluation, com-
parable to that in the last upturn in the market 
which ended at the beginning of the 1990s (see 
Box V.1). Increased property wealth was conducive 
to buoyant household consumption, while a signifi-
cant portion of the loans received by households 
was used for house purchases, this type of bank 
credit growing by more than 17% last year (see 
Box V.2).
The loans received by non-financial corporations 
from Spanish credit institutions decelerated some-
what in 2002, although those relating to property 
activities did not. Thus, total mortgage lending, an es-
sential part of the business of these institutions in 
Spain, continued to grow at rates of over 20%. The 
strength of this component explains much of the 
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notable resilience displayed by the Spanish banking 
system in a markedly adverse environment which, 
besides the slowdown in activity in Spain, was char-
acterised by the unfavourable performance of other 
economies in which Spanish banks have investments, 
by the fall in share values and by the depreciation of 
the main Latin American currencies. Thus, although 
their profits fell in 2002, their rates of return held at 
high levels (average ROE was around 12%), while the 
sector continued to show a high degree of solvency.
In sum, the financial position of deposit institu-
tions, which continue to play a central role in the 
channelling of financial flows between the different 
sectors of the economy, and of Spanish corporations 
and households should not be an obstacle to a re-
covery in consumption, investment and employment. 
However, as stated on other occasions, it also needs 
to be stressed that this position is now more ex-
posed to certain shocks. In particular, the behaviour 
of house prices may govern household spending de-
cisions to a greater extent than in the past. Likewise, 
it is reasonable to think that, in view of the higher 
levels of debt of the non-financial private sector, 
consumption and investment will be more sensitive 
to interest rate changes. Their higher indebtedness 
also limits the scope for Spanish firms and house-
holds to continue sustaining the growth of activity 
on the basis of a heavy recourse to external financ-
ing. Despite this, the information available for 2003 
Q1 still shows no clear signs of a slowdown in the 
financing raised by the non-financial private sector.
V.1.  FINANCIAL FLOWS IN THE 
SPANISH ECONOMY
The financing raised by the non-financial private 
sector decelerated slightly in 2002 but continued to 
grow at rates that are high when considering the 
cyclical position of the Spanish economy and the 
uncertainty surrounding activity. This slowdown was 
the net result of a moderation in the rate of growth 
of liabilities of by non-financial corporations and of a 
certain acceleration in borrowing by households. In 
both sectors, however, the strength of property-re-
lated credit was notable.
The net financial saving (“net financial transac-
tions”, according to ESA 95 terminology) of the 
non-financial private sector improved as a conse-
quence of the increase in household saving and the 
lower net borrowing requirements of non-financial 
corporations (see Table V.1). As for general govern-
ment, its net financial transactions were low. Overall, 
the net recourse of the Spanish economy to foreign 
savings amounted to 1.6% of GDP, as against 2.1% in 
2001.
V.1.1.  Financial flows of households 
and non-financial corporations
In 2002, the financial saving of households picked 
up to 1.4% of GDP, following the downtrend of re-
cent years (see Table V.1 and Chart V.1). However, 
this was a modest improvement considering the in-
creasing uncertainty last year and the sector’s heavy 
loss of financial wealth as a result of the behaviour 
of financial asset prices (see Chart V.2). In fact, the 
recovery in saving was moderated by the rise in the 
value of housing, the main component of household 
wealth and thus an important determinant of house-
hold borrowing capacity.
The increasing uncertainty also had a substantial 
effect on household financial investment decisions. 
Their net asset transactions, which picked up in 
2002, were characterised by a greater relative pref-
erence for more liquid and less risky instruments 
(see Table V.2 and Chart V.2). Cash and cash equiva-
lents (cash and sight and savings deposits) was the 
main component of the net acquisition of financial 
assets, although time deposits also received a high 
volume of investment, within the downtrend that 
dates back to 2000. Net household investment in 
mutual funds was still positive although, at 0.2% of 
GDP, the volume was more moderate than in 2001 
and varied according to the type of fund. Thus, while 
net investment in money market funds and euro-de-
nominated fixed-income FIMs was relatively high, 
there was a net redemption of shares in other FIMs. 
At the same time, despite the falls in stock market 
indices and their high degree of volatility, household 
investment in listed and unlisted shares was positive. 
Finally, contributions to pension and insurance 
schemes were also significant, although lower than 
in previous years.
On the liabilities side, the funds obtained by 
households rose to 8% of GDP, of which 6.8 per-
centage points corresponded to loans from resident 
financial institutions. This volume of financing was 
higher than in 2001, when it was 6.6% of GDP, and 
was largely determined by the persistence of easy 
monetary and financial conditions. Loan rates were 
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BOX V.1
Analysis of house prices in Spain
In 2002 the average price of appraised housing in Spain 
increased by 16.6%, up by more than one percentage point 
on the rise in 2001, making it the fourth year running of 
nominal growth above 10%. Moreover, this took place against 
a background of economic deceleration, which naturally 
raises the question of what is causing this behaviour. From a 
longer-term perspective, the adjacent chart (top panel) 
shows how real housing prices in Spain have doubled in the 
last 25 years. The expansion recorded is also very high in 
comparison with that of average household income.
Given the special nature of housing, which shares the 
features of both consumer durables and investment assets, 
there are various approaches that can be used to analyse the 
changes in its price. For instance, analyses focussing on mac-
roeconomic variables tend to show that house prices can be 
explained by a small number of factors, including most nota-
bly average household income and the user cost of housing, 
along with a significant inertial component which generates 
temporary deviations from long-term equilibrium. In Spain 
there are also other specific developments that may have 
helped to raise the demand for housing in the recent past, 
such as changes in the population pyramid, the rise in immi-
gration and the increase in second home purchases by both 
residents and non-residents. However, available evidence sug-
gests that in Spain, as in other countries, household income 
and the cost of financing are the variables that explain most 
fully the trend in property values over the last two decades.
The recent structural changes in the Spanish economy 
have significantly spurred employment growth, which has led 
to a rise in household disposable income. At the same time, 
there has been a sharp fall in nominal interest rates – one of 
the components of the user cost of housing – which, to-
gether with an increase in the average term of mortgage 
loans, has helped to reduce considerably the financial burden 
on households. While these factors together explain a large 
part of the recent rise in property prices, the (negative) cor-
relation between interest rates and income in this period 
makes it more difficult to estimate accurately the separate 
impact of each variable. Against this background, the adjacent 
chart (middle panel) gives an estimate of long-term equilib-
rium house prices in Spain under two complementary models that combine the above-mentioned macroeconomic variables (1).
Another approach exploits the financial properties of housing assets. It analyses the theoretical relationship between their 
price and the “dividends” they yield (rent or imputed value of the accommodation services they provide). The adjacent chart 
(lower panel) gives an estimate based on this alternative financial approach (2).
As can be appreciated, the results of both approaches—macroeconomic and financial—suggest that the housing market was 
somewhat undervalued in the second half of the 1990s, due to a progressive accumulation of the real price adjustments that com-
menced in 1991. Thus the expansionary behaviour of prices in this market at the end of the 1990s should be regarded, at least in 
part, as an adjustment that took prices towards their equilibrium value.
However, prices have increased beyond what was needed to restore their equilibrium value. Thus, at the end of the sample, 
houses are somewhat overvalued, although this is compatible with the adjustment dynamic that customarily operates in this mar-
ket. Consequently, and with the due caution that should accompany an exercise such as that carried out here, it is likely that in the 
near future the growth rate of house prices will gradually move towards levels more in line with the long-term fundamentals.
(1) The main difference between the two models is that in the first (model 1) the income elasticity of house prices is estimated freely, while in 
the second (model 2) it is restricted to unity. For more details, see the Banco de España Working Paper “Análisis del precio de la vivienda en España” 
by Jorge Martínez and Luis A. Maza.
(2) For more details, see Banco de España Working Paper No. 0304 “House prices and rents: an equilibrium asset pricing approach” by Juan 
Ayuso and Fernando Restoy.
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at historically low levels and fell even further during 
the final quarter, given the expectations (subse-
quently confirmed) of cuts in official interest rates, 
amid growing competition among institutions. The 
increase in credit was also underpinned by the rise 
in employment and the rise in the value of house-
hold property wealth (see Chart V.3). The credit was 
mainly used to finance house purchases, while the 
annual growth rate of credit for current and durable 
consumption fell significantly, to 6.4%, in line with 
the moderation in household spending.
As regards non-financial corporations, there was 
a fall in the volume of their investment in financial 
assets and in their acquisition of liabilities in 2002. 
The slight pick-up in their gross saving and the 
slackness of gross capital formation meant that 
there was a modest improvement in the net balance 
of their financial transactions, following the deterio-
ration of the last few years. This balance was still 
negative, at –4.4% of GDP, but that was a lower rate 
of dissaving than at similar stages of the cycle in the 
past.
The need for funds to finance a broader invest-
ment aggregate known as the financing gap (which 
includes, in addition to gross capital formation, finan-
cial investment of a permanent nature in the rest of 
the world) also fell to 7.4% of GDP, as a conse-
quence of a further contraction in outflows of for-
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BOX V.2
House prices and household consumption
Many analysts consider that the rise in house prices in 
certain countries has been a major determinant of house-
hold consumption behaviour in the current economic down-
turn. This explanation, which has been used particularly in 
the United States and the United Kingdom, is based on a 
wealth effect whereby household spending increases due to 
the increase in the value of property assets owned by 
households. The nature of this wealth effect differs, however, 
from that caused by a rise in the value of other assets, such 
as financial instruments, because it is due not to expecta-
tions of higher income (an increase in house prices in the 
present normally implies a higher cost of the accommoda-
tion services that the house provides over time) but rather 
to the role played by property as collateral for obtaining 
loans.
In this connection, when households decide on their 
desired combination of present and future consumption, 
they face constraints on their ability to borrow against fu-
ture income. In these circumstances, increases in property 
wealth mean more collateral with which to secure loans and 
thus tend to relax these constraints. This greater borrowing 
capacity can give rise to expenditure either through greater 
demand for bank loans that are immediately used for con-
sumption or through a reduction in the propensity to save, 
since households know that in the event of an unanticipated 
future decrease in, say, their income, they will be better 
placed to qualify for a loan.
Recently, to evaluate the importance of the relationship 
between house prices and consumption, attention has been 
given to an indicator known as “Mortgage Equity Withdraw-
al” (hereafter “MEW”). This indicator measures the differ-
ence between the change in mortgage lending to households 
over one year and the value of their residential domestic in-
vestment in the same period. Therefore, if the MEW is posi-
tive, the household sector is using part of its mortgage fi-
nancing for purposes other than house purchases. Such pur-
poses include consumption or investment in other types of 
assets.
The adjacent chart shows house prices, MEW and con-
sumption in the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Spain from 1970 to 2001. It can be seen that in the first two 
countries there have been various periods in which the 
MEW indicator has been positive, which means that on several occasions households have used mortgage financing for a purpose 
other than investment in housing. It can also be seen that the MEW is closely related to the pattern of consumption, which sug-
gests that the funds may have been used for this purpose. In the last part of the sample period, when house prices grew substan-
tially, the MEW increased significantly, particularly in the United Kingdom.
By contrast, in Spain the MEW has been negative over the whole period considered. This indicates that, in aggregate, Spanish 
households not only use all their mortgage loans to acquire new houses, but that the financing of these purchases requires re-
course to other additional sources of funds, typically the liquidation of financial assets. This behaviour of the MEW, shared by most 
euro area countries, suggests that, unlike in the United States and the United Kingdom, Spanish households have not used the 
higher value of their houses to obtain loans with which to step up their consumption.
However, despite the heightened economic uncertainty and the depletion of their financial wealth, the saving ratio of Spanish 
consumers has been falling over the last few years and grew only moderately in 2002. This, along with the evidence presented in 
Box IV.1 on the significance of the wealth effect in explaining consumer behaviour, suggests that the rise in house prices has spurred 
consumer spending mainly by reducing households’ propensity to save. In any event, the substantial growth of lending in this con-
text reveals that the rise in house prices has tended to underpin spending on residential investment to a greater extent in Spain 
than in other countries that have experienced similar processes in the recent past.
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eign investment, in an environment marked by low 
growth across the main economies, high levels of 
uncertainty and crisis in some Latin American coun-
tries (see Chart V.4).
The net acquisition of financial assets by non-
financial corporations continued to follow the 
path of moderation established in 2001, mainly on 
account of the lower growth in credit positions 
vis-à-vis other countries (see Table V.2). However, 
the latter were still relatively high and represent-
ed around 28% of the net financial investment of 
corporations. A significant portion of the acquisi-
tion of financial assets (more than 40%) consisted 
of trade credit, mostly made up of inter-company 
transactions (also reflected in the sector’s liabili-
ties).
The slowdown in the productive and foreign 
investment of Spanish corporations resulted in a 
reduction in the growth rate of their liability trans-
actions, which was reflected in most of the differ-
ent headings (see Table V.2 and Chart V.4). In 2002, 
the amount of funds obtained through the issuance 
of shares and other equity was 3.1% of GDP, as 
against 5.4% in 2001. Interest-bearing external fi-
nancing (securities other than shares and credit) 
rose by 14.3%, which was still a high rate, but nota-
bly lower than in 2001 (see the memorandum item 
in Table V.2). The net issuance of fixed-income secu-
rities was negative, especially in the case of short-
term securities, and credit financing grew by less 
than in the previous year, both in the case of its 
domestic component and in that of foreign loans, 
although the latter continued to be a significant 
������� ����� �� �������
��� ���� ��� ������� ������� �������� ����� ����� ��� �������� ����� ���� ��� ���� ������������
��� ���� ��� ������� ������ �� ������ ������
��� �������� ����������� ������
��� �������� ���� ������ �������� �� �������� ������ ������������ ������������ ������ ���������� ������� ����� ��� ������������ �����������
������������� ������������ ���������� ��� ������
��� ��������� ������ ���� ���� ���� ��� ��� ���
��������� ������������ �������� ���� ���� ���� ��� ��� ���
���� ��� ���� ����������� ��� ��� ��� ��� ��� ���
����� �������� ��� ��� ��� ��� ��� ��� ���
���������� ����� ���� ������ ��� ��� ��� ��� ���� ���
������ ��� ����� ������ ��� ���� ��� ��� ��� ���� ���
�� ������
���� �� ����� ���� ��� ��� ���� ���� ���
������ �� ������ ����� ���� ��� ���� ���� ��� ���
�� ������
����� ������ ����� ������� ���� ��� ��� ���� ��� ���
���������� ����� ����� ���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ����
��������� ��������� �������� ��� ��� ��� ��� ��� ���
������ ��� ����� ���� ���� ��� ��� ��� ���
��������� ������������ ������������� ���� ���� ���� ��� ��� ���
���������� ����� ���� ������ ���� ��� ����
������ ��� ����� ������ ���� ��� ���
����� ���� ���� ���� ��� ��� ���
�� ������
�������� ��������� ������������ ��� ��� ��� ��� ��� ��� ���
���� �� ��� ����� ��� ��� ��� ��� ��� ���
����� ������ ��� ��� ��� ��� ��� ���
��������� ��������� �������� ��� ����� ��� ��� ���� ��� ��� ���
���������� ����� ������������ �������
��������� ��� ���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ����
���� �������� ���� ���� ����
������������� ������������ ��� ���������� ��� ������
����� ���
� �� ���
114 115
source of financing (more than 30% of the net flow 
of credit financing). Significantly, however, credit did 
not grow at the same rate across the various pro-
ductive sectors. In industry (excluding construc-
tion) and the services sector (excluding property) 
moderate annual rates of expansion of 3.2% and 
5.7%, respectively, were recorded. However, loans 
to the construction sector and property services 
increased at higher rates than in 2001, of above 
20%, in line with the buoyancy of this sector last 
year.
V.1.2. General government financial flows
In 2002, the net balance of general government 
financial transactions was close to a balanced budget 
at –0.1% of GDP (see Chart V.5). These net financing 
requirements stemmed from a social security sur-
plus which almost cancelled out the small central 
and regional and local government deficits.
General government increased its net volume 
of marketable securities issuance, while reducing 
the balance of credits and other liabilities and in-
creasing its deposits. In the case of the State, net 
Treasury bill issuance was positive for the first 
time since 1997, although the amount was small 
(less than 0.1% of GDP). Two measures were taken 
to make this segment of the market more liquid: 
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first, with effect from August, the Treasury changed 
the frequency of tenders (from fortnightly to 
monthly), raising the amounts allocated by tender; 
second, each of the benchmarks began to be ten-
dered on more than one occasion, thereby increas-
ing the outstanding amount thereof. The main 
source of State financing, however, was still bond 
issuance, through which a volume of funds repre-
senting about 1.2% of GDP was raised. Net issu-
ance of three and five-year bonds gave a negative 
amount of €6.6 billion, while that of ten, fifteen and 
thirty-year bonds was a positive amount of €15.8 
billion. As regards the average life of State debt, fol-
lowing several years of gradual increase, it stabi-
lised from late 2001 at around six years. Net issu-
ance by regional and local government amounted 
to 0.5% of GDP and was concentrated at the long-
er dates.
Of the various sectors, the rest of the world was 
still the main supplier of financing to general govern-
ment in net terms. Non-residents held marketable 
securities representing around 46% of the total 
portfolio of government debt, a percentage that has 
been increasing since 1999, when it stood at around 
30%. Resident credit institutions, which hold around 
30% of government debt, increased their holdings 
moderately from 2001, when there was a notable 
increase in their demand, owing to the commence-
ment of Treasury liquidity tenders.
V.1.3.  Investment and foreign financing 
of the Spanish economy
In 2002, the net balance of the financial transac-
tions of the Spanish economy with the rest of the 
world amounted to –1.6% of GDP, as against –2.1% 
the previous year (see Table V.3). This small net in-
flow of funds was the result of a somewhat sharper 
reduction in liability transactions than in asset trans-
actions, with respect to 2001, in an environment not 
propitious to growth in international capital flows.
The Spanish economy’s investment in foreign fi-
nancial assets amounted to 11.6% of GDP, as 
against 12.2% in 2001. The adverse international 
environment was also reflected in the composition 
of these capital flows, which tended to be concen-
trated in less risky assets. Thus, while the acquisi-
tion of cash and deposits increased, other asset 
transactions declined. Investment in securities oth-
er than shares amounted to 4.3% of GDP, which 
was higher than investment in shares (3.1% of 
GDP).
Liability transactions with the rest of the world de-
clined moderately to 13.1% of GDP, from 14.3% the 
previous year. This decline was mainly attributable to 
the fall, as in 2001, in the net acquisition of shares and 
other equity of non-residents, which totalled 1.8% of 
GDP in 2002. However, the investment of non-residents 
in more liquid and less risky assets increased. Thus, the 
net acquisition of deposits and fixed-income securities 
amounted to 4.3% and 4%, respectively, of GDP.
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V.2. THE SPANISH FINANCIAL MARKETS
As already indicated, developments on the 
Spanish financial markets in 2002 were against a 
backdrop of economic and geopolitical instability, 
with the emergence of certain corporate scandals 
having an adverse effect on the credibility of the 
public accounts of listed companies. These factors, 
as in most of the developed economies, led to a 
significant fall in prices on equity markets and con-
strained securities issuance on primary markets. 
The greater uncertainty was reflected in an in-
crease in share volatility, which reached levels even 
higher than those recorded immediately after the 
attacks of 11 September 2001. In addition, there 
was a shift by issuers and investors from equities 
to fixed-income instruments. In particular, financial 
institutions issued bonds in order to raise funds to 
meet the high demand for financing from the non-
financial private sector. By contrast, in the case of 
companies, the adjustment of investment plans, 
partly linked to the restructuring undertaken by 
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certain major companies, reduced recourse to the 
markets.
V.2.1. The primary markets
The net issuance of shares on primary markets, 
by both non-financial corporations and financial in-
stitutions, continued to display moderation in line 
with the uncertainty on equity markets and the sig-
nificant reduction in share values. The funds raised 
through public share offerings fell significantly as a 
result of the smaller volume of IPOs and the ab-
sence of privatisations carried out through this 
channel (see Table V.4).
In the case of non-financial corporations, this 
reduction in the amount of funds raised through 
share issuance was not offset by financing raised 
on the fixed-income markets. Thus, in 2002, the 
sector made a net redemption of €1.5 billion of 
bonds and paper, which contrasts with the amount 
of almost €1 billion raised the previous year. The 
volume of funds raised by their subsidiaries abroad 
also fell significantly, for the first time in the last 
three years. All these declines are linked to the 
containment of investment and to the balance 
sheet restructuring in certain large Spanish compa-
nies, those that have in the past resorted most to 
this type of financing.
Conversely, financial institutions (which, in addi-
tion to credit institutions, include other financial in-
termediaries, such as portfolio investment institu-
tions and securitisation funds) increased their issu-
ance of fixed income on the domestic market signifi-
cantly. As in the previous year, these transactions 
were concentrated in long-term securities, most of 
which were placed through securitisation funds. 
Thus, credit institutions continued to increase their 
use of asset securitisation, especially in the case of 
mortgage loans, as an instrument to meet their fi-
nancing requirements. In 2002, the volume of funds 
raised by this means increased by 58.7% over the 
previous year, so that by the end of 2002 these se-
curities represented 5.1% of the credit extended by 
Spanish institutions and 29.9% of the outstanding 
amount of private fixed-income in Spain. Meanwhile, 
net debt issuance by the foreign subsidiaries of fi-
nancial institutions increased moderately. 
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In the case of general government, as already dis-
cussed, there was a significant increase in fixed-in-
come issuance, despite the low financing require-
ments of this sector. This increase seems to be attrib-
utable to the favourable conditions for raising funds, 
given the historically low level of interest rates.
V.2.2. Secondary market activity
Secondary market activity was governed by the 
behaviour of the primary markets. There was thus 
an increase in the trading volume on the public and 
private-debt markets, no change in the volume on 
equity markets and a fall in that on derivatives mar-
kets, on which trading is primarily in equity-related 
instruments (see Table V.5).
Volumes on the book-entry public-debt market 
increased by 15%, owing both to the growth of spot 
transactions and, especially, to the increase in repo 
and sell and buy-back transactions. This outcome 
partly reflects the higher volumes of issuance, while 
the Treasury continued to boost market liquidity.
Trading volumes on the AIAF fixed-income mar-
ket increased significantly (87% over the previous 
year), largely as a consequence of repos and sell and 
buy-back transactions, whose volumes were double 
those of outright transactions last year. In terms of 
instruments, the growth of activity was concentrat-
ed in commercial paper. This boom in trading was 
also seen, albeit to a lesser extent, in fixed income 
on the stock exchanges, in which trading grew by 
24%, basically owing to transactions in securities is-
sued by the regional (autonomous) governments.
Despite the decline in share values the volumes 
actually traded on the stock exchanges dipped only 
slightly. Behaviour was not uniform across sectors; 
while trading in the shares of certain corporations, 
such as financial institutions, electricity utilities and 
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construction companies increased notably, that in 
others, such as telecommunications companies, con-
tracted substantially. Meanwhile, the climate of un-
certainty affected foreign investment in the Spanish 
stock exchange, which in 2002 was negative in net 
terms for the third year running.
On the Spanish derivatives markets, trading once 
again fell significantly (30%), meaning turnover ac-
counted for little more than one-third of that re-
corded in 1999. Trading in stock futures, first 
launched in 2001, did not give rise to significant fig-
ures in 2002.
In 2003 to date, there has been no substantial 
change in financial market activity. Turnover on the 
debt markets continued to increase while on the 
stock market, despite a moderate pick-up early in 
the year, it remained on the decline.
Finally, the ongoing consolidation of domestic 
markets continued last year. Specifically, February 
2002 saw the merging of the domestic financial mar-
kets into the company “Bolsas y Mercados Es-
pañoles, Sociedad Holding de Mercados y Sistemas 
Financieros SA”, drawing together all the listing, 
trading and settlement systems existing in Spain. 
This process has continued in 2003, and in April 
“IBERCLEAR” − part of the aforementioned holding 
company − was set up as Spain’s central securities 
depository, covering trades on the stock, AIAF and 
government debt book-entry markets.
V.2.3. Secondary market prices
Prices on Spanish stock markets in 2002 contin-
ued on the downward course embarked upon by 
domestic and international equity markets in March 
2000 (see Chart V.6). This process, which began with 
the change in expectations arising in respect of the 
stocks issued by telecommunications and new tech-
nologies companies, was influenced last year by un-
certainty about the start of the economic upturn in 
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most countries, by corporate earnings expectations, 
by financial scandals and by the international politi-
cal situation. In addition, the prices of certain Span-
ish corporations were affected by the depreciation 
of the main Latin American currencies and by the 
Argentine crisis. The behaviour of equity prices did 
not follow the same pattern throughout the year. 
Until the middle of Q2, stock market prices held at 
their end-2001 levels. This stability was interrupted 
as the delay in economic recovery became apparent 
and growth forecasts and corporate earnings pro-
jections were scaled back. Thus, in October, the 
main stock market indices reached a low for the 
past five years. In the closing months of the year, 
improved corporate earnings and expectations of 
interest-rate cuts prompted most indices to rally.
Over the year as a whole, the decline in the 
IBEX 35 (28.1%) was greater than that in the Over-
all Madrid Stock Exchange Index (IGBM), which fell 
by 22.9%, reflecting the more unfavourable perform-
ance of the most capitalised stocks. This decline was 
significantly greater than that of the previous year, 
similar to that of the US markets (the S&P 500 fell 
by 23.3%), and less than that of the euro area mar-
kets (the broad DJ Euro Stoxx registered losses of 
34.5%). The greater uncertainty was also reflected in 
implicit volatilities, which in certain periods even 
exceeded the level observed in the days following 
the 11 September 2001 attacks.
The performance of the various sectors making 
up the IGBM was fairly uneven. The companies with 
the biggest declines during the year – technology 
(45%), telecommunications (40%) and banks (27%) – 
behaved in a very similar way to their European 
counterparts. The sectors that performed relatively 
better were food and construction, in contrast to 
developments in these branches on the euro area 
markets. In respect of insurance corporations, the 
trajectory of the Spanish markets was less unfavour-
able than in Europe, a fact related essentially to the 
lesser exposure of Spanish insurers to stock market 
prices (see Box V.3).
Yields on the Spanish government debt market 
trended similarly to those on other markets, such as 
Germany or the United States. There was thus a 
decline in yields on long-term debt, prompted by 
the scaling back of economic growth projections 
and agents’ preference for highly rated assets against 
a background of heightening uncertainty. In the case 
of short-term assets, the contraction in yields also 
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BOX V.3
Comparative impact of recent financial market developments on insurance corporations
The insurance sector is one of the main inves-
tors in shares in numerous countries and has there-
fore been particularly affected by the poor perform-
ance of stock markets in recent years. The deteriorat-
ing financial position of insurance corporations may in 
many cases have led them to close out equity posi-
tions, thereby exacerbating the fall in market prices. In 
addition, the decline in the price of the listed insur-
ance corporation shares themselves has also contrib-
uted to the fall in general stock market indices.
Worldwide, two main factors have contributed 
to the worsening situation of insurance corporations: 
the high payouts on claims in recent years and the fall 
in returns on their financial investments. The first fac-
tor, which primarily affects non-life insurance, can be 
offset, albeit only partially, by raising the premiums 
charged to insureds, since they are normally renegoti-
ated every year. The second factor particularly affects 
life and retirement insurance, since the policies have 
longer terms and therefore the investment of the pre-
miums received plays a more important role and the 
insurers have less leeway for correcting potential im-
balances between their earnings and their commit-
ments.
The sharp fall in share prices, the rise in defaults on credit and bond markets, the losses on credit derivatives 
and low official interest rates are the main reasons for the very low, or even negative, returns on insurance corpora-
tions’ investment portfolios. The stock market decline has been particularly sizable in those cases in which shares 
account for a very high percentage of the total portfolio (around 60% in the United Kingdom). In other countries, 
such as Germany, Switzerland and Japan, although the percentage of equities is lower, the existence of minimum 
guaranteed returns – which on occasions may be relatively high – has contributed to the worsening solvency of in-
surers.
Returns on insurers’ financial investments have also decreased in Spain. However, given the clearly conservative 
nature of their portfolios, with a high proportion of government debt and less than 10% invested in equities, the 
impact has been limited. This, together with the sharp improvement in technical income (before financial results) 
from non-life business, resulted in growth of the sector’s aggregate earnings of over 10% in 2002, according to the 
first available estimates.
The differing positions of and outlook for national insurance sectors were faithfully reflected in the perform-
ance of their share prices. Thus, while the market prices of insurance shares in the United Kingdom and in the euro 
area have seen a cumulative fall from end-2001 of around 60%, in the USA this fall was 30% and in Spain prices have 
risen by 7%.
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reflected expectations – which were subsequently 
confirmed – that official rates would fall. However, 
the budgetary and economic situation in Germany 
meant that the fall in the yield on long-term bunds 
was not as steep, so that the spread between the 
Spanish and German benchmarks narrowed signifi-
cantly at the end of the year (see Chart.7). 
Finally, the prices of the premiums of credit de-
fault swaps of most of the Spanish companies whose 
risk is traded on these markets increased notably, 
especially from August to October. This increase 
was partly indicative of investors’ greater conserva-
tism, but also of the worsening credit quality of cer-
tain companies, which resulted in their being down-
graded. This eased the effects of the decline in long-
term rates on the bond issuance costs for these 
companies (see Chart V.8). At end-2002 premiums 
fell, although they were still above the levels as at 
the beginning of the year.
In 2003 to date, equity prices have picked up 
somewhat against a background of high volatility 
linked to the uncertainty of the effects of the Iraqi 
conflict and the scant clarity of signals about the 
prospects for recovery of the world economy. Debt 
market yields continued falling, although in the case 
of long yields the trend was interrupted in mid-
March, meaning rates stood in April at around early-
2003 levels. Finally, risk premiums on the credit de-
rivatives markets held on a relatively stable trend.
V.3.  SPANISH FINANCIAL 
INTERMEDIARIES
The domestic and international economic con-
text and the above-mentioned trend of financial 
markets affected the results of Spanish financial in-
termediaries and prompted them to behave more 
conservatively in respect of their investment poli-
cies. Credit institutions thus reduced their exposure 
abroad, as a result both of the declines in the vol-
ume of lending and of the effect on the value of 
their assets of the depreciation of Latin American 
currencies. Institutional investors, while continuing 
to increase their portfolio of foreign assets, did so in 
the main through the acquisition of euro-denomi-
nated fixed-income instruments, reducing in parallel 
the weight of shares issued by non-residents.
An analysis of these flows shows how credit in-
stitutions assigned a greater volume of net financing 
to non-financial corporations and households than 
in 2001. However, this was offset by a smaller net 
flow of funds towards Spanish general government, 
such that although they continued to require net 
foreign financing, the amount was similar to that ob-
served the previous year and clearly less than that 
recorded in the period from 1998 to 2000. Set 
against this, and in line with the more conservative 
tendency in the management of their portfolios, in-
stitutional investors reduced considerably their dis-
investment in general government assets compared 
with previous years.
V.3.1. Deposit institutions
Spanish deposit institutions saw a fresh deterio-
ration in their results in 2002, against an unfavoura-
ble international and financial background which was 
alleviated only partially by traditional lending-deposit 
business in Spain. In any event, they maintained a 
sound balance-sheet position which enabled them 
to continue providing a high volume of funds, espe-
cially to households for house purchases but also to 
corporations.
Deposit institutions’ business, measured by total 
consolidated assets, has tended to flatten in recent 
years. After growing by 21.7% in 2000, and by 7.5% 
in 2001, it increased by only 0.6% in 2002. This is 
largely due to the depreciation of the Latin Ameri-
can currencies which, along with something of a de-
cline in intermediation activity in the region, entailed 
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a decline of approximately 25% in total business 
abroad in 2002 (one-third in the past two years). As 
a result, there was a reduction in the weight of such 
business from 27% of the total in December 2000 
to a figure 10 p.p. lower at the end of last year. Busi-
ness in Spain also moderated somewhat in 2002, 
growing by 8.3% (7.7% if measured by the average 
total assets of overall individual institutions). None-
theless, this was consistent with considerable mo-
mentum by non-interbank credit to the resident 
private sector, which accounts for almost half the 
total non-consolidated balance sheet (see Table V.6).
Hence, after the slowdown in lending to the pri-
vate sector in 2001, there was something of a re-
bound in 2002, along with strong growth in off-bal-
ance sheet securitisation, especially in the final 
quarter of the year. The outstanding balance of secu-
ritised loans increased by EUR 13.1 billion, almost 
three times the increase the previous year, account-
ing for 5% of total credit extended (on- and off-bal-
ance sheet). This expanded by 14.7% in 2002, against 
11.8% in 2001, accelerating at both commercial 
banks and savings banks, although the rate of expan-
sion was clearly higher at the latter. In real terms, 
the buoyancy of this item was less but the progres-
sion observed proved notable in the light of the cy-
clical stage in which the Spanish economy moved 
last year (see Chart V.9).
The increased buoyancy of credit was due exclu-
sively to the behaviour of real-estate loans (credit to 
households for house purchases, to the construc-
tion industry and to real-estate services), since both 
consumer and other loans extended to households 
and those granted to other services and to industry, 
excluding construction, eased in 2002. Particularly 
striking is the increase in loans to the construction 
industry and to real-estate services, which increased 
overall by 25% and accounted at the end of last year 
for 16% of the total. 
The mortgage market is clearly attractive to in-
stitutions. This is because of the lower historical 
level of default (in the case of credit to households 
for house purchases, although not so in the case of 
credit to the construction industry or to real-estate 
services), the fact loans are secured and the tying of 
customers to the institution over a long period of 
time. Indeed, in the past two years it has been tradi-
tional business in Spain, of which mortgage credit is 
a fundamental component, that has allowed institu-
tions to offset in part the poor results obtained in 
other business areas. However, a strategy geared to 
maintaining the growth of this item at a year-on-year 
rate of around 20% is not risk-free. This is particu-
larly so when, although the default ratio is –as dis-
cussed elsewhere in this report- low, there are signs 
of an overvaluation of house prices and relative 
household and corporate debt has increased sharply 
in recent years.
Among the factors behind the expansion of 
credit in 2002 was the low rate of doubtful assets 
and of bankruptcies and suspensions of payments. 
Doubtful assets grew last year by 22% (against 8% 
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the previous year), and by 14% in the case of 
those relating to the resident private sector. Not-
withstanding, the default rate in this sector held 
at a minimum level of around 1%, and the cover-
age ratio (provisions/doubtful assets) stood at 
over 200% on individual data (185% on consoli-
dated data).
The expansion of loans took place, moreover, 
against the background of the fresh interest-rate re-
ductions applied by institutions to their customers. 
In 2002 as a whole, then, the synthetic rate on as-
set-side transactions fell by 46 b.p., more or less in 
line with developments on the interbank market, 
and it has continued falling in 2003 to date, coming 
to stand below 4.3% in March 2003. This level is be-
low that reached in mid-1999, when interbank rates 
were at a similar level to that at present. Among the 
related components, however, only the rate on 
mortgage loans is clearly below the 1999 low, which 
shows the growing competition between institutions 
in this business area.
On the liabilities side, resident customer funds 
grew somewhat less than the previous year. Al-
though for the year on average the increase in sight 
accounts was greater, this was partly due to the 
changeover to the euro, which contributed to an ac-
celeration in this type of deposit at end-2001 and in 
early 2002. In cumulative twelve-month terms, resi-
dent customer funds increased by 6.8%, with sight 
and saving deposits climbing by 7.5% and time de-
posits by 6.5%. Changes in the new personal income 
tax legislation for 2003 once again favour shares in 
mutual funds over bank deposits. Specifically, the so-
called “tax toll”, whereby changing fund was accord-
ed the same tax treatment as a sale of shares, has 
been eliminated, and the single rate applicable to 
capital gains obtained over a period of more than 
one year has been lowered from 18% to 15%. Con-
sequently, competition to raise deposits will remain 
heightened, spurred moreover by the high-yield of-
fers of banks operating mainly on the Internet, 
which maintained strong increases in deposits, al-
though their weight in relation to the total remains 
small.
As a result of this competitive pressure, the in-
terest rates applied by institutions on both sight and 
saving deposits and on time deposits declined very 
moderately in 2002 (by 9 and 10 b.p., respectively). 
Despite the fact that in the opening months of the 
current year further cuts were seen, the present 
levels are between 15 and 25 b.p. higher than those 
observed in mid-1999. Commercial banks, among 
which are those specialising in offering on-line Inter-
net services, have been particularly incisive in this 
respect, passing through cuts in market rates to 
those on their deposits to a lesser extent than oth-
er institutions. Overall, the synthetic deposit rate 
declined by 39 b.p. from December 2001 to March 
2003, two-thirds of the decline seen in the synthetic 
lending rate.
As a consequence of greater competition in the 
domestic market, of the deterioration in business in 
Latin America, of the lower net results on the indus-
trial holdings portfolio and of the trend on financial 
markets, the net consolidated profit attributable to 
Spanish deposit institutions fell by 8% in 2002 
(against growth of 6.6% in 2001 and 20.9% in 2000). 
Nonetheless, this entailed a return on own funds of 
12% and of 0.7% on total assets, which compares 
favourably with the average figures for EU banks. 
The average capital adequacy ratio for the industry 
– calculated according to Spanish rules – held at 
11.1%, more than 3 p.p. above the minimum required 
level. 
Total provisions for bad debts set aside in 2002 
were virtually identical to those for 2001, when the 
high volume of provisioning due to the crisis in Ar-
gentina triggered the slowdown in results. The in-
crease in specific provisions was offset by the fall in 
the statistical provision, such that the latter, in its 
second full year of operation, has already exerted a 
significant stabilising effect on the profit and loss ac-
count. Conversely, while consolidated net operating 
income grew by 25% in 2001, last year, since it stabi-
lised, it did not contribute to augmenting profits. 
Extraordinary income and profits from group trans-
actions also shrank. In absolute terms, the decline in 
net income attributable was greater at commercial 
banks (12.3%) than at savings banks (2.8%). However, 
in relation to total assets, the opposite was the 
case.
For their part, non-consolidated accounts show 
growth of 2.9% in net income, unchanged on the 
previous year but far below the figure for 2000 
(20.6%). As can be seen in Table V.6, all margins nar-
rowed except for that of net income before taxes at 
commercial banks, owing to the effect of lower 
write-downs and to the capital gains arising on the 
disposal of property, permanent holdings and the 
held-to-maturity portfolio.
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V.3.2. Institutional investors
Institutional investors’ business in 2002 trended 
very similarly to that observed the previous year. 
The overall net volume of funds raised by mutual 
and pension funds and by life assurance companies 
was similar to that recorded in 2001 and below that 
absorbed by deposit institutions, being concentrated 
in the main at insurance institutions and pension 
funds (see Table V.7).
As a consequence of changes in financial asset 
prices, the results arising on investment portfolios 
were unfavourable (see Chart V.10). Securities funds 
and pensions funds posted negative average returns (of 
around –5%), while that on money-market funds stood 
at 2.4%, somewhat over 1 p.p. below that for the previ-
ous year and clearly below the actual inflation rate for 
the year. These low (and even negative) returns, which 
compound the poor profits of previous years, involve a 
significant loss of financial wealth for savers and a fac-
tor of risk for insurers and defined-benefit pension 
funds. However, as Box V.3 shows, Spanish insurance 
companies are facing lesser investment risks than those 
in other industrialised countries.
The obligatory externalisation of companies’ 
pension commitments to their employees (a proc-
ess which finalised – except for certain minor unre-
solved issues – on 16 November) contributed, once 
again, to the growth of saving raised by insurance 
institutions and pension funds. On the provisional 
information available, life assurance provisions grew 
by 14% last year, an identical rate to 2001, with 
group and retirement insurance expanding and unit-
linked provisions falling back once again. The net as-
set value of pension funds slowed, showing a year-
on-year increase of 9.8% in December 2002, against 
16.2% in 2001, the outcome of a lower return and, 
albeit to a lesser extent, of a fall in estimated net 
contributions. With a view to the future, the re-
formed personal income tax legislation provides for 
“retirement security policies”. This is a new product 
that life insurers will be marketing and which offers 
tax and liquidity features on a par with those of 
pension funds. It will promote tax neutrality among 
the various saving and provision vehicles.
Developments in life assurance and pension 
funds were once again in contrast to the behaviour 
of mutual funds, the overall net asset value of which 
declined by 3.6% year-on-year, the outcome of 
growth of 21.8% in FIAMMs (money-market funds) 
and a fall of 11.7% in FIMs (securities funds). Overall, 
net subscriptions of shares in FIMs were negative in 
all four quarters of 2002, and only short-term fixed-
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income funds and, to a much lesser extent, global 
funds posted positive net subscriptions for the year 
as a whole. In 2003, the elimination of the so-called 
“tax toll” might increase movements among differ-
ent types of funds. Moreover, this same measure 
should promote stiffer competition among institu-
tions marketing and managing mutual funds, accentu-
ating the tendency towards lower average commis-
sions seen in recent years.
The course of subscriptions and of prices nego-
tiated on financial markets entailed a fresh fall in 
the weight of equity instruments issued by non-
residents relative to the total portfolio of securi-
ties funds, while domestic equity instruments 
showed greater stability. Overall, the total equity 
portfolio accounted for 19% of the net asset value 
of securities funds in December 2002, compared 
with 31% in September 2000. In the case of pen-
sion funds, the decline was from 26% to 21%. Off-
setting the diminished weight of equity instruments 
was an increase in the fixed-income portfolio is-
sued by non-residents (mainly in euro), meaning 
that, in 2002, the foreign portfolio continued grow-
ing in securities and pension funds up to 53% and 
31% of the total, respectively (45% in money-mar-
ket funds).
V.4.  THE NET WORTH POSITION 
OF THE PRIVATE NON-FINANCIAL 
SECTOR
Investment and financing decisions and the be-
haviour of financial asset prices were reflected in 
the changes in the net worth position of the private 
non-financial sector. The sizable increase in recourse 
to debt made for a fresh rise in the sector’s debt 
ratios, although the declining course of interest 
rates prevented an equivalent rise in the associated 
financial burden from occurring. The adverse trend 
of stock market prices and the increase in liabilities 
entailed a deterioration in the sector’s net financial 
worth, which was more acute in the case of non-fi-
nancial corporations. However, the growth in house 
prices prevented a reduction in the total net wealth 
of households.
In the case of households, there was an increase 
in the weight of their lower-risk financial assets. 
Above all, that reflects the decline in the valuation of 
equity instruments, but also the sector’s lesser pro-
pensity to invest in such securities. Thus, at end-
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2002, cash, deposits and shares in fixed-income 
money-market and securities funds accounted for 
48.1% of the total portfolio, compared with 42.7% in 
2001, while the proportion of direct equity holdings 
and shares in other securities funds fell by 8 p.p. to 
26.4%. The weight of insurance technical reserves 
continued to increase, in line with the trend of re-
cent years, rising to 15.8% of the portfolio. This shift 
towards lesser-risk instruments suggests a lesser 
sensitivity of the sector’s gross financial wealth to 
changes in stock market prices.
With regard to liabilities, the growth of house-
hold financing translated into a fresh increase in 
debt ratios, which is largely due to the reduction in 
interest rates, the increase in employment and the 
rise in house prices. In terms of household gross 
disposable income (GDI), debt rose by 6 p.p. last 
year to 83% (see Chart V.11), a level which, while 
still below that of the United States or the United 
Kingdom, has now reached the euro area average. 
As a percentage of their gross financial wealth, 
credit to Spanish households climbed from 29.5% to 
34.6%. The increase in relation to the more liquid 
assets was naturally smaller, given the increase in the 
weight of the latter instruments in households’ 
holdings. The cost of borrowing, along with the 
lengthening of average repayment terms, neverthe-
less led to a slight easing of the associated debt-
service burden. Thus, interest payments relative to 
GDI shrank by 30 b.p. to 4.3%, while the total bur-
den, which includes repayment of principal, fell by a 
similar amount to 12.9%. Further reflecting the 
trend of liabilities was the behaviour of gross saving 
not earmarked for debt service which, though it 
picked up slightly in 2002, remains limited in the 
light of the current economic and financial setting.
Household net financial wealth fell by around 15 
p.p. in terms of GDP (see Chart V.12). Nonetheless, 
housing, which is the main component of their total 
wealth, grew robustly once again, meaning wealth 
did not deteriorate. In real terms, there has been a 
rise in the value of housing of 60.7% between 1997 
and 2002. That shows, primarily, a correction of the 
sharp downward adjustment in the real price of 
housing that took place in the first half of the nine-
ties. Moreover, the trend of the essential determi-
nants of house prices, such as income and interest 
rates, has been conducive to their expansion re-
cently. However, the evidence at hand suggests hous-
ing is overvalued to some extent at present, on a 
scale not far different from that seen in the previous 
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boom a decade back (see Box V.1). As was then the 
case, the most likely scenario is that a gradual slow-
down in prices will begin, with their trajectory mov-
ing more closely in line with the behaviour of the 
long-run determinants of housing. Were this not to 
occur, the continuing overvaluation of housing 
would naturally heighten the likelihood of sharper 
adjustments taking place.
As explained in greater detail in Box V.2, the 
greater possibilities of indebtedness offered by more 
highly valued properties, given their role as collater-
al, were duly taken advantage of by households, 
against a background of growing competition be-
tween banks, to finance an increase in residential in-
vestment spending. The rise in house prices also 
contributed to the expansion of consumption inso-
far as the greater capacity for potential access to 
credit reduced households’ propensity to save.
The financial position of households remained 
sound, as testified by the rise in their net wealth, the 
greater weight of lower-risk assets in their financial 
portfolio and the reduction of their debt-service 
burden. Indeed, their default ratio held in 2002 at a 
low level. However, the high level reached by debt 
and house prices suggests that the scope for house-
holds to increase borrowing is now more limited; 
consequently, it is unlikely that this factor can con-
tinue contributing to the same extent to sustaining 
consumer and residential investment spending. In 
addition, the current household debt ratios imply 
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greater sensitivity of their financial position to 
changes in borrowing costs, to the behaviour of 
their income and to how house prices trend. Con-
sequently, future spending decisions will foreseeably 
be more sensitive than in the past to changes in 
these variables.
Turning to non-financial corporations, the mar-
ket value of their holdings of shares and other equi-
ty was also adversely affected by the fall in stock 
market prices. The reflection of this, together with 
the sector’s moderate net investment in equity se-
curities, especially in instruments issued by residents, 
was a 3 p.p. decline in the weight of shares and oth-
er equity in their financial portfolio to 39.6% as at 
end-2002. As regards more liquid assets, their pro-
portion increased by 0.5 p.p..
The resort to borrowed funds led to a fresh in-
crease in the sector’s debt ratios (see Chart V.13). 
As regards operating results (defined as the sum of 
the gross operating surplus plus financial revenue), 
the value of the sector’s debt, measured by the out-
standing balance of bank loans and of fixed-income 
securities, stood at end-2002 as 358%, 20 p.p. above 
the related level in 2001. On CBSO data, the distri-
bution of this ratio by sector and by company size 
has been fairly heterogeneous in recent years. It is 
thus the biggest corporations, in the market services 
and energy sectors, that show the biggest relative 
levels of external borrowing. During 2002, the in-
crease in these corporations’ debt was more mod-
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BOX V.4
The financial position of Spanish firms and its impact on the level of activity
The adoption of a disaggregated approach to analysing 
the financial position of the business sector is essential in or-
der to assess the risk to macroeconomic and financial stability. 
The aggregate indicators may not reliably reflect the system’s 
financial soundness if the deterioration in the financial position 
of the more vulnerable firms is more pronounced that that of 
the sector on average. Using the Banco de España’s Central 
Balance Sheet Data Office database for the period 1985-2001 
makes it possible to identify the relative importance of the fac-
tors bearing on the financial position of Spanish firms and as-
sess the extent to which their level of activity varies with the 
degree of financial pressure on them. By way of a synthetic in-
dicator of this degree of financial pressure, use can be made of 
a measure of the relative debt burden, which is defined as fi-
nancial costs divided by gross operating surplus. This ratio – 
which is the net result of changes in interest rates, in business 
profits and in indebtedness – reflects the capacity to meet in-
terest payments out of funds generated within the business 
alone and is thus an indicator of firms’ financial tightness (or 
pressure).
The adjacent chart compares the average level of various 
real and financial variables in different corporate groupings de-
fined on the basis of their financial position. Each panel of the 
chart presents the average value of a certain variable for the 
firms belonging to three different deciles of the distribution 
defined in terms of the ratio of financial costs to gross operat-
ing surplus each year. The median decile (that including the 
firms between percentiles 45 and 55) can be regarded as rep-
resentative of the behaviour of a firm in an average financial 
position. Analogously, the top (bottom) decile includes the 10% 
of firms with the highest (lowest) relative financial burden.
The following comments may be made on the chart. First, 
the firms with the highest financial burden (top decile) have a 
similar financing cost to and slightly higher debt level than 
those of firms subject to average financial pressure. By contrast, 
these two corporate groupings differ notably in the relative 
size of their gross operating surplus. It therefore seems that 
the low profitability levels have contributed to the deteriora-
tion of the financial position of the firms that are in a more 
vulnerable position. Second, no significant differences in de-
mand for factors of production are observed between the 
firms with most financial pressure (bottom decile) and those 
with average financial pressure. However, the firms facing a 
higher financial burden have substantially lower investment and 
employment growth rates. Moreover, in the case of employ-
ment, this difference seems more marked in recessionary 
phases.
This evidence suggests, first, that a firm’s profit perform-
ance plays an essential role in determining its financial position 
and, further, that the impact of this position on real activity be-
comes more pronounced when the financial pressure reaches a 
certain threshold. Therefore, a poor profit performance would 
contribute to an effect whereby the increasing indebtedness 
seen amongst Spanish firms may heighten the vulnerability of 
the sector, particularly if the financial pressure on a significant 
number of firms reaches levels at which it has a more pro-
nounced influence on real activity. However, the relative finan-
cial burden borne by the business sector is, in historical terms, 
moderate. Therefore, its effect on their real decisions will foreseeably not be significant. Only in the financially more vulnerable firms 
would disturbances affecting their financial position be expected to give rise to sharper adjustments in spending decisions.
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erate than that observed for Spanish non-financial 
corporations as a whole.
The declining course of borrowing costs more 
than offset the effect of the rise in corporate indebt-
edness on the associated debt-service burden. Inter-
est payments thus accounted for 19.9% of their oper-
ating results, 1 p.p. less than in 2001 (see Chart V.14). 
Lower interest rates benefited most companies, al-
though the impact was naturally greater on those 
most indebted. On CBSO figures, the interest burden 
was somewhat higher in the market services branch 
(18.4%) and at major corporations (16.6%) than at 
electric utilities (13.8%) and, above all, in the manufac-
turing industry branch (10.3%). If short-term debt is 
also included, the aggregate burden on these corpo-
rations also fell, albeit only slightly, during 2002.
The composition of debt in terms of instruments 
scarcely changed last year. Credit extended by resi-
dent institutions remained the main source of funds 
and accounted for 67.4% of interest-bearing bor-
rowed funds, 0.5 p.p. less than at end-2001. Foreign 
loans continued to gain in weight and stood at 
28.2%, 1 p.p. up on a year earlier. The proportion 
represented by fixed-income securities fell by 0.5 
p.p. to 4.4%. The debt restructuring undertaken by 
certain large corporations, which are those that 
most use this instrument, would appear to be be-
hind this development.
The net financial worth of non-financial corpo-
rations shrank by 26 p.p. relative to GDP, 11 p.p. 
more than that of households. That essentially evi-
dences their greater relative exposure to move-
ments in stock market prices, as well as reflecting 
the consequences of the crises besetting certain 
Latin American economies and the cancellation of 
specific European investments by a major telecom-
munications operator (see Chart V.15). However, 
the aggregate financial position of the sector re-
mains sound, as testified, for example, by the low 
volume of liabilities affected by bankruptcies and 
suspensions of payments, despite their number in-
creasing in 2002. Moreover, according to the CBSO, 
ordinary net profit, which excludes extraordinary 
items, increased by 8%, which meant that the ordi-
nary return on equity held at close to 13%, al-
though in the case of manufacturing industry it was 
somewhat lower. Likewise, the lesser interest bur-
den entails less financial pressure on spending deci-
sions (see Box V.4).
Against this background, the financial position of 
the sector at the aggregate level does not appear to 
pose any significant obstacle to a pick-up in invest-
ment and employment, since financial pressure can-
not be seen to be at a level that might exert any 
relevant contractionary effect on companies’ spend-
ing decisions. Nonetheless, the high level of debt at 
some of these companies, such as the biggest corpo-
rations, suggests that their scope for increasing their 
debt is now less; consequently, this factor will not be 
able to continue contributing to the same extent to 
sustaining expansion projects. Furthermore, as is the 
case with households, their exposure to potential 
shocks is now much higher. In this respect, their in-
vestment decisions will be more influenced by the 
course of borrowing costs than they were during 
the recovery in the previous business cycle.
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INTRODUCTION
The annual accounts of the Banco de España 
(“the Bank”) comprise the balance sheet, the profit 
and loss account and the notes on the accounts, as 
established by Article 29.1 of its internal rules. Pur-
suant to the provisions of the same article, the ac-
counts have been prepared in accordance with the 
Bank’s internal accounting policies. These policies 
follow generally accepted accounting principles, 
adapted to the special characteristics of the opera-
tions and functions of a central bank. They also com-
ply, wherever applicable, with the accounting criteria 
and valuation rules established for the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB), as required by Ar-
ticle 26.4 of the Statute of the ESCB, relating to 
standardisation of accounting principles and practic-
es in the Eurosystem.
In accordance with the provisions of Articles 29 
and 32 of its internal rules, the Bank’s annual ac-
counts have been audited by the Internal Audit De-
partment and reviewed by the Accounts Review 
Committee appointed for the purpose by a resolu-
tion of the Bank’s Governing Council of 21 Decem-
ber 2001. The accounts have also been audited by 
independent external auditors, as stipulated by Arti-
cle 27 of the Statute of the ESCB.
Under the provisions of Article 4.2 of Law 13/
1994 of 1 June 1994 of Autonomy of the Banco de 
España, it is for the government, upon proposal by 
the Minister of the Economy, to approve the Bank’s 
balance sheet and accounts for the year, which will 
be sent to Parliament (Cortes Generales) for informa-
tional purposes. The Governing Council of the Bank, 
under the provisions of Article 21.1 (g) of the afore-
mentioned Law, is responsible for formulating the 
Bank’s annual accounts.
Unless otherwise indicated, the figures refer to 
millions of euro. It should be pointed out that, due 
to rounding, on occasions the totals included in the 
balance sheet, profit and loss account and notes on 
annual accounts may not equal the sum of the indi-
vidual figures.
This document presents the accounts for the 
year 2002. Section I includes the balance sheet and 
profit and loss account; Section II contains the notes 
on the accounts, with the accounting policies that 
have served as a framework for their formulation 
and explanatory notes on the most important as-
pects of the balance sheet and profit and loss ac-
count; and Section III, in compliance with Article 4.2 
of the Law of Autonomy, details the contributions 
made to the Deposit Guarantee Funds and the 
loans and transactions agreed on other than an 
arm’s-length basis or which in any other way entail a 
loss of profit or losses for the Bank, giving estimates 
of the amount of such loss of profit or losses.
Finally, Annexes 1 and 2 include the reports of 
the external auditors and of the Banco de España 
Accounts Review Committee on the annual ac-
counts presented in Sections I-III. 
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II. NOTES ON THE ACCOUNTS
II.1. ACCOUNTING POLICIES
1. Basic principles
The following accounting principles have been 
applied in formulating the annual accounts:
• economic reality and transparency;
• going concern;
• prudence;
• recognition of post-balance-sheet events;
• materiality;
• the accruals principle;
• consistency and comparability.
2. Basis of accounting
The accounts have been prepared on an histori-
cal cost basis, modified as necessary to include mar-
ket valuation of marketable securities, gold and the 
foreign currency position. Transactions in assets and 
liabilities are reflected in the accounts on the basis 
of the date on which they are settled.
As an exception to the application of the general 
historical cost criterion, it should be pointed out that, 
on 31 December 1998, at the time the ESCB was es-
tablished and in application of the harmonised ac-
counting standards established for the European Sys-
tem of Central Banks, gold, domestic and foreign secu-
rities and foreign currencies were valued at the market 
prices and exchange rates then prevailing, without rec-
ognising profits, in the event of unrealised gains, and 
with a charge to the profit and loss account in the case 
of unrealised losses. These unrealised gains are subse-
quently credited to the profit and loss account, when 
the sale of the asset in question takes place or, under 
certain conditions, when unrealised losses arising at a 
later date can be netted against them.
The specific valuation criteria applied to each of 
the assets and liabilities specified were the following:
Gold
Gold is recorded at acquisition cost, which is 
determined by the cash amount paid, including all 
the expenses inherent in the transaction.
The cost of sales is obtained by applying the daily 
net average cost method. In the event that the cash 
to be paid or received is specified in a currency 
other than the euro, it is translated into euro at the 
mid-market exchange rate two business days before 
the settlement date.
On the last day of each month, stocks are valued 
at the market price in euro per troy ounce of fine 
gold. Unrealised gains or losses (except for unreal-
ised losses at year-end) are reflected in an adjust-
ment account and credited or debited, respectively, 
to a revaluation or expense account. Both revalua-
tion and expense accounts are reversed at the end 
of the following month.
Unrealised losses existing at the end of the year 
are taken to the profit and loss account and the av-
erage book price is modified. Such losses are con-
sidered irreversible.
Sales of gold against foreign currency under re-
purchase agreements are recorded as off-balance-
sheet items, with no effect on the balance sheet. The 
foreign currency received by way of consideration is 
recorded on the assets side, with the obligation to 
repay it being recorded simultaneously on the liabili-
ties side. Possible differences arising between gold 
delivered spot and that received forward are re-
corded as if there had been an independent outright 
sale or purchase, at the time of maturity of the 
transaction.
Foreign currencies
Purchases are recorded at acquisition cost in 
euro. Purchases and sales of foreign currencies 
against euro are valued at the exchange rate agreed 
in the transaction. Where foreign currencies are 
bought and sold against other foreign currencies the 
euro valuation is at the mid-market exchange rate 
of the currency sold on the contract date.
The cost in euro of foreign currency sold is cal-
culated using the daily net average cost method.
Foreign currencies are revalued monthly to mar-
ket price. This revaluation is performed without net-
ting unrealised gains against unrealised losses on the 
various currencies. Unrealised gains and losses (ex-
cept for unrealised losses at year-end) are reflected 
in adjustment accounts and credited or debited, re-
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spectively, to revaluation accounts and expense ac-
counts. Both revaluation and expense accounts are 
reversed at the end of the following month.
Unrealised losses existing at the end of the year 
are taken to the profit and loss account for the year, 
in which case they affect the average cost of the 
currency in question. Such losses are considered ir-
reversible.
Foreign banknotes
The criteria applied are the same as those indi-
cated in the preceding section for foreign curren-
cies.
Special drawing rights (SDRs)
SDRs and the net International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) position are valued at the year-end SDR mar-
ket exchange rate. 
Securities
Securities are recorded at acquisition cost, which 
is determined by the cash amount paid, after de-
ducting any accrued gross coupon.
The cost of foreign securities sold or redeemed 
is determined by the average book price of the se-
curity in question.
Securities are revalued monthly to market price. 
This revaluation is carried out without any netting 
of unrealised gains and losses on different security 
codes. Unrealised gains and losses (with the excep-
tion of unrealised losses at year-end) are reflected in 
adjustment accounts and credited or debited, re-
spectively, to revaluation and expense accounts. 
Both revaluation and expense accounts are reversed 
in subsequent revaluations.
Unrealised losses existing at the end of the year 
are taken to the profit and loss account. Their 
amount is credited directly to the securities ac-
count, and the average book price – and therefore 
the internal rate of return – of the security code 
concerned is modified. Such losses are considered 
irreversible, not being reversed at the end of the fol-
lowing month.
Any premiums, discounts and coupons that have 
accrued but are not due are recorded in accruals 
accounts, using the internal rate of return of each 
security code for their calculation.
The above references to acquisition cost and 
market prices shall, in relation to securities denomi-
nated in foreign currency, be understood to refer to 
the currency concerned, these amounts being trans-
lated into euro, as stipulated in the “Foreign curren-
cies” section.
Repurchase agreements involving securities
Reverse repurchase agreements involving securi-
ties are recorded on the assets side of the balance 
sheet as collateralised outward loans for the amount 
of the loan. Securities acquired under reverse repur-
chase agreements are not revalued or included in 
the securities portfolio.
Repurchase agreements involving securities are 
recorded on the liabilities side of the balance sheet 
as an inward deposit collateralised by securities, the 
balancing entry of which is the cash received. Securi-
ties sold under this type of agreement remain on 
the balance sheet of the Banco de España and are 
treated as if they had remained part of the portfolio 
from which they were sold. Repurchase agreements 
involving securities denominated in foreign curren-
cies have no effect on the average cost of the cur-
rency position.
In direct loans of securities, repurchase and re-
verse repurchase agreements conducted simultane-
ously are accounted for separately, each being re-
cording according to the valuation rules set forth in 
the preceding two paragraphs.
Automated security loans are not recorded in 
the balance sheet. The only item accounted for is 
the income, which is recorded in the profit and loss 
account. Operations outstanding at year-end are re-
corded off-balance-sheet.
Doubtful debtors
 Where there is any reasonable doubt over the 
recovery of an asset, it is recorded in a separate ac-
count and the relevant provision set aside.
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Loans to financial institutions and balances 
with EU central banks
These are valued at their nominal amount.
Special loans to the State and the 
Social Security System
Special loans granted to the State that are re-
ferred to in transitional provision seven of Law 21/
1993 on the State budget for 1994, and those grant-
ed to the Social Security System that are envisaged 
in transitional provision six of Law 41/1994 on the 
State budget for 1995, are valued at their nominal 
amount, in accordance with the ESCB’s harmonised 
rules.
Shares and participating interests
Shares and participating interests in national and/
or international institutions, including the participat-
ing interest in the European Central Bank (ECB), are 
valued at cost.
Tangible and intangible fixed assets
Fixed assets are valued at cost, which includes 
any non-deductible VAT borne and all additional ex-
penses that may arise until they are in operation. 
Fixed assets whose cost is less than €120 are re-
corded as expenses in the year in which they are 
acquired.
Annual charges for depreciation are calculated 
on the basis of the estimated economic life of the 
various assets using the straight-line method. Land 
and items forming part of the Bank’s art collection 
are not considered to be depreciable assets. Depre-
ciation is taken monthly, starting from the month 
following that in which the asset is recorded in the 
accounts or put into operation.
Major expenses relating to projects that will be 
in effect for several years may be capitalised and de-
preciated over a maximum period of four years.
In 2002, the depreciation percentages applied to 
the various fixed assets were the same as those ap-
plied in 2001, and were as follows:
Banknotes in circulation
The ECB and the 12 participating NCBs, which 
together comprise the Eurosystem, have issued euro 
banknotes since 1 January 2002 (1). The total value 
of euro banknotes in circulation is allocated on the 
last working day of each month in accordance with 
the banknotes allocation key (2).
The ECB has been allocated a share of 8% of 
the total value of euro banknotes in circulation as 
from 2002, whereas the remaining 92% has been 
allocated to the NCBs according to their weight-
ings in the capital key of the ECB. The share of 
banknotes allocated to each NCB is disclosed un-
der the balance sheet liability item “Banknotes in 
circulation”.
The difference between the value of the euro 
banknotes allocated to each NCB in accordance 
with the banknote allocation key and the value of 
the euro banknotes that it actually puts into circula-
tion also gives rise to remunerated intra-Eurosystem 
balances. These claims or liabilities, which incur in-
terest (3) are disclosed under the sub-item “Intra-
Eurosystem: Net claim/liability related to the alloca-
tion of euro banknotes within the Eurosystem” (see 
“Intra-Eurosystem balances” in the notes on ac-
counting policies).
%
• Land and buildings                                                                    2 
• Facilities                                                                                    6 
• Furniture and office equipment
  — Libraries                                                                             10
  — Furniture                                                                            10
  — Offices machines other than computer equipment           20
  — Machines for the treatment of banknotes and coins        20
  — Computer equipment                                                         25
  — Other machines and equipment                                        20
• Transport equipment                                                               20
• Computer applications                                                            33
• Art collection                                                                             0
(1) Decision of the European Central Bank of 6 December 
2001 on the issue of euro banknotes (ECB/2001/15), OJ L 337, 
20.12.2001, pp. 52-54
(2) The banknote allocation key refers to the percentages 
that result from taking into account the ECB’s share of the total 
euro banknote issue and applying the subscribed capital key to 
the NCBs’ share of such total.
(3) Decision of the European Central Bank of 6 December 
2001 on the allocation of monetary income of the national cen-
tral banks of participating Member States from the financial year 
2002 (ECB/2001/16), OJ L 337, 20.12.2001, pp. 55-61
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From 2002 until 2007 the intra-system balances 
arising from the allocation of euro banknotes will 
be adjusted in order to avoid significant changes in 
NCBs’ relative income positions as compared with 
previous years. The adjustments are effected by 
taking into account the differences between the 
average value of banknotes in circulation of each 
NCB in the period between July 1999 and June 
2001 and the average value of banknotes that 
would have been allocated to them during that pe-
riod under the ECB’s capital key. The adjustments 
will be reduced in annual stages until the end of 
2007, after which income on banknotes will be al-
located fully in proportion to the NCBs’ paid-up 
shares in the ECB’s capital.
The interest income and expense on these bal-
ances is cleared through the accounts of the ECB 
and is disclosed under “Net interest income”.
The Governing Council of the ECB has decided 
that the seigniorage income of the ECB arising 
from the 8% share of euro banknotes allocated to 
the ECB shall be distributed separately to the 
NCBs in the form of an interim distribution of 
profit (4). It shall be so distributed in full unless the 
ECB’s net profit for the year is less than its income 
earned on euro banknotes in circulation. For 2002, 
one interim distribution was made on the second 
working day of 2003. This is disclosed in the Profit 
and Loss Account under “Income from equity 
shares and participating interests”. From 2003 on-
wards, interim distributions will be made after the 
end of each quarter.
Intra-Eurosystem balances
Intra-Eurosystem balances arise from the 
Banco de España’s participating interest in the 
ECB, claims equivalent to the reserves trans-
ferred to the ECB, the net balance resulting from 
the transfers issued and received by TARGET (5) 
among the national central banks of the ESCB, 
including the ECB, and the balances resulting 
from allocation of euro banknotes within the 
Eurosystem.
The intra-Eurosystem balances arising from the 
allocation of euro banknotes within the Eurosys-
tem are included as a net single asset or liability 
under “Net claim/liability related to the allocation 
of euro banknotes within the Eurosystem” (see 
“Banknotes in circulation” in the notes on account-
ing policies).
Recognition of income and expenses
Income and expenses are recognised in the pe-
riod in which they accrue.
Realised gains and realised and unrealised losses 
are taken to the profit and loss account. To calculate 
the acquisition cost of items sold, the average cost 
method is used for securities and the daily net aver-
age cost method is used for foreign currencies and 
gold. In the case of unrealised losses on any item at 
year-end, its average cost is reduced to the end-of-
year market price and/or exchange rate.
Unrealised gains are not recognised as income, 
but are transferred to a revaluation account.
Unrealised losses are taken to the profit and loss 
account if they exceed previous revaluation gains 
recorded in the corresponding revaluation account, 
and are not reversed in subsequent years against 
new unrealised gains. Unrealised losses in any one 
security or currency or in gold are not netted 
against unrealised gains in other securities or cur-
rencies.
Premiums or discounts on purchased securities 
are calculated and shown as interest income and ac-
crued over the remaining life of the securities con-
cerned, according to the internal rate of return 
method.
Pension scheme
Contributions to an external pension fund by 
employees who, having joined the Bank after 
31.1.1986, are eligible to and do participate in the 
Pension Scheme, are established at 6.5% of the so-
called “regulating salary”, consisting of the salary 
items determined in the Scheme Rules. The 
amounts contributed by the Bank are recognised 
as a current expense in the year to which they re-
late.
(4) Decision of the European Central Bank of 21 November 
2002 on the distribution of the income of the ECB on euro bank-
notes in circulation to the NCBs of the participating Member 
States (ECB/2002/9).
(5) Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement 
Express Transfer system.
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Off-balance-sheet positions (6)
Foreign exchange forward transactions and for-
ward legs of foreign exchange swaps are included in 
the net foreign currency positions in order to calcu-
late foreign exchange gains and losses.
Interest rate futures are revalued on an item-by-item 
basis and treated in a similar manner to securities.
Profits and losses arising from off-balance-sheet 
positions are recognised and treated in a similar 
manner to those arising from on-balance-sheet as-
sets and liabilities.
Post-balance-sheet events
Assets and liabilities are adjusted to reflect 
events that occur between the annual balance sheet 
date and the date on which the Governing Council 
formulates the financial statements if such events 
materially affect the asset-liability position.
II.2. NOTES ON THE BALANCE SHEET
1. Gold and gold receivables
The Banco de España’s gold holdings amount to 
€5,499.85 million, consisting of 16,828 million troy 
ounces of fine gold valued at €326.83 per ounce (7). 
This amount is €198.95 million higher than at end-
2001, basically as a result of the rise in the market 
price of gold during the year (at end-2001 the price 
per ounce was €314.99), the number of ounces hav-
ing remained unchanged during the year, except for 
slight differences arising from deposit and swap 
transactions.
2. Receivables from the IMF
These include: a) Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) 
within the reserve tranche (€1,517.64 million) which 
include the net International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
position (€1,517.64 million) and the euro tranche 
position and its balancing account (€2,464.60 million, 
with a positive and negative sign); b) SDRs at the IMF 
(€337.12 million), and c) other claims against the IMF 
(€65.62 million). In total, receivables from the IMF 
decreased by €37.62 million, with respect to end-
2001, as a result of a net increase of €161.96 million 
in investments and a reduction of €199.58 in the 
overall position due to variation in the exchange rate. 
There was no change in Spain’s IMF quota in 2002. 
SDRs are valued at the year-end market rate, 
calculated by the ECB for all the Eurosystem na-
tional central banks, of €1 = SDR 0.7714.
3.  Balances with banks and security 
investments, external loans and other 
external assets
This sub-item includes security investments, bal-
ances with banks, loans and other claims on non-
euro area residents denominated in foreign currency. 
Their total amount is €30,427.36 million, with the 
following breakdown:
At end-2002, 99.97% of the foreign-currency bal-
ances with foreign banks, security investments and 
loans denominated in foreign currency were de-
nominated in US dollars. The equivalent value in eu-
ros of this US dollar amount was transferred to the 
balance sheet at the year-end market exchange rate 
(€1 = USD 1.0487).
“External loans and other external assets” in-
clude, inter alia, certain assets amounting to €10.07 
million considered to be of doubtfully recoverable. 
Country-risk and other provisions have been re-
corded for the full amount of these assets.
(6) The net position under foreign exchange forward transac-
tions and swaps, and the foreign-exchange gains and losses gener-
ated by such position are shown in the balance sheet under sub-
items 11.4 on the assets side and 12.1 on the liabilities side, de-
pending on their sign.
(7) One troy ounce is equal to 31.1035 grams.
Type of asset 2002 2001
( m)
Balances with banks                              3,929.91              735.06
Security investments (8)                      26,301.63         30,432.89
External loans and other external
 assets                                                    201.05              238.81
 Loan provisions                                     –10.07              –11.95
Non-euro area banknotes                             4.85                  4.18
   TOTAL                                       30,427.36         31,398.99
(8) As at 31 December 2002, repurchase agreements were 
constituted over part of the USD-denominated securities portfo-
lio, with a market value of USD 1,119.43 million, under automat-
ed security lending contracts with the depositories of these secu-
rities. Automated security lending contracts allow the depository 
to lend the securities to a third party in overnight operations 
under the limits established in the contract.
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The decrease in the balance of this item 
(€971.63 million) was basically due to the net effect 
of the factors listed in the following table:
4.  Claims on non-euro area residents 
denominated in euro. Balances with 
banks, security investments and loans
Substantially all the €475.05 million balance of 
this sub-item relates to the purchase in 2002 of se-
curities issued in euros by international agencies 
outside the euro area.
5.  Lending to euro area credit institutions 
related to monetary policy operations 
denominated in euro
This item includes the amount, classified by type 
of operation, of the euro-denominated lending to 
euro area credit institutions through which mone-
tary policy is implemented.
The balance as at 31 December 2002 was 72.6% 
higher than in 2001 (€18,203.30 million in 2002, as 
against €10,546.69 million in 2001). The average dai-
ly flow of financing extended during the year rose by 
7.81% from €13,709.67 million in 2001 to 
€14,780.41 in 2002.
82.80% of the average daily financing balance was 
extended through “Main refinancing operations”, 
16.98% was granted under “Longer-term refinancing 
operations” to provide additional longer-term fi-
nancing to credit institutions, and only 0.22% of the 
average annual balance was financed through other 
instruments.
6.  Other claims on euro area credit 
institutions denominated in euro.
This item includes claims on credit institutions 
unrelated to monetary policy operations. Its balance 
of €8.17 million includes the amount of the corre-
spondent accounts in euro with euro area credit in-
stitutions. Also, as a significant event in the year, it 
should be mentioned that on 1 January 2002 credit 
institutions were granted €10,325.39 million of in-
terest-free loans recorded in this item, which will be 
repaid in three instalments of €3,441.80 million 
each on 2, 23 and 30 January. These loans were 
granted under the “linear debiting model” estab-
lished in Guideline of the European Central Bank 
ECB/2001/1 of 10 January 2001 adopting certain 
provisions on the 2002 cash change-over.
7.  General government debt denominated 
in euro.
a) State
This item includes loans which, by virtue of their 
respective laws of creation, were granted to the 
State prior to the entry into force of Law 21/1993 
of 29 December 1993 on the State budget for 1994. 
Transitional provision seven of this Law states that 
the terms and maturities originally established in 
such loans shall be maintained and, in the absence 
thereof, they shall be repaid on a straight-line basis 
within twenty-five years, by means of annual pay-
ments as from 1999.
The outstanding balance as at 31 December 
2002 of the loans granted to the State amounted to 
€8,359.21 million, broken down as follows:
The change was solely due to yearly repayments 
on the above-mentioned loans, as specified in the 
above table.
b) Social Security System
This sub-item (€1,408.69) corresponds to the 
outstanding amount of two loans granted to the 
( m)
Net purchase/sale of foreign currency                           2,103.17
Increase in the outstanding gold swaps position
 at year-end                                                                     165.65 
Increase in the market price of foreign securities             307.80
Change in the market exchange rate                           –4,992.67
Gain/loss on sale of securities and futures                       357.25
Foreign-currency-denominated interest income             1,087.17
   TOTAL                                                                   –971.63
Breakdown of the change
31.12.2002 Repay-ment 31.12.2001
( m)
Treasury. Law 3/1983 special
account                                           2,147.76     97.63    2,245.39
Treasury. Law  4/1990 special
account                                           5,558.38   347.40    5,905.78
Credits arising from subscription
for participating interests,
contributions and quotas in
international agencies                       653.07     40.82       693.89
   TOTAL                                    8,359.21   485.84    8,845.06
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Social Security System under Law 41/1994 of 30 
December 1994 on the State budget for 1995. The 
first includes the principal of another loan granted 
to this institution, which was not paid on its maturi-
ty, of €1,539.19 million, and the second includes the 
interest due but not paid on the previous loan to 
31.12.1994, amounting to €501.90 million. The re-
payment of the first loan, by means of twenty annual 
instalments starting in 2000, is treated in the same 
way as established for the repayment of special 
loans granted to the Sate, referred to above. The 
loan for interest due to 31 December 1994 is being 
repaid on a straight-line basis over ten years, the 
first instalment having been made on 31 December 
1995.
€76.96 million of the reduction in the balance 
of this item in 2001 (€127.15 million) corresponds 
to receipt of the third repayment instalment on 
the loan of €1,539.19. The remaining €50.19 mil-
lion corresponds to receipt of the eighth repay-
ment instalment on the loan of €501.90 million. 
The amount of this payment was recovered by 
means of set-off against some of the amounts due 
to the Social Security System in respect of interest 
payable on its interest-bearing accounts with the 
Banco de España.
8. Intra-Eurosystem claims
a) Participating interest in ECB
The fully paid-up subscription of the Banco de 
España to the capital of the ECB amounts to 
€444.68 million, which is equal to a share of 8.8935% 
in such capital. This percentage, which remained un-
changed during the year, corresponds to the Banco 
de España in accordance with the capital key estab-
lished by the European Commission on the basis of 
Spain’s population and GNP.
b)  Claims equivalent to the transfer of foreign 
reserves to the ECB
Pursuant to Article 30 of the Statute of the 
ESCB/ECB, the Banco de España transferred foreign 
reserve assets to the value of €4,446.75 million to 
the ECB at the beginning of 1999. These claims are 
equivalent to this transfer.
c)  Net claims related to the allocation of euro 
banknotes within the Eurosystem
See Note 22 on the balance sheet.
d) Other claims within the Eurosystem (net)
The balance of €18,269.71 million reflects the 
position of the Banco de España vis-à-vis the ECB, in 
respect of the transfers issued and received through 
TARGET by the national central banks of the ESCB, 
including the ECB. This sub-item also includes the 
balances held with the Eurosystem NCBs through 
correspondent accounts, which constitute an insig-
nificant part of the total, and the Banco de España’s 
position vis-à-vis the ECB in respect of the interim 
dividend receivable relating to the euro banknotes 
issued by the ECB.
From 30 November 2000, the balances arising 
from TARGET transfers vis-à-vis the Eurosystem 
banks, and vis-à-vis other European Union banks, 
have been netted and replaced by a single balance 
vis-à-vis the ECB. The year-end balance of 
€18,203.17 million represents 99.64% of the total of 
this balance sheet sub-item.
9. Tangible and intangible fixed assets
The balance of this sub-item amounted to 
€208.91 million at end-2002, of which €413.27 mil-
lion related to cost and €204.36 to accumulated 
depreciation.
The breakdown of this sub-item into its compo-
nents, together with their accumulated depreciation 
is as follows:
Accumulated
depreciation
Property 
and
facilities
Furniture 
and
equipment
Fixed assets 
under
construction
Other 
fixed
assets
Total
( m)
1 January 2002  107.84       63.34           —        18.18      189.36
Change during
the year               8.64         3.64           —          2.72        15.00
31 December
2002                116.48       66.98           —        20.89      204.36
Cost or valuation
Property 
and
facilities
Furniture 
and
equipment
Fixed assets 
under
construction
Other
fixed
assets
Total
( m)
1 January 2002   233.55      84.70      20.91        84.59      423.75
Additions                 1.55      29.19      10.03          6.00        46.77
Disposals                 0.20        7.46      20.94        28.64        57.24
31 December
2002                 234.90    106.43      10.00        61.95      413.27
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The decrease in fixed assets was due to the sale 
of the Bank’s total holdings of silver, which had been 
included until disposal in “Other fixed assets” 
(€28.48 million). The rest of the fixed assets in-
creased by €3.01 million in the year.
As a result of the Banco de España’s decision to 
restructure its branch network, a protocol was signed 
with the Ministry of Finance providing for transfer of 
the buildings housing the 30 branches to be closed.
10. Other financial assets
99.98% of the balance of this sub-item relates to 
the portfolio of book-entry domestic State securities, 
in which the Banco de España has €4,402.24 million 
invested, €831.12 million more than a year earlier. 
This increase is basically due to a net purchase of se-
curities (€697.31 million), as well as to the net unre-
alised gains recorded at year-end (€115 million) and 
to accrued implicit interest (€18.81 million).
A post-balance sheet event calling for comment 
is the Banco de España’s participation in the capital 
increase of Sociedad de Gestión de los Sistemas de 
Registro, Compensación y Liquidación de Valores, 
S.A. (formerly Promotora para la Sociedad de 
Gestión de los Sistemas Españolas de Liquidación, 
S.A.) through non-monetary contributions of the 
means and resources referred to in Law 44/2002 of 
22 November on Financial System Reform Meas-
ures. In exchange, the Bank received 4,451 shares 
which, together with those already held in the 
former company, amount to 39.39% of the capital.
11.  Off-balance-sheet instruments 
revaluation differences
This sub-item includes the amount of the net 
debtor position arising from foreign-exchange for-
ward and swap transactions valued at the exchange 
rates prevailing at the end of the year. When this 
position is a creditor one, as was the case in 2001, it 
is recorded under the same heading in liability sub-
item 12.1. The end-2002 balance of €369.25 million 
is the net value of the forward transactions and cur-
rency swaps outstanding as at that date.
12. Accruals and prepaid expenses.
The main components of the total balance of 
this sub-item (€638.62 million) are accrued interest 
receivable on securities, deposits and other assets 
denominated in foreign currency (€243.42 million), 
on book-entry domestic State securities (€126.51 
million), on the claims equivalent to the transfer of 
foreign reserves to the ECB (€125.28 million) and 
on the net balance of claims within the Eurosystem 
arising from transfers made through TARGET 
(€58.90 million).
13. Sundry
The most significant component is the transfer 
made to the Treasury on 4 November 2002 of 
€1,156.34 million, equivalent to 70% of the Bank’s 
recorded profits earned to 30 September 2002.
The other major component is the home loans 
granted to employees, the balance of which amounts 
to €113.35 million.
14. Banknotes in circulation
The balance of banknotes in circulation includes 
the Banco de España’s share in the total euro bank-
notes in circulation (see «Banknotes in circulation» 
in the notes on accounting policies) and the peseta-
denominated banknotes not yet exchanged as at 
31.12.2002.
Of the above-mentioned balance (€37,505.32 
million), €36,217.59 million are the euro corre-
sponding to the Banco de España in application of 
the key for allocation of euro banknotes within the 
Eurosystem (10.1020% of total issued banknotes af-
ter deducting those corresponding to the ECB, 
which are 8% of the total). The remainder, €1,287.73 
million, relates to peseta-denominated banknotes 
not exchanged as at year-end. In compliance with 
the resolution of the Governing Council of the ECB 
of 5 December 2002, these peseta banknotes were 
removed from this balance sheet item on 1 January 
2003 and included in «Other liabilities – Sundry».
15.  Liabilities to euro area credit 
institutions related to monetary policy 
operations denominated in euro
The overall balance of the different types of 
deposit held by credit institutions with the Banco 
de España amounted to €9,291.35 million at end-
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2002. The decrease with respect to the previous 
year was concentrated in current accounts (cover-
ing the minimum reserve system), which fell from 
12,273.21 million at 31.12.01 to €9,271.35 million 
at 31.12.02. This decline was because at end-2001 
credit institutions needed financing to pay for one-
third of the euro banknotes and coins frontloaded 
on the first working day of 2002. The average an-
nual balance of this item in 2002 amounted to 
€11,163.43 million, 7.3% higher than in 2001 
(€10,401.04 million).
16.  Other liabilities to euro area credit 
institutions denominated in euro
Although at end-2002 this sub-item did not have 
a balance, it should be mentioned that until 31 De-
cember 2001 it included cash deposits of €2,451.79 
million placed by credit institutions to secure that 
part of the euro banknotes and coins frontloaded 
up to that date not covered by the existing loan 
agreements collateralised by securities. These de-
posits were progressively cancelled throughout Janu-
ary 2002 as payments were made for the frontload-
ed euro banknotes and coins.
17.  Liabilities to other euro area residents 
denominated in euro. General 
government
This sub-item includes the deposits held by gen-
eral government with the Banco de España. The 
outstanding balance at year-and was €14,022.99 mil-
lion, which breaks down as follows:
The rise in the balance of this sub-item 
(€1,784.95 million) was basically due to the in-
crease in the balances held by the Social Security 
System.
18.  Liabilities to other euro area residents 
denominated in euro. Other liabilities
Included here are the current accounts of financial 
institutions other than credit institutions, such as the 
Deposit Guarantee Funds, other financial intermediar-
ies associated with securities markets settlement, other 
intermediaries in the debt book-entry market, etc., as 
well as the current accounts of employees and pen-
sioners and other accounts of legal entities classified in 
“Other resident non-financial sectors”. The balance at 
end-2002 was €1,192.27 million, an increase of 
€140.65 million on end-2001, basically due to the in-
crease in the balances of the current accounts of “State 
agencies – Regional agencies” (€99.37 million).
19.  Liabilities to non-euro area residents 
denominated in euro
This item basically includes the balances of euro 
accounts held by international agencies and central 
banks that do not belong to the euro area. The bal-
ance of €48.25 million was €13.49 million lower 
than a year earlier.
20.  Liabilities to non-euro area residents 
denominated in foreign currency. 
Deposits, balances and other liabilities
Substantially all of the €1,371.23 million balance 
of these liabilities at end-2002 related to debts aris-
ing under repurchase agreements relating to the 
management of the foreign-currency reserves of the 
Banco de España. The total amount of this sub-item 
rose by €1,073.10 million.
21.  Counterpart of special drawing rights 
allocated by the IMF
This item of €387.34 million shows the amount 
of the special drawing rights allocated to Spain in 
proportion to its IMF quota.
22. Intra-Eurosystem liabilities
a)  Net liabilities related to the allocation of euro 
banknotes within the Eurosystem
This item consists of the claims and liabilities of 
the Banco de España vis-à-vis the Eurosystem in re-
2002 2001
( m)
Central government (State)                   2,798.26                        2,793.60
Treasury current account                      299.89                           394.98
Other central government
agencies and similar bodies           2,498.36                        2,398.62
Territorial government                                 87.97                             80.21
Regional (autonomous)
governments, administrative
agencies and similar bodies                81.20                             76.45
Local government                                     6.78                               3.77
Social security funds                           11,136.76                        9,364.23
   TOTAL                                       14,022.99                      12,238.04
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lation to the allocation of euro banknotes within the 
Eurosystem (see “Banknotes in circulation” and “In-
tra-Eurosystem balances” in the notes on account-
ing policies).
b) Other liabilities within the Eurosystem (net)
This sub-item includes the net position vis-à-vis 
the ECB arising from the contribution and allocation 
of monetary income in the Eurosystem (see “Net 
result of pooling of monetary income” in note 6 on 
the profit and loss account).
23. Items in course of settlement
Of the total balance of this item (€44.97 million), 
€40.66 corresponds to transfers ordered by credit 
institutions pending payment at year-end. These 
transfers also account for most of the decrease with 
respect to 2001 (€37.66 million out of a total of 
€45.09 million).
24.  Other liabilities. Off-balance-sheet 
instruments revaluation differences
See note 11 on the balance sheet.
25.  Other liabilities. Accruals and income 
collected in advance
The most significant components of this 
sub-item totalling €320.30 million are interest 
accrued but not yet paid (€223.08 million) and 
ordinary and pre-system profits. The latter are 
attributable to the sale of foreign currencies 
under forward transactions pending execution 
(€91.24 million) and are therefore considered 
unrealised until the transactions mature and are 
executed.
26. Other liabilities. Sundry
The most important components of this sub-
item are the contributions payable to the Banco de 
España employee social welfare scheme (Mutualidad 
de empleados), which amounted to €340.75 million, 
down €20.38 million on the previous year, and the 
“Settled credit interest pending allocation”, corre-
sponding to a loan granted in the past to the Social 
Security System, with a balance at year-end of 
€100.39 million, down €50.19 million on the previ-
ous year (9).
27. Provisions
With the exception of country-risk provisions, 
which are presented in the balance sheet as reduc-
tions of the value of the assets concerned, provi-
sions are recorded under this item, with the follow-
ing breakdown:
The most important provision relates to pre-
system exchange rate risks. It was created by a res-
olution of the Executive Commission of 26 January 
1999 to cover exchange rate risks affecting the ex-
ternal reserves of the Banco de España. It should be 
pointed out that the balance of this account was 
held unchanged in 2002 as authorised by the Execu-
tive Commission on 24 September 2002, while the 
risk of unrealised losses on the reserves transferred 
to the ECB disappeared. As a result, the level of cov-
erage of the Bank’s foreign exchange position in-
creased.
The increase of €136.12 million in the other 
provisions was basically due to coverage of pay-
ments to be made in the coming years for early re-
tirements agreed by the Banco de España with its 
employees in August 2002, as a result of the closure 
of 30 Bank branches between 31.12.2002 and 
31.12.2004.
28. Revaluation accounts
These accounts represent revaluation reserves 
arising from unrealised gains on financial assets and 
liabilities. Their breakdown is as follows:
2002 2001
( m)
For exchange rate risks–Pre-system
account                                                 3,767.58     3,767.58
For early and regular retirement               128.78               —
For sundry liabilities and charges             107.94        100.54
For other risks                                                0.22            0.28
   TOTAL                                          4,004.53     3,868.40
(9) This loan is referred to in Note 7.b) above.
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The difference between the pre-system and 
ordinary revaluation accounts is that the former 
record the unrealised gains existing at end-1998 
(immediately before the start of Stage Three of 
EMU) and the latter those arising since that 
date.
The decline of €151.17 million in the balance of 
the pre-system revaluation accounts in 2001 has the 
following breakdown:
The balance of the ordinary revaluation accounts 
decreased by €3,687.85 million, with the following 
breakdown:
29. Capital
The capital of the Banco de España, constituted 
in accordance with the provisions of Royal Legisla-
tive Decree 18/1962 of 7 June 1962, totalled 
EUR1.37 million and remained unchanged during the 
year.
30.  Reserves
Included in this sub-item, which remained un-
changed during the year, is the amount of capital, 
reserves and profits that arose in 1973 when the 
now-defunct Spanish Foreign Currency Institute was 
included in the Banco de España.
31. Profit for the year
The net profit for the year, after deducting the 
transfer to the Beneficent-Social Fund (€4.40 mil-
lion), amounted to €2,196.25 million, down 54.2% 
on 2001. Of this amount, €1,156.34 million was paid 
to the Treasury on 4 November 2002, in accordance 
with Royal Decree 1080/2002 of 22 October 2002.
The following amounts were also paid to the 
Treasury during the year out of the profit for 2001.
a) On 1.2.2002, €2,055.78 million, in order to 
reach 90% of the profit for 2001 (€4,793.49 
million).
b) On 26.7.2002, once the Balance Sheet and 
Profit and Loss Account for the year 2001 had 
been approved by the Council of Ministers, 
€479.35 million, representing the rest of the 
profit for 2001.
The details of the various components of the 
profit for 2001 are given in Section II.3 below, relat-
ing to the profit and loss account.
II.3.  NOTES ON THE PROFIT AND LOSS 
ACCOUNT
1. Interest income
This item includes income from interest accrued 
on the main assets of the Banco de España. It was 
made up, in 2002 and 2001, as follows:
Pre-system revaluation accounts      3,727.85           3,879.02
Due to exchange rate differences         909.43              980.19
Due to price differences                     2,818.43           2,898.83
Gold                                                  2,565.39           2,565.53
Securities denominated in foreign
currencies                                                2.47                11.55
Book-entry public debt                        250.57              321.75
Ordinary revaluation accounts           3,100.69           6,788.54
Due to exchange rate differences         638.11           4,949.37
Due to price differences                     2,462.58           1,839.17
Gold                                                  1,353.99           1,154.81
Securities denominated in foreign
 currencies                                        896.68              588.42
Book-entry public debt                        210.94                95.94
Other                                                       0.97                     —
    TOTAL                                        6,828.55         10,667.56
2002Type of account 2001
( m)
Breakdown of change  m
Due to exchange rate differences                          –4,311.26
Due to price differences                                              623.41
Gold                                                                           199.18
Securities denominated in foreign currencies          308.26
Book-entry public debt                                              115.00
Other                                                                             0.97
      TOTAL                                                         –3,687.85
Total
Breakdown of the
change in 2002
Due to the 
realisation 
of capital 
gains in
sales and 
redemptions
Due to
netting 
against
unrealised 
capital
losses
( m)
Due to exchange rate differences    –45.57     –25.19        –70.76
Due to price differences                   –80.40            —        –80.40
Gold                                                  –0.14            —          –0.14
Securities denominated
in foreign currencies                     –9.09            —          –9.09
Book-entry public debt                   –71.18            —        –71.18
   TOTAL                                  –125.97     –25.19      –151.17
Pre-system revaluation accounts
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As regards the interest on foreign-currency in-
vestments (€1,110.68 million), the majority 
(€1,004.72 million, equivalent to 90.46%) arose from 
investments denominated in US dollars, which had 
an average balance of USD 27,533.11 million and an 
average yield of 3.7%, compared with 5.6% in 2001. 
The rest of the interest arose from much less sig-
nificant investments in SDRs, Canadian dollars and 
other smaller investments in other currencies.
The interest on euro-denominated investments 
(€1,592.64 million) arose from the following assets:
Of the decrease in total euro-denominated in-
terest income (€574.44 million), nearly 80% was due 
to the fall in the average return on these assets 
(down from 4.3% in 2001 to 3.4% in 2002) and the 
remainder was due to the decline in the average in-
vestment (€49,160.06 in 2001). It should also be 
noted that interest of €43.19 million was earned on 
the days in 2002 when there was a net debit balance 
in the Eurosystem accounts related to the allocation 
of banknotes within the Eurosystem.
2. Interest expense
This item includes interest expenditure on liabili-
ties, with the following breakdown:
The decrease in the expense compared with 
the previous year (€9.88 million) was primarily 
due to the fall in the average cost of financing re-
ceived (3.2% in 2002 compared with 4.3% in 
2001) – which was main reason for the lower 
cost of minimum reserves (€84.59 million) and of 
general government deposits (€70.01 million) – 
and, to a lesser extent, to the lower interest paid 
on foreign currency liabilities (€40.95). These de-
creases in expenses were offset by the amount of 
the remuneration earned on the days when there 
was a net debit balance in the Eurosystem ac-
counts related to the allocation of banknotes 
within the Eurosystem, which amounted to 
€182.84 million.
3.  Realised gains/losses arising 
from financial operations
This item includes the profits and losses arising 
from dealing in financial assets. In 2002, there was a 
net realised gain of €727.99 million, basically arising 
from the following sources:
— Foreign exchange gains upon the sale of foreign 
currency totalling €361.32 million, of which 
€292.60 million corresponded to the profit for 
the year and the rest, €68.72 million, to the re-
alisation of unrealised gains existing as at 
31.12.1998.
  Of the above-mentioned €361.32 million, 
€195.08 million arose from the sale of US dol-
lars, which amounted to €886.97 million in the 
year, and €138.08 million from forward opera-
tions. The other gains basically related to the net 
sale of SDRs (€20.02 million) and other foreign 
currencies (€8.14 million).
Foreign currency
2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001
Euro Total
( m)
Securities             949.52  1,659.58      179.06     175.04   1,128.58  1,834.62
Other assets        161.16     183.94   1,413.58  1,992.04   1,574.73  2,175.98
  TOTAL       1,110.68  1,843.52   1,592.64  2,167.08   2,703.31  4,010.60
Average
investmentAssets Amount
Average
yield
in 2002
( m and %)
Loans to institutions related
to monetary policy
operations                              14,780.42      493.97           3.3%
Net balance with the ECB
arising from TARGET
operations                              22,508.95      746.06           3.3%
Net balance with the ECB
arising from accounts
related to the allocation
of euro banknotes within
the Eurosystem                        1,290.53        43.19           3.3%
Claims equivalent
to the transfer of foreign
reserves                                   4,446.75      125.28           2.8%
Book-entry debt portfolio            3,669.69      178.70           4.8%
Other                                                      —          5.44          —
    TOTAL                           46,696.34   1,592.64           3.4%
Average
financing
Interest expense
2002 2001
Average
cost
in 2002
( m and %)
Remuneration of minimum
reserves                                      11,163.43   367.88      452.47        3.3%
General government deposits        11,883.92   386.30      456.31        3.3%
Net balance with the ECB
arising from accounts related
to the allocation of euro
banknotes within the
Eurosystrem                                  5,514.97   182.84              —        3.3%
Liabilities denominated in foreign
currency                                           802.79     15.78        29.49        1.9%
Other euro- and foreign-currency-
denominated liabilities                              —       3.39        27.80       —
   TOTAL                                  29,365.11   956.19      966.07        3.2%
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— The net price-related gains arising from the pur-
chase and sale of foreign securities amounted to 
€358.16 million and related in full to the sale of 
US dollar-denominated securities.
  Of the total of €358.16 million, €349.07 million 
corresponds to gains arising and realised in 2002 
and the rest (€9.09 million) to the realisation of 
unrealised gains existing as at 31 December 
1998,
Compared with the previous year, the net profit 
on these transactions fell by €1,320.08 million, of 
which €1,294.73 million related to the decrease in 
foreign exchange gains and €25.35 million to the 
decline in gains arising from price movements
— The decrease in foreign exchange gains basically 
arose from the depreciation of the US dollar 
against the euro and the lower volume of sales 
of US dollars (USD 3,899.00 million in 2001 
compared with USD 886.97 million in 2002). In 
addition, gains on forward operations in US 
dollars were €253.28 million lower in 2002 
than in 2001, when they amounted to €391.36 
million.
— The decrease in gains arising from price move-
ments basically arose on the sales of fixed-in-
come securities denominated in US and Canadi-
an dollars owing, in the first case, to the realisa-
tion of lower pre-system gains and, in the second 
case, to the absence of any sales of this currency 
in 2002.
4.  Net income from fees and 
commissions
This basically includes income and expenses aris-
ing from fees and commissions for banking services 
and the like (transfers, handling of cheques, custody 
and administration of securities, telephone service 
for securities transactions, etc.). It may be broken 
down as follows:
The increase in fee income in 2002 (21.3%) was 
mainly due to the rise in the rates charged on op-
erations via the Banco de España’s Settlement Serv-
ice.
5.  Income from equity shares 
and participating interests
Of the total amount of €228.65 million re-
corded, €226.58 million originates from the ECB, 
of which €160.03 million corresponds to the dis-
tribution in 2002 of the ECB’s profit for the year 
2001. Also included under this heading is the dis-
tribution of the ECB’s income on euro banknotes, 
which amounts to €66.54 million (see “Banknotes 
in circulation” in the notes on accounting poli-
cies).
6.  Net result of pooling of monetary 
income
In 2002 the amount of each NCB’s monetary in-
come was determined by multiplying the liability 
base of each NCB by the main refinancing opera-
tions rate. The liability base consists of the following 
items: banknotes in circulation (including both euro 
banknotes and non-returned national banknotes); li-
abilities to credit institutions related to monetary 
policy operations denominated in euro; net Intra-
Eurosystem liabilities resulting from TARGET trans-
actions; and net Intra-Eurosystem liabilities related 
to the allocation of euro banknotes within the Eu-
rosystem. Any interest paid on liabilities included 
within the liability base is to be deducted from the 
monetary income to be pooled. The monetary in-
come pooled by the Eurosystem is to be allocated 
among NCBs according to the subscribed capital 
key. The difference between the monetary income 
pooled by the Banco de España, amounting to EUR 
1,124.86 million, and reallocated to the Banco de 
España, amounting to €1,057.01 million, is the net 
result arising from the calculation of monetary in-
come.
7. Other income
This includes the income and losses that cannot 
be included in other items, as well as other diverse 
income of an exceptional nature. It may be broken 
down as follows:
Income
2002 2001 2002 2001
Expenses
( m)
Foreign operations               0.96        0.56        –1.18       –1.17
Domestic operations          15.92      13.35        –0.69       –0.49
    TOTAL                    16.88      13.91        –1.86       –1.66
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€71.18 million of the profit on the public-debt 
portfolio relates to pre-system profit arising from 
gains on debt redeemed in the year and the remain-
ing €5.39 million to profit for the year. In total, this 
profit was €45.98 million higher than that obtained 
in this connection in 2001.
The €67.70 million of extraordinary profit 
arose mainly as a result of the receipt from the 
Social Security System of interest accrued in 
previous years (€50.19 million) and of the sale of 
silver (€27.65 million), offset by the loss result-
ing from the increase in the provision to cover 
assistance for death and retirement (€5.91 mil-
lion) and by the loss on the exchange of bank-
notes that ceased to be legal tender between 
the date of publication of the Law of Autonomy 
of the Banco de España and 31.12.2001 (€6.91 
million).
8. Staff costs
This item increased by €13.24 million, basically 
due to the overtime that had to be worked because 
of the changeover from the peseta to the euro.
9.  Administrative expenses (10)
This item includes expenses arising from the 
purchase of current assets and of diverse services 
received during the year. The most important were 
office expenses (including IT costs), which amounted 
to €32.38 million, and costs relating to premises 
(especially maintenance), which amounted to €15.88 
million.
It breaks down as follows:
“Sundry operating expenses” include 
€112,165.04 (including VAT) relating to the fees of 
the external auditors PricewaterhouseCoopers, S.L. 
for the audits in 2002 of the Bank’s annual accounts 
and of the Bank’s management of European Central 
Bank reserves. This firm was also paid €159,068.48 
for the purchase of IT products and services.
10. Depreciation of fixed assets
Included here is the expense of the estimated 
depreciation of the Bank’s fixed assets, which breaks 
down as follows:
11. Banknote production services
This amount (€115.23 million) corresponds to 
payments made by the Banco de España to purchase 
banknotes, basically from the National Mint. The de-
crease with respect to the previous year (€51.74 
million) was attributable to the lower volume of 
euro-denominated banknotes acquired by the Bank, 
in comparison with the extraordinary volume that 
had to be purchased in 2001 to cater for the mas-
sive exchange of peseta banknotes from 1.1.2002.
12. Other expenses
This item includes extraordinary expenses aris-
ing from the peseta/euro exchange process, particu-
larly those relating to the cost of transport and dis-
tribution.
Description 2002 2001
( m)
Profit on book-entry public debt                76.57                30.59
Extraordinary profit                                     67.70                43.20
Sundry                                                          0.61                  1.23
   TOTAL                                           144.87                75.02
(10) Given that there is no explicit provision for non-income 
taxes in the harmonised ESCB profit and loss account format, 
these are included in this item.
Description 2002 2001
( m)
Office expenses                                            –32.38         –26.94
Property expenses                                        –15.88         –13.65
Transport and communications                       –5.65           –4.82
Surveillance and security                                –6.14           –5.52
Training and grants                                         –1.67           –1.68
Sundry operating expenses                            –8.19         –13.54
Local taxes                                                      –0.87           –0.81
   TOTAL                                                –70.78         –66.96
Description 2002 2001
( m)
Depreciation of property                                     –8.73        –8.78
Depreciation of transport equipment                  –0.26        –0.12
Depreciation of furniture and office equipment  –9.78        –7.30
Depreciation of computer applications               –2.49        –2.28
Other depreciable expenses                                     —        –0.02
    TOTAL                                                   –21.25      –18.50
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13.  Transfers and additions to other funds 
and provisions
The balance of this item at €175.43 million was 
€127.37 million higher than in the previous year, 
mainly because of transfers to special funds for fu-
ture early retirement payments relating to the 
Bank’s agreement with its employees in August 
2002 and other retirement provisions (€128.78 
million). Also included are expenses arising from 
payment commitments to the Banco de España 
Employee Social Welfare Scheme (€39.72 million), 
the transfer to the country-risk provision to cover 
100% of the loans extended under the bilateral 
agreement with Cuba (€2.38 million) and the con-
tribution to the Beneficent-Social Fund (€4.40 mil-
lion). Since the Banco de España provides financial 
services, it is not an institution with a high environ-
mental risk. In 2002 it was not considered neces-
sary to record any provision for environmental 
contingencies and expenses.
14. Profit for the year
As detailed and explained in the preceding notes, 
the net profit for 2002 amounted to €2,196.25 mil-
lion, down 54.2% on the previous year.
The table below shows that, pursuant to Royal 
Decree 1080/2002, €820.28 million was paid into 
the Treasury on 3 February 2003. This was the 
amount necessary, taking into account the advance 
payment of €1,156.34 million on 4 November 2002, 
to make a total payment of 90% of the Bank’s profit 
for the period ending 31.12.02.
III.  SPECIFIC INFORMATION REQUIRED 
BY ARTICLE 4 OF THE LAW 
OF AUTONOMY OF THE BANCO 
DE ESPAÑA
1.  Contributions made by the Bank to the 
Deposit Guarantee Funds (Article 4.2 of 
the Law of Autonomy of the Banco de 
España of 1 June 1994)
The contribution of the Banco de España to the 
Deposit Guarantee Funds is regulated by Article 3 
of Royal Decree 18/1982, according to the wording 
established by additional provision seven of Royal 
Legislative Decree 12/1995 of 28 December 1995 
and Royal Decree 2606/1996 of 20 December 1996, 
which implemented the legal regime for such funds.
The latter Royal Decree established that the De-
posit Guarantee Funds may only exceptionally be 
supplemented by contributions from the Banco de 
España, the amount of which shall be fixed by Law. In 
2002 the Banco de España made no contributions 
whatsoever to the Deposit Guarantee Funds.
2. Loss of profit
The table below shows the loans outstanding in 
2002 with interest rates below the reference rates 
used, in order to estimate the loss of profit for the 
year pursuant to the provisions of Article 4.2 of Law 
13/1994 of 1 June 1994 of Autonomy of the Banco 
de España.
Included under “Net State debt” is the average 
balance during the year, on a daily basis, of the spe-
cial loans granted to the State before 1994 and the 
deposits held by the Treasury with the Banco de Es-
( m)
1.  Profit for the year 2002                                               2,196.25
2.  Payments to the Treasury:
    — on 4.11.2002, 70% of profit as
      at 30.9.2002                                       1,156.34
    — on 3.2.2003, balance to raise
      the preceding amount to 90%
      of the profit for the year ending
      31.12.2002                                            820.28      1,976.62
3.  Profit pending payment
    to the Treasury (11)                                                       219.62
   TOTAL (2 + 3)                                                        2,196.25
(11) The remaining amount due shall be paid to the Treasury 
when the annual accounts for 2002 have been approved by the 
Government.
Estimated 
average 
balance
in 2002
Interest 
rate 
received
(%)
Reference 
interest 
rate
(%)
Estimated 
loss of
profit
( m and %)
Net State debt                     8,514.82          0.00         3.27  278.43
Loans to the Social
 Security System              1,535.50          0.00         3.27    50.21
Home loans and
 repayable advances
 to employees                      132.14          1.95         3.27      1.75
Home loans                         111.08          2.32         3.27      1.06
Repayable advances             21.06          0.00         3.27      0.69
    TOTAL                   10,182.46          0.02         3.27  330.39
Average balances of loans outstanding in 2002
with interest rates below the reference rates
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paña, when there is a net balance in favour of the 
latter. 
As regards the loans to the Social Security Sys-
tem, transitional provision six of Law 41/1994 of 30 
December 1994 on the 1995 State budget, when 
establishing the conditions for repayment of certain 
loans to the Social Security System, provided that 
no interest shall accrue on such loans as from 1 
January 1995.
The home loans and advances to employees are 
those granted under the Banco de España’s collec-
tive agreements with its personnel.
The reference rate used to estimate the loss of 
profit in all these loans is the monthly average of the 
interest rate on main refinancing operations during 
the year.
In 2002 mention should also be made of the 
non-remunerated loans granted on an exceptional 
basis to credit institutions on 1 January 2002 in ap-
plication of the Guideline approved for the Eurosys-
tem by the ECB’s Governing Council (ECB/2001/1) 
to finance the holdings of euro banknotes front-
loaded to them up to 31.12.2001 by all the national 
central banks. In Spain they amounted to €10,325.39, 
which was paid by the credit institutions in three 
equal instalments on 2, 23 and 30 January 2002.
In this case, application of the average daily rate 
on the main refinancing transactions to the daily out-
standing balance results in interest of €16.43 million.
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ANNEX
1. REPORT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITORS
AUDIT REPORT ON THE ANNUAL ACCOUNTS
To the Governor and Governing Council of the Banco de España
We have audited the annual accounts of the Banco de España, comprising the balance sheet as at 31 
December 2002, the profit and loss account and the notes on the accounts for the year then ended. 
The Governing Council of the Bank is responsible for the preparation of the accounts. It is our respon-
sibility to express an opinion on the annual accounts taken as a whole based on our audit conducted in 
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, which require examination, by means of selec-
tive tests, of the documentation supporting the annual accounts and evaluation of their presentation, of 
the accounting principles applied and the estimates made.
For comparison purposes, the attached annual accounts present, in addition to the 2002 figures, 
those for the previous year for each balance sheet and profit and loss account item. Our opinion refers 
solely to the 2002 annual accounts. Our audit report issued on 3 June 2002 on the 2001 annual ac-
counts contained an unqualified opinion. 
In our opinion, the attached 2002 annual accounts present, in all material respects, a true and fair 
view of the net worth and financial position of the Banco de España as at 31 December 2002 and of 
the results of its operations in the year then ended, and contain the required information, sufficient for 
their proper interpretation and comprehension, in conformity with the accounting principles and stand-
ards referred to in Section II.1 of the notes on the accounts, based on the accounting policies estab-
lished for the member central banks of the European System of Central Banks, which are consistent 
with those applied the previous year.
PricewaterhouseCoopers Auditores, S.L.
[signed]
José Wahnón Levy
Partner
29 May 2003
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2.  REPORT OF THE ACCOUNTS REVIEW 
COMMITTEE
We the undersigned, José Manuel González-
Páramo Martínez Murillo, Eduardo Bueno Campos 
and Jaime Requeijo González, members of the Gov-
erning Council of the Banco de España and of the 
Accounts Review Committee appointed by the 
Governing Council, were given the task of reviewing 
the accounts of the institution for the year 2002.
By virtue of this mandate, the Accounts Review 
Committee has analysed the operations of the Ban-
co de España. This examination basically involved: 1) 
studying the Annual Accounts of the Banco de Es-
paña for the year 2002, prepared by the Internal Af-
fairs Department of the Banco de España; 2) study-
ing the audit of the balance sheet and profit and loss 
account of the Banco de España for 2002, conducted 
by the Internal Audit Department; 3) studying the 
documentation requested by the members of this 
Committee from the independent external auditors; 
4) interviewing the persons responsible for the in-
dependent external audit, for the Internal Audit De-
partment and for the Control and Accounting De-
partment; and 5) making proposals for the modifica-
tion, correction or clarification of various matters, 
all of which have been satisfactorily incorporated in 
the Annual Accounts by the Control and Accounting 
Department.
The basic conclusion of our report is that from 
the analysis carried out of the examination and ac-
counting procedures, of the accounting records and 
of the internal controls in place, it can be inferred 
that the Annual Accounts for the year 2002 give a 
true and fair view of the net worth and financial po-
sition of the Banco de España.
Madrid, 28 May 2003.
D. JAIME REQUEIJO GONZÁLEZD. JOSÉ MANUEL GONZÁLEZ-PÁRAMO
MARTÍNEZ-MURILLO
D. EDUARDO BUENO CAMPOS
INDEXES
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